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I was interested in history while I was in school and I pursued 
this interest as a history student at the University of Tabriz 
where I graduated in history in 1973. Apart from a major part 
of our studies in history, which were about the Iranian and foreign 
dynasties, we had to study a great deal about the lives of 
individual Kings; but hardly any space was allocated to the history 
of social and political movements in Iran. The names of patriots 
and political thinkers such as Khiyaban1 were not, for political 
reasons, mentioned. These movements, however, no matter how 
briefly they were covered in our history books~ were still able to 
arouse my curiosity and interest in discovering more about these 
movements and their leaders. In 1977 I decided to undertake 
research in modern history. My decision coincided with social and 
political upheavals in Iran which resulted in the revolution of 
1979. This by itself strengthened my conviction that we must study 
and understand our history in its particular social and political 
content. That is to say revolts and revolutions are not something 
which appear suddenly, but are the product and result of historical 
developments in which peoples, as a living force, have taken part. 
These revolts and revolutions are, in fact, the manifestations of 
longstanding social injustices and oppressions which have been 
imposed on the people by despotic kings, irresponsible governments 
X 
and reactionary rulers. In recent social upheavals of Iran I 
witnessed how thousands of sincere people and patriots gave their 
lives and wished to free their country from age old backwardness. 
This reflected the continuation of the constitutional revolution 
and Khiyaban1 1 s uprising (1910-1920). Since my grandfather 
Mirza r~uhammad Tag1 Tabataba I i Khatamba!h~ was involved in the 
constitutional revolution and Khiyaban1 1 s uprising and I naturally 
had heard a lot about Khiyaban1 through my relatives, both personal 
curiosity and historical interest made me choose Khiyabani as the 
subject of my research. 
Some--books and articles have been written about Khiyaban1 which 
are either very superficial or based on misrepresentation. They 
are superficial because they have not attempted to explain why and 
how Khiyabani 1 s uprising began and the reasons for its success and 
failure and the role of central government in Tehran in this event 
is not examined. Khiyaban1 1 s original speeches and works have not 
been studied in depth. The opposition to ~iyabani 1 s uprisi-ng has 
misrepresented him in different ways. The most striking aspect of 
this is the fact that he has been accused by his political opponents 
over and over again of being a 11 Separatist 11 • Some historians have 
even either spelt Khiyaban1 1 s name wrongly or copied the errors of 
others. 
I came to Edinburgh and was accepted as a postgraduate student 
in October 1979, and then went to London where I studied and examined 
the British Foreign office archives and also studied in the British 
Library. Through the Edinburgh University Library I received some 
X1 
books and newspapers in Russian, French, English, Persian and Azari. 
Three times I travelled to Iran where I could consult the Iranian 
Parliamentary documents, newspapers, books and interviewed a 
number of Iranians who either participated in or had valuable 
memories of Khiyabani 1 s uprising. It is hoped, therefore, that 
the present study will shed a great deal of light upon a hitherto 




In this thesis we have attempted to describe and analyse the uprising 
of Shaykh Muhammad Khiyaban1 in Tabriz in 1920. The main purpose -- . -
is to show that contrary to the view often held, Khiyaban1 was a 
patriot whose Democratic Movement did not wish to separate 
Azerbayjan from Iran. This is illustr-ated clearly by his speeches. 
Khiyaban1's uprising is to be regarded as a continuation of the 
Constitutional Revolution of 1905. 
In the first chapter the social and political situation in 
Iran before the Constitutional Revolution is briefJy reviewed, and 
the Russian intervention in the internal affairs of Iran, the 
elements in the formation of the Constitutional Revolution and the 
gains and failures of the Constitutional Revolution are discussed. 
In the second chapter Khiyaban1's life and his political 
activities both in Azerbayjan and in Parliament are examined, and 
the nine months of fighting during 1908-9 between the 
constitutionalists and the government forces which was ended by 
the Russian occupation of Tabriz, are discussed. During this period 
all ~iyaban1's political activities were carried out secretly and 
the democratic movement went underground because of political 
suppression by the central government. 
In the third chapter we have shown how the withdrawal of Russian 
forces from Iran due to the October Revolution of 1917 gave the 
opportunity to Britain to establish herself as the sole foreign power 
... 
Xln 
in Iran by obtaining the Anglo-Persian Agreement of 1919. The 
nature of this agreement and most of the original correspondence 
between the British Embassy in Tehran and the Foreign Office in 
London have been examined, and the views of Khiyaban1 and also the 
views of other countries in regard to this agreement have been 
recorded and analysed. 
In the fourth chapter the reasons for Khiyaban1's uprising, his 
activities during this uprising, the manner in which his uprising 
was suppressed and what happened after Khiyaban1's death in 
Azerbayjan have been discussed. 
In the final chapter, our purpose is to illustrate the 
political views of Shay~ Mu~ammad _Khiyaban1 through his speeches. 
An attempt has also been made to give an overall picture of 
Khiyaban1's philosophy and outlook by using material from his 
speeches which were published in the Newspaper Tajaddud in Tabriz 
between 1917 and 1920. 
Certain material which is of interest but which we have been 
unable to utilise in the body of the thesis, in addition to some 
photographs, have been included in a number of appendices. 
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IRAN'S SOCIAL AND POLITICAL POSITION BEFORE THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
REVOLUTION 
The Qajar period marks a turning-point in the history of Iran. 
At the time of its establishment western influence was still almost 
non-existent. The Portuguese had attempted to dominate the trade 
of the Gulf at an earlier period, and from the time of Peter the 
Great onward the Russians had already shown signs of interest in 
expansion southward through Iranian territory, although in the late 
18th century the main concerns of the Russian Empire seemedto.l·ieelse-
In little more than a century, however, the aggressive 
policies of these two states were playing a vital role in Iran's 
internal affairs, and the country was virtually partitioned between 
them. Other states, notably Germany, were seeking a role in Iran 
also, and with the outbreak of the First World War the Ottomans also 
became briefly involved. 
By the beginning of the 20th century, Iran had become in reality, 
virtually a semi-colonised state under the control of Britain and 
Russia, whose interference was a factor in keeping Iran backward. 1 
1. See N. Fatimi. Diplomatic History of Persia, 1917-1923, p.244; 
M.S. Ivanov. ~ovezshay~ . lstoriya Irana • Tr. into Persian by 
Tizabi and Qayim Panah under the Persian title (Tarikh-i Nuvin-i 
Iran), p.lO; N.R. Keddie, 11 Iranian Politics 1900-1905: Background 
tl:EJ.1.§, . - - - - . 
to Revolution'~ p.6, and A. Qasimi, ~hi~ sal Inqilab-1 
Ma~ru~iyyat-i iran, p.4. 
The effect of Russian and English domination and in particular 
of the military aggressiveness of Russia turned the country into 
a battlefield of Western imperialism. 1 Unjust agreements, and 
licences and facilities for trading granted to Russia and Western 
European countries, opened Iran's gates to a flood of foreign products 
. d . I 2 and manufacturers, while foreign investment 1ncrease 1n ran. 
In theory, the emerging industries of Iran were invigorated by 
these development; in reality, this foreign investment further 
harmed Iran economically. It caused bankruptcy, dissatisfaction and 
deeper social inequality in Iranian society. The court was composed 
of people who had little understanding of political reality and only 
sought to bolster up their own position. 3 They held on to their 
wealth by imposing burdensome taxes on the people, especially the 
poor farmers. Those in power eventually had to find a further source 
of income. One lucrative source was the dealing in trading licences 
with foreign countries. 4 The increased income was often spent on 
frivolous pursuits or corruptly frittered away. 
1. See L.P. Elwell-Sutton, Modern Iran, p.59. 
M. Afshar, La Politique 
Europeenne en Perse, p.l89; F. Adamiyyat, Fikr-i Azad1 va Muqaddama-yi 
Nihzat-i Ma~rutiyyat, p.22, and for more details see, M. Ittihadiyya, . . -------
Gusha ha'i Az Ravabit-i Khariji-y; Iran, pp.40-51 . . -
2. See, A. Jahan Ban1, Marzha-yi fran va ~ura~, p.22 and for more 
details see A. Qasim1, QQ.cit. pp.5-7. 
3. See cA.A. Bina, Tarikh-i Siyas1 va o1plumas1-yi Iran, p.57; 
M.S. Ivanov, T.N.I., p. 14, and L.P. Elwell-Sutton, M. I., p.61. 
4. See E.G. Brown, The Persian Revolution 1905-1909, (Cambridge, 1910) p.57. 
M. McCarthy, Anglo-Russian Rivalry in Persia, p.37; and 
R. Ra'1s Niya and D. CA~uri, Zam1na-yi I~·tisadi va Ijtimac1-yi 
In~ilab-i Ma~ru~a-yi fran, p.26. 
2 
The guarantors for the repayment of loans raised by the court 
were the small cultivators and other lower classes who were in the 
power of their court and their masters. 1 The crippling loans which 
coincided with the arrival of foreign advisors affected the 
administration of customs, finance, the army and post~l services. 2 
The deals had two beneficial consequences for the foreign countries 
involved. Firstly, they could sell their products at their own 
prices, without paying any customs duties or taxes. Secondly, they 
had control of administration. 3 The court's practice of bestowing 
estates, towns and villages on landowners and feudal lords in return 
for money and gifts had regrettable results for the small farmers. 
A farmer could have his land confiscated or be deprived of water and 
seed. 4 Besides these misfortunes, they were obliged to pay fo~r-
fifths of their annual produce to their feudal overlands and masters. 
Sometimes they had to pay oil, butter, chicken and sheep to their 
masters. 5 
1. SeeR. Riza Zada-yi Malik, ~aydar Khan-i cAmu Ug~li, p.7, and 
Y. Aryan Pur, Az Saba Ta Nima Vol .2, p.51. 
2. See E.G. Browne, P.R., p. 104. 
3. See M.S. Ivanov, T.N.I., p.8. 
4. See A. Kirmani, Nama ha-yi Aqa Khan-i Kirmani, No. 16 (Tehran N.D.), 
and R. Rizazada-yi r~alik, Q2_.cit., p.7. 
5. See M. CAbbas1' Tar1!b_-i Inqilab-i Iran, p.41; cA.A. B1na, 
QE.cit., p.57, and R. Ra'1s Niya and o. cA~ur1, z.r.r., p.21. 
3 
When there was a famine and the amount of produce was reduced, 
the peasant farmers were sometimes forced to give their daughters 
to the overlords in lieu of the annual taxes. Thus for example 
"In 1905 the people of Quchan had not been able to pay 
their annual tax to their masters because of shortages, 
and the overlords accordingly took 300 Quchan1 girls and 
sold them to the Turkman chiefs." 1 
In villages, the overlords could rule independently. They were free 
2 to organise the local court, to pass judgements and bring charges. 
In a few parts of Iran such as Balu~istan and Fars, they could 
arrange the purchase and sale of slaves. Because of grinding poverty 
the people were obliged to live at subsistance level. 
and overlords, meanwhile, ~er~ living in luxury. 3 
Their rulers 
Famine and epidemics of cholera and plague occasionally spread 
throughout the country. The pitiful position of the people was made 
worse by the failure of many domestic industries because of ever 
increasing competition from foreign goods and products. This 
resulted in massive unemployment. Thousands of these unemployed 
people were forced to emigrate to escape from hunger and death. 
Every year they were obliged to emigrate to Russia and India. The 
number of these people at the beginning of the twentieth century was 
more than two hundred thousand. 4 
1. See M.N.I. Kirmani, Tarikh-i Bidari-yi Iran1yan, p.l98, and 
M T R.· - ~ • ... . 1 zvan 1 , Inqilab-i Ma~ru~iyyat, p.52. 
2. See A. Kasrav1, Tar1~-i Mashru~a-yi Iran, p.7; R. Ra'is N1ya and 
c- -D. A~uri, QE.cit., pp.12,18. 
3. See M.S. Ivanov, T.N.I., p.9, and A. Kasrav.1, T.M.I., p.287. 
4. See Mahnama -yi A~arbayjan, No. 10, (Tabriz, 1968). 
4 
The people left behind were at the mercy of their rulers, who 
frequently committed acts of barbarism, and people could be mutilated 
or hanged at a whim. Iranians thus suffered at the hands of their 
own rulers, and also suffered because of foreign intervention in 
l their country. 
RUSSIAN AND BRITISH INTERFERENCE IN IRAN•s INTERNAL AFFAIRS 
Owing to her important strategic and geographical situation lying as 
she does on the direct route between Europe and the East (India in 
particular); her rich and potential resources, and eventually 
because of her vital position in the Gulf, Iran suffered greatly from 
the attentions of the two major powers of the nineteenth century. 
From the time of Peter the Great, Russia has wished to bring 
into reality her dreams of having access to the warm and open waters 
of the Persian Gulf, one of the most important routes in the world 
in fact. Equally, the reason Britain attempted to establish a 
position within Iran was to protect her rich colony of India by 
transforming Iran into a strong-point against foreign interference. 2 
1. See Hon. J.M. Balfour·, Recent Happenings in Persia, p.76; 
J. Malcolm, History of Persia, Vol.2, p.300; A. Qasim1, op.cit., 
p.5, and M.S. Ivanov, T.N.I., p.l3. 
2. See E.G. Browne, P.C.N., p.329; R. Kumar, 11 Anglo-Turkish 
Antagonism in the Persian Gulf 11 in, Islamic Culture, 1960, p.lOO; 
D.N. Walker, Iran Past and Present, p.79, and M. Mujtahidi, 
iran-u Ingilis, p.75. For a full account see, R.L. Greaves, 




Russia and Britain competed in seeing who could gain more 
influence in Iran and thus take advantage of the country more 
successfully. As well as the Northern provinces, which Russia 
gained from Iran by invasion and military force most of the country 
had become Iranian in name only. 1 
Britain interfered with Iran's affairs so that she could control 
Iran's frontiers with Afghanistan and Iraq. To enable Britain to 
strengthen her power in India, she had to build up a barrier before 
the Russians. With this end in mind, Britain obtained from Iran 
a Licence to erect a telegraph line from Baghdad to India through 
Iran. 2 
A missed opportunity for Iran occurred when Britain learned 
of the existence of the oil field in the South of the country. 
Britain obtained a licence for sixty years through the agency of 
William Knox D'arcy in 1901. According to this agreement, the 
company agreed to pay the sum of £20,000 at the beginning of the 
exploration and also took to give £20,000 worth of shares. Sixteen 
1. See Hon. G.N. Curzon, Persia and the Persian Question~ Vol.2, 
pp.607-610; L.P. Elwell-Sutton, "The Pahlavi Era", on 
Persia: History and Heritage, ed. by J.A. Boyle and H. Mellard, 
p.Sl; D.N. Wilber, I.P.P., p.79. For more details see, 
Iranian Foreign Office, "Majmcu-i cAhd Nama Ha-yi Tarikhl'-yi 
Iran Az cAhd-i Hakhamanish1 ta cAsr-i Pahlav1" ed. by-
V. Mazandaran1, pp.l26,170. 
2. See M.S. Ivanov, T.N.I., p.3 and M. Mujtahidl', ~-, p.75. 
6 
per cent of the company's annual profits were to be paid to the 
Iranian Government. 1 
The foreign powers vied with each other in gaining influence 
at court, but were on good enough terms with each other eventually 
t t 
. 2 o come o a comprom1se. By 1907, Iran had been divided into 
three spheres of influence: Northern Iran was under Russian control, 
Southern Iran under British, while the central area was neutral. 
This neutral area was further divided in 1915. 3 
In 1910, the Iranian Government invited an American advisor, 
William Morgan Shuster, to attempt to reform the disorganised and 
bankrupt financial administration. There was a temporary improvement 
and finances became better regulated, but the reaction of Russia to 
this improvement shows how deep and malign was her interference in 
Iran's internal affairs. 4 The Iranian Government, she declared, 
1. See L.P. Elwell-Sutton, M. I., p.64; A. Ha'iri, Shi 'aism and 
constitutionalism in Iran, p. 171; and eA. Mustawfi, 
Tar1~-i Idari va Ijtimaci-yi Qajar, Vol.3, pp.218-9. 
2. See A. Kasravi, Tari~ Hijdah Sala-yi A~arbayjan, p.337, and 
M. Mujtahidi, ~-, p.l8. 
3. See G.P. Gooch and J.H.B. Masterman, A Century of British 
Foreign Policy, p.76; M. McCarthy, op.cit., p.50; and 
A. Razi, Tari~-i Mufa~~al-i Iran, p.519. 
4. See G. Lanczowski, Iran under the Pahlavis, p.ll; E.G. Browne, 
P.C.M., p.328; H. Kafur, Soviet Russia and Asia, 1917-1927; 
p.l44; "Persia" in Encyclopaedia Britannica, Vol.XXI and, 
- - - c -M. Dawudi, Ayn al-Dawla va Rizhim-i Ma~ru~a, pp. 187-252. 
7 
must dismiss Shuster and take note, henceforth, that if Iran 
wished to invite any foreign advisor, she should first consult 
with Russia and Britain. 1 
Many thinking Iranians were affronted by this ultimatum, 
which they saw as yet another example of foreign interference. 
In the National Parliament of Iran, one of these leading thinkers, 
Shaykh Mu~ammad Khiyaban1, the subject of the present thesis, 
spoke out against this ultimatum. But as we know Russia continually 
used force to impose her demands on Iran. 
Previously, in 1908, the Majlis had been bombarded and 
2 forcibly dissolved by Colonel Lyakhov, the Russian Commander of 
c -Muhammad Ali Shah's Cossack Brigade, by order of the Shah, who was 
firmly supported by Russia. 3 The action was mounted to close 
parliament, exile some leaders and kill certain liberal people. 4 
Britain and Russia, the two competitors, both benefited equally 
from their involvement in Iran, but Russia caused more harm to the 
country. 5 Britain was involved in political manoeuvres and plans 
1. See M.W. Shuster, The Strangling of Persia, p.l82; D.N. Wilber, 
I.P.P., p.85; A. Banani, The Modernization of Iran, (1961), p.37. 
2. The Persian Cossack Brigade was formed in 1879 by Nasir al-Oin 
Shah as a royal bodyguard. This guard later received most of its 
orders from Russia. For more details, see also, M.A. Afschar, 
QE.cit., p.26 and P. Mansfield, ££-Cit., p.81. 
3. See L.P. Elwell-Sutton, M.I. (London 1941), p.63. 
4. For more details see F. Adamiyyat, Q£.cit., pp.330-31 and 
M.I. Riz~ani, QE.Cit., pp.l70-72. 
5. See Sir P. Sykes, A History of Persia II, p.426; Y. Aryan Pur, 
QQ.cit., Vol.2, p.8 and M. Bahar, Tarikh-i Ahzab-i Siyasi-yi Iran, 
p.225. 
8 
but Russia harmed the very life of the people.
1 Her behaviour in 
Tabriz was particularly notorious. When people protested at 
Russian interference and misdeeds, many people were cruelly executed, 
some cut in half like sheep. 2 The most famous monument in Tabriz. 
the Mongol Ark-i cAli Shah was bombarded by Russian troops.
3 
However in 1915, Russia and Britain signed another agreement which 
completed the 1907 Agreement. The neutral zone of Iran was now also 
divided between the two major powers. Thus, they concluded, Iran 
would cause them no bother and would be a country in name only. 
Britain and Russia used different methods to gain their ends, but 
4 
basically shared a common aim and secretly united to carry it through. 
1 . See ~1. W . S h us t er , .QQ. c i t . , p . 4 3 ; ~ . M ak k i , T a r i k h- i B 1 s t 
Sala-yi lr~n, Vol.2, p.24, in the introduction; and K.T. Z~da-yi 
Bihzad, Qiyam-i A~arbayjan oar Inqilab-i Ma~ru~iyyat, p.315. 
2. M. Mvjtahidi, Rijal-i A~arbayjan Oar cAsr-i Ma~ruta, pp.ll4-222, 
and A. Kasrav1, T.H.S.A., pp.337-39, 340-42. 
3. See M. Machray, "Mesopotamia and Persia" in, Fortnightly Review, 
108, (London, 1920), pp.618-l9 and M. Itti~adiyya, op.cit., p.28. 
4. E.G. Browne, A brief narrative of recent events in Persia, p.24, 
and A. Kasravi, T.H.S.A., p.337. 
9 
CAUSES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL MOVEMENT 
From the previous discussion we have seen that most Iranians 
lived in a miserable life at the beginning of the twentieth 
century. The oppression of the Qajar Dynasty and bribery had 
reached unprecedented heights. 1 
Other elements played a major part in creating a constitutional 
movement. One element in the movement for constitutional reform 
was the minority class of broad-minded intellectual thinkers. They 
were generally familiar with the laws of European countries and 
understood the workings of democratic government. They put 
forward the idea that government springs from the nation and that 
religion and stdte should be kept separate. They favoured a 
European-style Constitutional Monarchy and wanted a new political 
society in Iran. 
The majority of people were ignorant and illiterate, however, 
and were not receptive to the ideas of this minority. Their 
constribution to new thoughts and ideas in Iran was, nevertheless, 
considerable and should not be overlooked. M~rz~ Malkam Khan, 
(1833-1908) was one of the first men to work for the enlightenment 
and reform of Iran. He entered government service and rose to the 
position of Minister to Great Britain, and published the newspaper 
Qanun in London (1889-1890). His political activities were extremely 
1. See Sh. Bakhash, Iran, Monarchy, Bureaucracy and Reform under the 
Qajars, 1858-1896, p.305; A. Kasravi, T.H.S.A., pp.l48-49, and 
M. I. RizVah~, op.cit., p.SO. 
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influential. The role of Qanun in diffusing ideas hostile to the 
regime was unquestionably great, and Mirza Malkam ~an was also a 
strong advocate of the application of western values in order to 
end European Colonial investment in Persia.
1 
Sayyid Jamal al-Oin Asad abadi (Af~hani) (1838-1892) bitterly 
attacked the court in his speeches and sought to rouse the people from 
their slumbers. His hope was to establish a constitutional and 
republican regime, declaring that it would be impossible for the 
distinguished liberal politicians to ignore their own interests 
unless a constitutional government was established. 2 Among his best 
known followers were Shaykh Ahmad Rub1, Mirza Aqa Khan and Khab1r 
al-Mulk. 3 
M1rza Hasan Rushdiyya, the founder of new schools in Iran, was 
the publisher of the paper Maktab, in Tehran. Mirza Hasan Ru~diyya 
had been pronounced an infidel by the cUlama and his school destroyed 
by a mob of tullah (religious students). 4 
l. See H. Algar, Religion and State in Iran 1785-1906, pp. 192,458; 
H. Natiq, Az Mast Ki Bar Mast, pp.l65-194; A. Ha'iri, QQ.cit., . -
p.39; . and 
A . Ka s r a vi , T . M . I . , p . l 0 . 
2. See E.G. Browne, P.R., pp.l-30; eA. A. Halabi, Sayyid Jamal 
al-Oin Asad abad1; for a fuller account see G.R. ~abr1-Tabrizi, 
The Bibliography of Sa~id Jam~l Eddin Asad a .badi, the Islamic 
Philosopher of the East.? Tabrlz..,J9b5. 
3. See E.G. Browne, P.R., p.94. 
4. See H. Algar, ££-Cit., p.244, and A. Kasravi, T.M.I., p. 19. 
11 
Mirza cAbd al-Hashim Talibof, (1855-1910) was born in Tabriz, 
but lived mostly in Russia. His numerous Persian books, written 
in simple style, helped popularize modern political ideas and 
science in Iran. He was one of the famous scholars who worked to 
enlighten public opinion. His contribution to the Persian 
awakening and the development of constitutional theory in Iran was 
as important as theirs, if not more so. He used to say, "first I 
love the universe, then I 1 ove Iran, and eventually, I love the 
clean soil of Tabriz". 1 
M1rza cAll Akbar-i sabir, (1862-1911) was one of the most active 
and famous opponents of despotic government and a radical poet of 
Iran. He is especially known for his satirical poems written under 
the title of Hu~u~Nama. He defended the poor people and attacked 
the powerful, and is particularly known for his attacks on religious 
hypocrisy. He examined the laws and government of European countries 
and compared them with the situation in Iran, thus helping the 
2 Iranians to appreciate the shortcomings of their own system. 
Another element was the manner in which Iranian leaders granted 
licences to foreigners and raised loans to maintain their luxurious 
lifestyle. When loans could not be paid, rich lands or resources were 
1. See M. cAbbas1, ~.cit., pp.22,35, M.A. Tarbiyat, Danishmandan-i 
A~arbayjan, p.41. 
2. See E.G. Browne, P.R., p.35. For more details, see 
c - - -_- -
A.A. Sabir Tahirzada, Kulliyyat-i Hup Hup Nama, and A. Sihhat, 
Asar-i Bar Guzida, pp.355-6. 
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sometimes given, thus increasing Iranian discontent.
1 In 1900, a 
loan of two and a half million roubles was borrowed from Russia at 
the interest of five per cent to be repaid within seventy five years 
for Muzaffar al-Oin Shah to go for medical treatment to Europe. 
Subsequently one and a half million roubles was borrowed from 
Russia, again for the King to go to London. In exchange for 
these loans to Iran, Russia demanded the right to the customs of 
Northern Iran and the licence to build a highway from Julfa to 
- 2 Tehran through Tabriz and Qazvin. 
The constitutional movement owed much to the clergy. They 
were an effective force in society and had the trust of the people 
to whom religion was important. c -The Ulama (clergy) called for 
justice and criticised oppression which was roundly denounced in 
the mosques. 3 Some cUlama were well informed about the working of 
European Governments. In response to questions about the 
Constitutional Laws, which had been put by leading Iranian clergy 
in 1905 to the most famous Iranian religious leader in Najaf (Iraq), 
Ayat-Allah Kazim Khurasani, 4 who had similarly demanded constitutional 
1. See M. McCarthy, QE.cit., p.36, and M.N. Kirman1, op.cit., p.376. 
2. See H. Algar, op.cit., p.226; A. Kasravi, T.M.I., p.24. 
3. See M. Savory, .. Persia .. , in The Cambridge History of Islam, Vol. It·:, 
p.597; L.P. Elwell-Sutton, M. I., p.61 and ~a'iri, op.cit., p.l09. 
4. See E.G. Browne, P.R., pp.262,421 and M.N. Kirman1, op.cit., 
pp.66-68. 
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rule, security, justice and eventual freedom for Iran,~declared: 
"We have learned about European countries which are 
governed by democracy; we wish to have a real 
constitutional government in Iran. We state 
categorically that this would not involve any 
conflict with Islam; rather that this type of 
government would be in accord with religious law 
and the Prophet's orders which decree that the rule 
of law and justice should be administered to the 
people." 1 
Certain spiritual leaders, however, rejected the movement. 
These spiritual leaders were generally from the wealthiest class, 
or those who had control of lands 2 held as religious Awqaf 
(endowments). At the beginning of the movement many members of 
this class had supported the people in their struggle for their 
legal rights, but realising that their interests were endangered 
by constitutional advance, they gradually left their former position, 
and took the Shah's side. Among members of this group were 
Mfr H~shim and the Imam Jum'a of Tabriz. 3 There was a certain 
group of clergymen like Haj1 Mfrza Hasan Mujtahid-i Tabr1z and the 
Imam Jum'a of Tehran for instance, who themselves were from the 
highest feudal families of Iran, and had an inseparable connection 
1. See N. Keddie, ~., pp.150-60; A. Ha'iri, op.cit., p.l83, for 
more details seer~. Pavlovich, S. Iranski and V. Terya, op.cit., p.42. 
2. See F. Kazemzadeh, Russia and Britain in Persia, 1864-1914, p.545 
and R. Rizazadi-yi Malik, op.cit., p.l94. 
3. See M.Q. Hidayat, ~a~irat va ~a~arat, p.l72; M.B. V1juya'f 
Balva-i Tabr1z, p.23; A. Razi, ~.cit., p.518. 
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with the court. 
Shaykh Sa11m, Malik al-Mutakallim1n and Shay~ Mu~ammad Khiyaban1 
had a connection with the mass of the people. Their lives had no 
apparent difference from those of the rest of the people and most 
of them were at the service of the masses. As the constitutional 
movement developed these two groups began to accuse each other of 
deviating from Islam. The ideology of the second group was based 
on the poor and labouring classes, while that of the first group, 
lay in pressing the people to obey the court, making use of the 
Quranic text; "0 ye who believe obey God and obey the Apostle, 
1 and those charged with authority among you". 
At the beginning of the movement, one of the most famous 
spiritual leaders who helped and supported the people greatly was 
Shay~ Fazl-Allah-i Nur1, but like most of the other clergymen, he 
changed his attitude and took a position which was against the movement 
and the Iranian Revolution. 2 There exists a letter which was written 
by him to Mu~1r-al-Sul~an (The Prime Minister) while there was an 
anti-constitutional demonstration going on at the Bagh-i Shah in 
Tehran. In this letter Shaykh Fail-Allah expresses his aims 3 and 
l. Quran, 5:59. 
2. See E.G. Browne, P.R., p.l48; M.B. Vijuya•i, QE.cit., pp.l4,15 
and M.N. Kirman1, op.cit., pp.545-560. 
3. See~- Muca?ir, Tar1~-i Istiqrar-i Ma~ru~iyyat, Vol .rr, 
(Tehran, 1956), pp.1002-3. See also, R. Ra•1s Niya and 
A. Nahid, Du Mubariz-i Junbish-i Ma~ru~a, p.38. 
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point of view, and his support for the Shah and his disagreement 
with the constitutional laws. Kasrav1's view of the members of 
this class, particularly Shay~ Fazl-Allah, is interesting. 
Kasrav1 believes that the Shaykh had another aim in his mind. He 
liked to live at ease, comfortably at his pleasure leading a 
luxurious life and living in a fabulous building. He had built a 
- -c park (Park Al-Shari d) and possessed many coaches, owned much 
property and was living aristocratically. He was genuinely 
interested in establishing Islamic laws in theory, but we have to 
realize that the country and nation had no value in his mind as 
compared to his personal well-being. 1 
Newspapers explained the aims and content of the proposed 
constitutional reform. .Reactionary clergy spoke out emphatically 
against it and managed to persuade some of the erstwhile supporters 
of reform to oppose the movement. It is said that as soon as they 
spoke about developing the country, the power of the masses, the 
proposed education of girls or the possibility of sending students 
to Western countries, the reactionary clergy saw these suggestions 
as a turning away from religion and abandoning the law of Islam. 2 
l. See A. Kasravi, T.M.I., p.287. 
2. See L. Lockhart 11 The Constitutional Laws of Persia .. , M.E.J. 
19, 1918, p.376; M. Pavlovich, ~.cit., pp.48,81; A. Qasimi, 
~.cit., p.25 and H. Al9ar, QQ-Cit., p.233 and see also 
A. Kasravi, Zindagan1-yi Man, (Tehran 1945), p.31. 
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On the other hand, there are other views which completely 
differ from the above argument. Although Shay~ Fazl-Allah allied 
himself with the other two Mujtahids, Tabataba•1 and Bihbahan1, 
and supported the reform of the constitution, he turned against the 
constitution, when the supplementary fundamental law was approved 
in 1907. 1 
Shay~ Fazl-Allah was supported by other famous Mujtahids 
such as Haji Sayyid r~uhammad Kazim Tabataba • i -yi Yazdi and other 
religious leaders such as Shaykh cAbu al-Hasan Marand1 and -- . 
M1r Hashim. This was the first effective setback which the new 
Iranian Constitutional regime suffered. 
There were meanwhile, other clergy who put themselves at the 
service of the people and worked hard to achieve a constitution. 
Ayat Allah Sayyid Muhammad Tabataba•1 was one of these. 2 . . . 
A final element in bringing about the campaign for constitutional 
reform was the influence of the revolutionary movements abroad. 
Foremost among these were the revolutionary activities in Russia and 
Ottoman empire, which particularly influenced the people of 
1. For more details see M. Malik Zada, Tar1kh-i Ynqilab-i 
Ma~ru~a-yi Iran, Vol .IV, pp.209-220. 
2. See N.R. Keddie, ~., pp.234-5, Y. Aryan Pur, op.cit., p.236; 
M. Malik Zada, op.cit., p.263. 
17 
1 
A~arbayjan, whose province bordered on these areas. Merchants 
also gained enlightenment when they travelled to Russia, and 
compared and contrasted their home situation with that in other 
t 
. 2 coun r1es. All of these diverse elements combined to inspire 
the constitutional movement which roused Iran from the sleep of 
centuries. 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL MOVEMENT 
We have now examined the background causes of the constitutional 
movement. There was however a particular incident which finally 
gave the movement the impetus it needed to translate thought into 
action. The Regie (Tobacco monopoly) episode of 1891 made people 
realize that it was possible to combat the ruler who oppressed them. 
In the Regie Agreement, a monopoly of the purchase and sale of tobacco 
was given to a British merchant. The people opposed this agreement 
and Nasir al-D1n Shah was finally obliged to cancel it. 3 This 
outcome made the people realize that it was possible to gain their 
1. See N.K. Belova, Revolyutisonnoye ovizheniye V Iranskom 
Azerbaydzhane, pp.7-8; A. Kasravi, T.M.I., pp.268,272 and 
r. ?afa'1, Rahbaran-i Ma~rutQ, Vol.l, p.35. 
2. See N. Keddie, ~P., pp.455,57,59. 
3. See L.P. Elwell-Sutton, M. I., p.305; M. Davudi, Qg.cit., p.58 
and Sh. Bakhash, QE.cit., p.305. For more details see 
M.N. Kirman1, £E.cit., pp.36-42. 
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legal rights by perseverance and persistence in face of the king 
1 and his despotic court. 
The Iranian Constitutional Revolution began in December 1905 
with massive demonstrations in Tehran. The people were demanding 
the dismissal of the reactionary and despotic prime minister, 
cAyn al-Dawla, and that: 
11 8elgian2 employees should be dismissed from 
government positions, and that a court should 
be established to investigate the people's 
complaints and to ensure that the law worked 
fairly for everyone. 113 
This movement quickly spread to other parts of Iran, especially 
Tabriz. The people made more demands. They wanted constitutional 
laws to be drawn up, an effective parliament to be formed and the 
rights of private ownership secured. 4 
The movement gathered momentum. Young intellectuals and 
even some students studying abroad left their books to join in the 
struggle. Patriotic clergy like Ayat Allah Sayyid Muhammad 
Taba~aba'1 and Ayat Allah Sayyid cAbd Allah Bihbahani were at the 
forefront of the battle, providing leadership in the struggle for 
l. See E.G. Browne, P.R., p.ll9; A. Bausani, The Persians, Tr. from 
the Italian by J.B. Downe, p. 169 and eA. Parv1z, Tar1kh-i 
Tamaddun-i Jadid-i Dunya va Iran, p.538. 
2. See a full account A. Kasrav1, T.M.I., pp.29,34,37. 
c - - - -3. See M. Abbasi, QE.Cit., p.67; A. Qasimi, QE.cit., pp.l4.15. 
4 • See M • S • I van o v , T . N • I . , p . 1 7 ; A . Ka s r a v 1 , T . M . I . , p . 1 6 2 and 
A. Kasrav1, Z.M, p.l29. 
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freedom and legal rights in the spirit of the great Amir Kabir. 
Leading intellectuals in Tabriz demanded constitutional laws for 
Iran. 1 
Under increasing daily pressure, on August 5, 1906 Mu~affar 
al-Oin Shah finally issued a decree conferring Iranian Constitutional 
Laws. This temporarily satisfied the people, but it soon became 
obvious that this decree was not going to fulfil any promises. 
Muzaffar al-Oin Shah was a sick and a weak2 man who had issued 
the order merely to quiet the people. 
The nobles and cAyn a1-Daw1a in particular would certainly not 
agree to it. What happened was that anybody caught talking about 
freedom or even justice was sent to prison by order of cAyn al-Dawla; 
and any meeting held to discuss people's rights was broken up with 
. 1 3 v1o ence. 
Once awakened from their sleep of centuries, however,the people 
could not be so easily subdued. Activities and discussion continued 
and the country seemed set on the course of revolution. 
Eventually, on September 9, 1906, Muzaffar al-Oin Shah gave 
permission for an elected assembly. Despite some reservations, this 
was a major victory for the people in the face of opposition from 
the despotic court, King and prime minister. 
1. See 
K. Tahir Zada-yi 
Bihzad, QE.cit., pp.50,57 and A. Kasravi, T.M.I., pp.l5,156,906. 
2. Su~an, (Tehran 1953), No.6, p.369. 
3. A. Qasim1, ~.cit., p.l3 and A. Kasravi, T.M.I., pp.415,418. 
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1 
Clergy like Shaykh Fail Allah Nuri, a favourite at court and 
opponent of the constitutional movement, were banished. Finally, 
on December 30, 1906, the Iranian Constitutional Law was approved 
and signed by Mu:affar al-D1n Shah. 
Newspapers and other publications continued to play a leading 
role in informing and educating the people. In the years of 
revolution there were many publications in Iran; about three 
hundred and fifty papers and magazines were printed, one hundred and 
fifty in Tehran and fifty in Tabriz. 2 
The first parliament in which sat many of the most dedicated 
and politically aware members passed some useful laws. Life 
pensions held by the aristocracy were cancelled, the problem of 
corruption was tackled and feudal lords were dismissed. 
The court and the aristocracy in general reacted swiftly. They 
began to plot against the very foundations of the constitution with 
the help of Muhammad cAli Shah who was crowned after the death3 . --
of his father Muzaffar al-Din Shah on 8.1 .1907. 
1. See M. Bahar, Tarikh-i Mukhtasar-i Ahzab-i Siyasi, Vol.l, p. 168, 
and N. Fath1, Zindagi Nama-yi ~iqat al-Islam ~ahid, p. 184, 
where the author declares: 11 To destroy the constitution, 
c ~ -
Mu~ammad Al1 Shah, had guaranteed T.40,000, of vihich ShaYkh Fail 
Allah had received T.28,000 ..... , and see also, M.N.I. Kirman1, 
Tarikh-i sidar1-yi Iranian, p.563. 
2. For a full and valuable account see E.G. Browne, The Press and 
Poetry of Persia, and also see M. eA. Tarbiyat, QE.cit., pp.405-414. 
3. See F. Adamiyyat, ££.cit., pp.330-31 and M. Kirman1, QQ.cit., 
pp. 193-201. 
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In the middle of all this Russia now began to interfere 
actively again in Iran's internal affairs. On June 23rd 1908, 
the Shah's reactionary troops and the anti-revolutionary forces 
carried out a coup d'etat in Tehran. The National Assembly was 
bombarded by Lyakhov. 1 Newspapers were banned and local associations 
were closed down. Tabriz rebelled at this threat to the 
constitutional gains and tried to make its own revolution. 
Muhammad cA11 Shah sent cAyn al-Dawla with a large number of troops 
to quell the rebellion. - 2 They were supported by M1r Hashim, a 
leading reactionary cleric in Tabriz. 
The troops surrounded the city but the people resisted and 
cAyn al-Dawla was forced to return to Tehran. Defence forces in 
Tabriz were led by Sattar3 Khan, Baqir Khan and Shay~ Muhammad 
Khiyaban1 who were determined not to give in. Tabriz was besieged 
for eleven months. The people suffered and starved but would not 
submit. They gained valuable experience in resisting oppression 
1. See W.M. Shuster, ~.cit., p.40; A. Qasim1, op.cit., 35; M. I. 
Rizvan1, QE.Cit., pp.l70-72 and K. ~ahirzada-yi Bihzad, op.cit., 
pp. 119-1 21 . 
-
2. SeeR. Ra'is Niya, A. Nah1d, D.M., p.24; I. ?afa'1, op.cit., 
p.436 and A. Qasim1, op.cit., p.33. 
3. Sattar Khan was the leader of the Tabriz volunteer fighters. 
After Mu~ammad cA11 Shah's coup d'etat in 1908, all Iran except 
one quarter in Tabriz came under the Shah and here, Sattar Khan 
refused to give up. He was an illiterate man of the people, 
and was a horse-seller before the Iranian Constitutional 
Revolution. (Photograph p.l10 ) 
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1 and the might of the court, and .were an examp 1 e to the rest of 
the country. The stand taken by the Tabrizis against the 
despotic rule of those years played a considerable role in 
preserving the constitutional revolution in Iran and prevented it 
from collapsing until its final downfall. 2 
The spirited defence of Tabriz gave fresh hope and inspiration 
to I ran. When the coup d'etat took place it had seemed that civil 
liberty was at an end but the stand taken by Tabriz Anjuman 
(Political Society) revived the idea of constitutional government. 
On July 9, 1909, G1lan1 insurgents commanded by Sipahdar and 
Bakhtiyar1s commanded by Samsam al-Saltana approached Tehran to 
face government troops defending the Shah. 
Muhammad cA11 Shah was for.ced to flee to the Russian Embassy. 3 
A council made up of ex-members of the Majlis, cUlama and Military 
leaders then voted to depose Muhammad cAli Shah and replaced him by 
his fourteen year old son, Ahmad Shah . . -
Muhammad cA11 Shah was sent into exile. He went to Russia 
and raised another force, but failed in his efforts to destroy the 
1. See Markaz1 Tabl1_g_hat ~ucbas1n1n Na~riyyas1, 11 Shahr1varln On 
Ik1s1 11 1324-1325 (Tabriz 1981 ), p.25; M.N. Kirman1, op.cit., 
p.201, and for more details see A. Qasim1, op.cit., pp. 17,28,34,35. 
2. ~ . 
R. Ra'is N1ya I A. Nahfd, D.M., pp.54,222. 
3. See 
K. Tahir Zada-yi 
Bihzad, QE_.cit., p.l25 and M. Pavlovich 1 S. Iranski 1 v. Terya, 
~.cit., p.93. 
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revolutionaries. The Majlis then cancelled his regular annual 
salary. His brother Sardar Ascad attacked the revolutionary 
1 
forces from Kirman~ah in the l~est but, he too, was unsuccessful. 
Thus by 1914 Iran seemed set fair on a course to success and 
achievement but, unfortunately, the outbreak of World War I dashed 
all her hopes. 
11 The Iranian Government made a feeble gesture of 
neutrality, which the belligerants with one accord 
decided to ignore. The North-West became a 
battleground for Russian and Turkish armies; in 
the South British troops operated to prevent a 
Turkish thrust towards Afghanistan and German 
agents (supported by Swedish gendarmeries) stirred 
up trouble among the tribes. 112 
During the disastrous war, Iran became a battlefield for the 
different warring factions. The Iranian people who had recently 
had cause to celebrate their release from the clutches of 
Muhammad cAli Shah, saw all their gains nullified and rendered void. . -
Iran sank back into her previous hopeless and distressed state. 
Poverty and hunger were again on the increase and epidemics were 
'f 3 A r1 e. part from her permanent guests, Russia and Britain, Iran 
1 . See 
M.S. Ivanov, T.N.I., p.26 and A. Qasim1, 
op.cit., p.49. 
2. See L.P. Elwell-Sutton, M.I., p.66; Sir Percy Sykes, H.P., 
Vol .2, p.263 and A. Jahan Ban1, op.cit., p.20. 
3. See M.S. Ivanov, T.N.I., pp.ll ,28, for more details see also, 
M. Kasravi, T.H.S.A., pp.668-704. 
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now found herself playing host to representatives from Germany 
and Turkey. The latter saw the war as an opportunity to pursue 
its dreams of Pan-Turkism but any hopes that the Tabriz insurgents 
would join Turkey were soon disappointed and the Turks were 
forced to leave Iran. 1 
The Germans were involved in Iran because they realized the 
country•s importance as a gateway to India, Britain's main colony 
in the East, and because Germany and Britain were rivals in the 
competition to market their goods in Iran. Before the war was 
over, Russian involvement in Iran came to a halt because of the 
Russian Revolution. With their defeat, Germany and Turkey also 
2 had finally to leave the country. It seemed that Iran might be 
left in peace, but, unfortunately, the 1919 agreement once again 
3 disturbed the political atmosphere. 
Finally it should be noted that the two super-powers' 
interference in Iran•s affairs and her constitutional movement 
drove many intellectuals and militants to opposition both to the 
Iranian regime and to its foreign backers. One of these opponents 
was Shay~ Mu~ammad Khiyaban1, whose life and political activities 
will be the concern of the following chapters. 
1. See M.S. Ivanov, T.N.I., p.26. 
2. See M. Kumaramangalam, Iran at the Crossroads, p.6; M.S. Ivanov, 
T.N.I., p.26 and A. Kasrav1, T.H.S.A., pp.705-714. 
3. This will be discussed in detail in the following chapter. 
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Chapter 2 
EARLY LIFE OF KHIYABANI 
Shaykh Muhammad Khiyaban1 was born in 1889 in the village of -- . -
Khamina in Azerbaijan. 1 His father cAbd al-Ham1d was a merchant 
who traded with Russia. Khiyaban1 after spending some time at 
a Maktab (religious school) in Khamina, went to Petrovsk 
(modern t~akhach Kala, in Daghistan) to join his father. Khiyaban1 
finished his secondary studies in the latter town. Because of 
his father's acquaintance with liberal intellectuals, Khiyaban1 
was able to meet M1rza cAbd al-Rah1m Talibov and became a close 
friend of this revolutionary poet and intellectual. Khiyaban1's 
friendship with revolutionary activists in Petrovsk turned him 
into a revolutionary. After a while Khiyabani came back to 
Tabriz where he studied philosophy with Mirza Ismacil, 
mathematics with Haj1 Najm al-Dawla, history and geography with 
Mi rza Ri za Khan Muhandi s-i Qarajada_g_b_l, and re 1 i gi ous science 
with Haj1 M1rza cAbd al-Hasan Aqa Mujtahid-i Angaj1. He became 
extremely proficient in all of these subjects and in addition 
1. Few details are available of Khiyaban1's life. Later writers such 
as Azar1 and Tahir Zada-yi Bihzad have been able to add nothing new 
to the account given by Badamsni in the Monograph devoted to 
Khiyaban1 published by Iranschahr in 1926 in which remains our 
only source in Persian for this period and from which the 
following account is taken. 
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was fluent in French, Turkish, Arabic and Russian. 1 Khiyabani was 
very interested in study. One of his teachers, Mirza Ismacil, 
said of him, 11 Mirza Mu~ammad Khiyabani is a clever and intelligent 
student. Whatever I taught him, he has learnt to perfection. It is 
obvious that if he carries on as he has done so far, he will succeed me ... 
A remark like this from such a scholar is an important testimony to 
Khiyabani•s abilities. Khiyabani married the daughter of Haji 
Sayyid Husayn Aqa the Pishnamaz of Khamina and succeeded his father-. - -
in-law as Pi~namaz (Prayer Leader) of the Masjid-i Jumca-yi Tabriz 
(Tabri z Friday mosque) and the Masj id- i Ka rim ~an· ( Karim Khan Mosque) 
where his sermons are said to have attracted audiences of more than 
one thousand, for four years. He had a brother who lived in Baku 
and an uncle who was killed during the Russian Civil War in 1918 during 
the shelling by Denikin•s forces of Petrovsk. Khiyabani had six 
children, four sons and two daughters. Five of these children are 
still living in Tabriz and Tehran while the other has recently 
emigrated to Canada. 
KHIYABAN!•s POLITICAL LIFE UP TO THE AZERBAIJAN UPRISING 
From his earliest days freedom and independence were consistent themes 
running through Khiyabani•s life. He realised that a person must 
struggle to gain his rights however di ffi cult that struggle may be, and 
in addition to his fight to change the way of thinking of his fellow 
1 s~e. 9 . . 4~a~ Uj~lt~ (eel.) 
A~arbayjan Ruznamasin1n Nashr1yyas1, (Baku, 1961), p.3. 
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countrymen, he always showed himself ready to carry on the struggle 
by the use of force if necessary. 
Khiyabani was introduced to ~iqat al-Islam, a famous religious 
revolutionary figure of Azerbaijan, by Musta~ar al-Dawla and had 
connections with ~aj1 cAli Dawa Furu~, one of the leading Social 
Democrats of Azerbaijan and an active member of this Party. 
Thus during the Iranian Constitutional Revolution, in which the 
people of Tabriz fought bravely to restore the constitution, 
Khiyaban1 fought rifle on shoulder along with Sattar Khan and 
other patriotic volunteers against the anti-constitutional forces of 
the central government. 
During the Istibdad-i Sa~1r, 1 along with M1rza Ismac11 
Ha~tarudi (a famous and courageous revolutionary. of Tabriz and 
Tabriz deputy to the second Majlis of Iran) he carried the Bayraq-i 
Kaviyan1 beside Sattar Khan and other revolutionaries, who were 
proposing to march on Tehran to impose the nation's demands on 
c - -Muhammad Ali Shah. Muhammad cAli Shah no sooner received this 
report than he agreed to put into effect the supplementary laws of 
the constitution, which Khiyaban1 believed to be progressive laws 
for the conditions of that period. 
l. A period in which the Majlis was bombarded and many Iranian 
liberals were killed, after which the Majlis was shut down for 
three months from June 1908. 
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When Tabriz was surrendered by cAyn al-Dawla, Khiyaban1 was 
the representative of the Mujahid1n (freedom fighters) who 
negotiated with him in the face of his demands for Tabriz to submit. 
He and his colleagues M1rza Muhammad Taqi Tabataba'1 Khatambakhsh, 1 . - --
~usayn Khan-i cAdalat and Mirza Husayn Vaciz refused to accept the 
conditions of the central government and declared, 
"we are not afraid of your powerful troops and heavy 
artillery and we will not abandon our rights; we 
want to have a govenment like the European countries 
and be strong like them and stand on our own feet 
without any external interference". 2 
They fulfilled this promise, and resisted the central government 
troops and, while they were surrounded, preferred to eat yunja 
(lucerne) in the lack of other food rather than submit. 
Thus during this period Khiyaban1 took part in the revolt of 
a people who were oppressed and deprived of their rights, and 
discharged his duty fully. It is presumably from this period that 
he became politically aware and active, and during the following 
years he was to assume a leading part in awakening and enlightening 
the people. 
THE TABRIZ ANJUMAN 
The Tabriz Anjuman or council was founded in 1906, after the 
establishment of the constitution. In the beginning, the only 
l. See Appendix No.J. 
2. eA. A~ar1, Qiyam-i Shaykh Muhammad ~iyaban1, p.l2. -- . 
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purpose of this council was to choose the Azerbayjan deputies 
for the National Assembly. However this council eventually 
became so powerful and dealt with so many important matters that 
the crown Prince Muhammad cAli, who was residing in Tabriz, was 
obliged to accept its existence and to follow its orders. 
The establishment of the Tabriz council brought a great deal 
of improvement to Tabriz; 
11 The council dealt with the complaints of the Tabrizis. 
Its members were broad-minded, liberal and well-informed 
people. Some of its members were the following: 
Mirza Muhammad Taq1 Tabataba•1, Shaykh Muhammad Khiyaban1 
. - - - . -c- - -- -:- . -
Shaykh Salim, Haji Isma il Amir Khizi and Muhammad Husayn 
Vaci·~~~l · · 
Following the hoarding of certain vital provisions, especially 
wheat, the council requisitioned this reserve of wealth and established 
a fixed price for bread and meat. But the most important action of 
the Tabri z counc:i 1 was to cha 11 enge t~uhammad cA 11 Shah, who had now 
succeeded his fathe~ and his illegal activities. The leaders of the 
council were attempting to put a stop to the Shah•s activities and 
those of the local reactionary groups and the external enemies of the 
country who supported him, while the reactionary and anti-
constitutional groups, who were helped by Russian funds and 
encouraged by Mu~ammad cA11 Shah, were working against the 
constitution along with Shaykh Fazl Allah-i Nur1, culminating with 
1. SeeK. Tahir Zada-yi Bihzad, ~.cit., pp.=48-49. 
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the demonstration of Maydan-i Tupkhana, which took place in 1909. 
The council took certain steps against the reactionary groups. 
Ahmad Kasravi says of this event; 
11 In the event of the Tup~ana some of the reactionary 
rebels under the supervision of Shaykh Fail Allah 
were demonstrating against the constitution with the 
encouragement of the Shah and financial aid from the 
Russians and were demanding, 'we want the Prophet's 
religion, and we are not interested in the 
constitution ..... l 
Because of this event the Assembly and the Constitution were in a 
dangerous position, and the Tabriz council carried out two 
. c - -
important tasks; they- declar·ed Mu~ammad Ali Shah-deposed, who had sworn 
on the Quran to rule the country according to the constitution 
but who had· been involved in dishonest activities against the 
country and the nation, and they informed the s~a h and a 11 foreign 
ambassadors in Iran of their action. 
Furthermore, the Tabriz council instructed all the Azerbaijani 
soldiers and officers who were in the service of Muhammad cA11 
Shah not to obey him any longer; otherwise the council would arrest 
their relations, destroy their property and sequestrate their wealth 
if they did not recognize the power of the deputies of the Majlis. 
As a result of these moves there was a great surge of pro-constitutional 
activity among Iranians throughout the country. 
l. R. Ra•is Niya, D.M., p.238. 
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R. Racis Niya, writing about this incident, states; 
11 Muhammad cAli Shah in this situation, due to much 
ha~assment, was losing his patience and was 
obliged to ask the deputies to talk to the nation on 
his behalf because the Tabriz council, through the 
assembly, had even gone as far as to demand that 
another king be chosen 11 • 1 
However, the Tabriz council stood firm and the Shah was forced to 
ask for support from British and Russian representatives. In spite 
of everything he clung to power, and although he had promised to 
recognise the assembly and act in accordance with the constitution 
he gave orders to destroy the assembly. The Tabriz council assumed 
its duties and they informed all embassies in Iran of this matter. 
Muhammad cAli Shah knew the Tabrizis very well, as he had ruled 
in Tabriz when he was still crown prince. He was absolutely aware 
of the fact that he would never be able to impose his dictatorship 
on the country without much resistance from such a people. The 
following lines from H. Taqizada may help us to understand the 
position further. 
11 
••• 0ne day Majid al-Mulk, who was a close friend of 
Muhammad cAli Shah said that the king and his associates 
had been discussing the people's wishes. The king said; 
'my greatest wish is to be ruler of Kirman'. This 
claim surprised them very much and they felt much 
unhappiness on hearing it. As we know Tabriz has 
always been the pride of Iran because of its resistance in 
the face of despotism and its movements for freedom. 
c- -1. R. Ra is Niya, D.M., p.40. 
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We asked the king the reason for this wish. He 
answered 'Don't be foolish! There would be no 
resistance in Kirman even if we were to skin them 
alive, but the people of this city (Tabriz) are 
t • 1 ul emo 1ona ... 
In order to inform people of what was happening in the capital, 
the Tabriz council published pamphlets and asked people to take 
notice of what was going on and to gather in the mosques. They 
taught people how to use a rifle and how to defend themselves. 
Through these activities, which were directed by the politically 
conscious and well-informed leaders of Tabriz such as Muhammad 
Khiyabani and Mirza Mu~ammad Taqi ~aba~aba'i (chairman of the Tabriz 
council and also the Tabriz deputy for the fourth assembly) they 
would, they hoped, be able to defeat despotism and all those who 
were reactionary and anti-constitutional. 2 
K.T. Bihzad in his interesting work on this council and its 
activities states that 
11 in fact the Tabriz council was the only Iranian political 
force to resist in the face of an arbitrary government. 
During the 11 months in which it was surrounded by the Shah's 
troops, Tabriz was still the only city to maintain the 
constitution and keep it alive, putting up a brave 
resistance. Most of the decisions made in this council 
were proposed by Sayyid ~asan Taq1 Zada who was one of 
Iran's most famous politicians. His speeches were tough 
and effective - M. cA11 Shah would say 'let's have our 
supper, if Taq1 Zada wi 11 a 11 ow us'. The Tabri z 
1. H. Taq1 Zada, ~atabaha-yi Sayyid ~asan Taqizada Mushtamalbar 
Shamma'1 Az Tar1kh-i Avayil-i Inqilab-i Ma~ru~iyyat-i Iran 
(Tehran 1958), p.58. 
2. eA. A~ari, Kulunil Muhammad Taq1 Khan-i Pisyan, p.71. 
33 
council had asked all newspaper correspondents 
throughout the world to come and see what was going 
on in Tabriz. The Islamic Council had been acting 
against the constitution and this centre of aggression 
• - 1 was destroyed in Ramazan and closed down forever ... 
RUSSIAN INTERFERENCE IN TABRIZ 
During this period Tabriz in particular suffered many upheavals and 
disturbances provoked by foreign interference. Especially brutal 
and tragic in its results was Russian intervention. Russia took 
a great part in the events of these years, including the dividing 
of Iran between herself and Great Britain in 1907 and 1915 and the 
bombardment of the Majlis by Lyakhov by which he hoped to destroy 
the Iranian constitutional base and Iranian hopes for constitutional 
progress. The suppression of the liberals and patriots of Tabriz 
in 1908-9 was carried out only because the Tabrizis were demanding 
their legal rights of Constitutional Law and Assembly. In order 
to enforce this the Russians sent three divisions from Yerevan and 
Tiflis to Tabriz. On this occasion Tabriz became a slaughterhouse 
of the liberals. A number of books which analyse this event in 
Tabriz show us the magnitude of the Russian interference with the 
Tabrizis. The most valuable of these accounts is that given by 
E.G. Browne, who explains these events much more fully than 
1. SeeK. Tahir Zada-yi Bihzad, Q£.cit., p.l50. 
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1 anybody else. When the Russians discovered that they would not 
be able to achieve their aims through their local agents, they 
decided to operate directly themselves. At this period, Samad 
Khan-i Shujac al-Dawla was in open revolt against the constitution 
and the liberals. The Russians openly protected him and supported 
him indirectly until they realized that the Tabrizis were determined 
to resist their aggressive aims. The Russians then started to 
arrest and imprison the liberals2 and Mujahid1n (freedom fighters) 
and occupied the important points in the city. By the beginning of 
February, refugees from Tabriz were arriving in Constantinople, and 
one of these refugees reported all of the events which were happening 
in Tabriz. This account was published in the Manchester Guardian 
of February 9, 1912, with the help of E.G. Browne. 3 While discussing 
this aggression, we should mention some of the patriotic Tabrizis who 
lost their lives for the sake of freedom. Those who were hanged in 
December 1911 were the two brothers Hasan and Qadir, the sons of 
cAli Monsieur, Shaykh Sal1m, S~diq al-Mulk, Kazim Z~da, Ziyi' -- . . 
al-cUlama and his uncle and finally ~iqat al-Islam. 
1. E.G. Browne is the only person who has given an accurate and full 
account of the Iranian constitutional events outside Iran. There 
are also a few historians writing in Persian whose works are valuable 
and useful, e.g. Kasravi and Bihzad. 
2. In this period Vu~uq al-Dawla was the Foreign Minister. In answer to 
the Tabrizis' appeal for help against the Russian tortures and killings, 
his only reply was to blame them for fighting against the Russians. 
See Ya~ma, No.37, (Tehran 1951), pp.230-231. 
3. The original reports are kept at the library of Cambridge University. 
These valuable and important letters were presented by Professor 
E.G. Browne to this Library. They have been published under the title 
of N~maha'1 Az Tabr1z (letters from Tabriz) by H. Javad1. 
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Hasan was sixteen years old and his brother was twelve. Their 
offence was merely that their elder brother was one of the Mujahid1n 
who was not captured by the Russians. They were the first 
sacrifices. Hasan bravely climbed on the chair and cried 11 Long 
live Iran, Long live freedom .. , then he was hanged, before Qadir•s 
eyes. While his elder brother was in his death-throes, the younger 
brother was prepared for hanging. He repeated what his brother had 
said and shouted, 11 down with Russia ... ~iqat al-Islam having prayed, 
was the third in this tragic event. He declared, .. It is our 
pleasure to be killed by the enemies of our religion on this day ... 
Then ~iqat al-Islam personally put the rope round his neck and the 
hanging took place. Kasrav.1, who was an eyewitness of these tragic 
days, describes an execution as follows; 
..... first Mashhad1 cAmu Uqhli came bravely and climbed 
up on a chair and put the noose round his neck, took 
off his hat and threw it in the face of a Russian officer 
who was in charge, then immediately pushed away the chair 
which was holding his body; after a while, he was dead. 
He lived bravely and died generously. 112 
The Tabrizis who were executed by the Russians numbered forty 
two. This figure does not include those who were killed by the 
Russians during the fighting. The next shock produced by Russia 
was the 1911 ultimatum in which Russia put forward the following 
demands; 
1 See A. Kasravi, T.H.S.A., p.369 
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The Persian Government should dismiss Mr W.M. Shuster; 
The Persian Government should undertake to appoint no 
foreigners in government service without previously consulting 
the Russian and British1ministers in future; and the 
Iranian government should pay an indemnity for the expenses 
involved in the despatch of the Russian expedition. 2 
It was not possible for the people to endure such demands, indeed 
it was a matter of life and death; acceptance of this ultimatum 
would have meant that Iranian independence3 and the country itself 
would no longer exist. Many thinking Iranians were affronted by 
this ultimatum which they saw as yet another example of foreign 
interference. In the National Parliament of Iran, Shay~ 
Muhammad ~iyabani, who was the deputy for Tabriz in the second period 
of the parliament, declared that he was amazed at this note which 
had been delivered by Russia. lhe. -~,~1<';',n·.··'J ;.s e~.t~·'".~·-e..trac;ltJtt.oh ot h.·s ->f~ec.k: 
From the hour that this note from the Russian Government 
was read in a special session of the Majlis and we learned 
about the contents of the note, since then, I, as an 
Iranian, am in a state of astonishment and shock. For 
when I think about the question in this 
note I realise that this is not simply an article of 
law about which we must sit and discuss. All gentlemen 
here and even all the world if it were present here 
eau 1 d agree that there a re some questions in the \vorl d 
1. Although this event is known as the Russian ultimatum, we should, 
nevertheless, realize that it was given by both Russia and 
Britain to Iran. 
2. See Banani, QQ.cit., p.37; E.G. Browne, The Persian Crisis of 
December 1911, p.l4 and W.M. Shuster, ~.cit., p.37. 
37 
whose answers have been given three or four hundred years 
ago and have been approved universally in the high 
courts of the world ... the question is this: when 
human beings appeared on earth and laid the foundation 
of finding food and existence, obviously there was an 
age of barbarism - that is to say every man 
instinctively desired to acquire anything which attracted 
him or her and rejected laws and regulations. This 
selfish drive in man has been the cause of conflict and war. 
In order to free themselves from such a situation they, 
thousands of years ago, gathered together and formed 
governments. This was done to protect what is in the 
interest of man and reject what is against the human 
interest. In order to prevent aggression by one group 
against another group and in order to make man realize 
his own rights, national and social governments were 
formed. However this did not stop people from being 
aggressive and war mongers, and conflict among nations 
existed and continued. They plundered each other, and 
what an individual naturally used to do, the same was 
done by nations. One nation tried to destroy another 
or reduce it to poverty. But fortunately now we live in 
an age in which nations have sat and agreed upon certain 
international laws which should be obeyed. These laws 
are being gradually observed and I hope will continue to 
be observed. Now if one nation treats another nation as 
was done a thousand years ago and expects her demands to 
be fulfilled, then we have to say that history has 
answered this kind of relationship four hundred years ago. 
We have to tell a demanding nation politely, 1your demand 
is contrary to the present age and contrary to all 
agreements made on the world level 1 • Now we return to 
the subject of demands that have been put forward by the 
Russian government to the Iranian government. There are 
a few points that perhaps other persons might describe 
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and discuss. I shall express the matter as I feel. 
There has been an agreement made in the world and taken for 
granted, that is, that anyone who possesses something which 
is transfered to or acquired by him lawfully, he or she has 
the right to protect and keep this thing and to have all 
freedom to do with his possession whatever he likes. 
'This is called independence. • That is to say every 
individual has the right to use his property as he wishes. 
It is the same with social matters namely with 
governments. A government is indepdendent when it can 
control all its possessions freely. When it is slightly 
in danger of being harmed it should be able to defend 
itself. Now as I pointed out before, no-one has a right 
to deprive others of independence and freedom unless he 
thinks in terms of two thousand years ago. Regardless 
of the long history of Iran, 6000 years old, Iran has 
formed a government and is one of the founders of social 
law and order. Now anybody realizes this, that the 
demands that have been put to Iran are contrary to her 
freedom and independence. I do not want to discuss 
these demands in detail; the time is short, and my 
friends will discuss it in detail, but one of the articles 
in the Russian Ultimatum is this, that 'if the Iranian 
Government wishes to employ any advisors she should consult 
both the Russian and British Governments'. This means 
that if they do not agree then Iranian Government can not 
take any action. Well, in this world in which there is so 
much trade, commercial and financial relationships, if 
someone sees that his freedom and independence are slightly 
threatened he has the right to protest and say that his 
interests are based on universal agreements. I as a 
representative of a nation.which has acquired these rights 
thousands of years ago say that so far we have been 
independent; that is to say we can protect the rights and 
advancement of our country. If we now accept this 
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ultimatum, which we have not experienced before; 
then the independence of our country will suffer. 
This means they will not allow us to think about and 
prepare for the advancement and independence of our 
own country. With the utmost courage and with the 
utmost regret and with the utmost open heart I must 
tell our neighbour government that it is never 
possible for a nation which regards itself as a 
living one, to transfer her own responsibility to 
others. Finally I must add that since these 
demands will damage the independence of Iran, there 
is not any doubt and it is impossible that Iran would 
accept this demand willingly; and I am sure that the 
Russian Government, in view of her friendship with 
Iran and her efforts to improve this friendship will 
realize that this demand is contrary to the 
universally accepted agreements among nations, and 
contrary to all statements expressed by Russia as 
regards Iranian independence. I hope that this demand 
will be withdrawn and that Iranians' feelings will not 
be hurt; and I hope that the honourable ministers will 
go along with the nation and Majlis in order to reject 
this Russian demand.· 
Persian Parliamentary Documents 1911 
Although as we have seen the Majlis rejected the ultimatum 
Muhammad cA11 Shah with the aid of Lyakhov shut down the second 
Majlis. Khiyaban1 then made another speech against this ultimatum 
at S~bza Maydan (a square in Tehran). Afterwards, on government 
orders, he was forced to leave Tehran for Mashhad. In the meantime 
some of Khiyaban1's friends were arrested and some banished to Qum 
After a few months' stay at Ma~had, Khiyaban1 
decided to visit Tabriz. He travelled to Julfa via Southern 
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Russia, a route which was rather safer than travelling through 
Iran. In Julfa he was advised to go to Petrovsk where his father 
had a business and not to visit Tabriz. In Tabriz there was no 
protection from the government•s officers and the Russian 
appointed agent ~uj a(al-Dawla, a man who was known to be cruel 
and oppressive and to be anti-constitutional. After a few years 
sojourn at Petrovsk and Baku he returned home, but because of the 
terrible situation in ·Tabriz, there was no chance of political 
activity among the people. ~uj ~ al-Dawla dominated Tabriz 
until 1917, the year in which the Tzarist Government collapsed. 
The collapse brought a ray of hope to the people of Tabriz who 
were struggling to survive in the hands of a despotic government 
and its agents. Indeed, the onset of the Russian revolution 
helped to change the whole political atmosphere of Iran, particularly 
Tabriz, because the most aggressive and disruptive oppressor of 
Iran had been greatly weakened. 
THE FORMATION OF THE ANJUMAN-I AYALATI VA VILAYATI 
We have studied in the previous chapter the various events which 
followed the fourth election to the Majlis and led to Khiyaban1•s 
rising. On July 2, 1917 a manifesto was published by the committee 
of the Azerbaijan Ayalat which can be summarised as follows: 
Dear fellow countrymen, The period of the great Iranian 
Revolution, in which there was such anarchy and bloodshed, 
is now over. In order to prevent the return of such a dark 
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situation which threatens our independence and freedom; 
and in order for the Ayalat committee to control the 
governmental officials according to the Iranian 
Constitutional Law; in order to rebuild our ruined 
country and prevent the interference of such 
unauthorised people in the governmental departments, 
we would like to hold an election to select the 
members of the Anjuman-i Ayalati va vilayati who 
are famous for being honest, active and patriot 
1 . t. 1 persona 1 1es. 
On July 12, 1917 the Committee sent a telegram to Tehran 
stating its demands as follows: 
11 There is no need to describe Azerbaijan's necessities; 
the harsh conditions in Azerbaijan are obvious to our 
government, nevertheless, due to the lack of objection 
and protest by Azerbaijanis no attention is paid to by 
the government to this province. We as the deputies of 
the people will not leave the Telegraph Office, unless 
you seriously examine our demands as follows: 
a. the appointment of a wise and responsible governor-
general who is trusted by the people. 
b. the appointment of officials to the Azerbaijan 
finance and justice departments. 
c. the sending of a committee for the Gendarmerie in 
order to build up security both outside and inside 
of Azerbaijan. 
Signed by the representdti ves of the people, Shay~ 
Muhammad Khiyab~n~, Muc~n al-Rac~ y~, Muctamad al-
TuJjar, M~h~r al-Sadat and M1rz~ Jacfar Javan ...... 2 
1. See eA. A~ari, Q.Kh., p.l63. 
2. See eA. Azar1, QE.cit., pp.l99-110. 
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Meanwhile elections were held in Tehran in August 1917 but 
the date of elections was not announced for other provinces. On 
September 1, 1917 another telegram was sent to Tehran by the 
Anjuman-i Ayalat1 committee in regard to the delay of elections 
in Azerbaijan. According to the Iranian Constitutional Law, 
fifteen days after elections in the capital, the other provinces 
must hold elections, but this did not take place either in the 
other provinces or in Azerbaijan. 
In response to the telegrams from the Anjuman-i Ayalati the 
following telegram was sent by the government to Tabriz: 
11 To prevent a crisis, the Prime Minister has agreed 
to appoint as soon as possible a governor-general 
- - - 1 whom Anjuman-i A~arbayjan wanted .... 11 
Of these events Tajaddud, the official organ of the Democrat party, 
wrote: 2 
11 
••• The spirit of democracy and revival has suffered from 
the events which have taken place in our country. There 
was no way to freedom unless society was in a normal 
situation. We democrats would not wish to live in this 
poisoned atmosphere and stand these conditions any more. 
We would like to ask our responsible government to put an 
end to this abnormal position and we democrats hereby 
announce that we reject this and are going to challenge 
it through our democracy. 113 
On August 23, 1917 the Anjuman-i A~rbaijan published its 
policy which briefly runs as follows: 
1 . See eA. A~ari, Q. Kh. , p. 121 . 
2. See p. 141 of this thesis. 
3. See eA. A~ari, ~.cit., p. 146. 
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1. Azerbaijan and its policy: They declared that Azerbaijan was 
inseparable from the rest of Iran and rieither external powers nor 
internal reactionary groups had the right to destroy their freedom. 
The Democrat Party of Azerbaijan wished to take steps on the path 
to revival and declared its opposition to the present anarchy in 
Iran. The Ayalat Committee demanded the appointment of honest 
governors who had demonstrated their good character. As regards 
the tribes they frankly demanded of them that they should live in 
peace and not be permitted to make trouble for others, and finally 
they stated that they would react against those who opposed them. 
2. Concerning the Parliament elections: The Committee declared 
that, due to the importance of the National Parliament in which all 
laws were drawn up and put in action; according to the Iranian 
Nation's demands, the Committee asked for quick elections. At the 
time of elections the democrats would work to support their own Party's 
representatives to the Majlis. 
3. The importance of the District and Provincial Anjumans: The 
Anjuman-i Ayalati-yi A~arbaijan realized that how important were the 
district and provincial Anjumans, and the Committee therefore 
immediately took steps in the latter mentioned Anjumans. 
4. The Ayalat Committee and the recent Revolution in the U.S.S.R.: 
Since the Iranian and Russian Nation's relations were close and 
friendly, in accordance with both nations' struggle against their 
despotic governments, the Committee was pleased to announce how 
grateful they were for the recent Revolution in the Soviet Union. 
They accordingly wanted to further activities and relations between 
the two nations. 
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5. Discipline in the Party: Since discipline was an important 
matter for any party, the Committee noted its importance and asked 
its members to put themselves in order as quickly as possible. 
6. The Democrats and other Parties: As regards the other Parties 
in the country the Committee asked for their co-operation and that 
they should all work together for the Iranian Nation's prosperity. 1 
Despite these activities of Khiyaban1 and other democrats in 
the Anjuman-i Ayalati-yi A~arbayjan, anarchy still existed at an 
extreme level. The peop 1 e of Ga rus v1ho were being plundered by the 
tribes took refuge in Tabriz where many of them were forced to beg 
and were reduced to a desperate situation. Urumiya was burnt down 
and its Bazar was plundered and set on fire by the Russians; in 
Ahar the situation was so bad that local Shah Savan tribesmen rebelled; 
in Miyana Muqtadir Nizam the governor-general had caused many troubles 
for the people; in Tabriz a demonstration took place against the 
injustice committed by governmental officials; in other cities and 
villages of A~erbaijan conditions were the same as in Tabriz. 
Meanwhile in other cities, apart from A~erbaijan, particularly in 
Tehran, terrorism was rife; the American Consul was killed by a group 
of people; Matin al-Sultan, director of the newspaper cAsr-i Jadid, 
Muntakhab al-Dawla, Ahmad Khan-i Safa, Mu~1r Zada and Abu al-Fath 
and some others also were killed by a "Committee" in Tehran and 
other cities. The members of this Committee who called themselves 
1. Tajaddud, l ,6,1296 (20.8.1917). 
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Kumita-yi Mujazat (Punishment Committee) were M1rza Ibrahim 
Khan-i Mun~i Zada, Asad Allah Khan-i Abu al-Fath Zada and 
Muhammad Nazar Khan-i Mishkat. 1 
World War I caused a great deal of hardship in Iran. The 
allied forces who were using Iran as a supply route to Russia, and 
the famine of 1917 in Azerbaijan had a dire affect on the living 
conditions of the people, which were made much worse by hoarders 
and greedy merchants. The people suffered both physically and 
spirftually, that is to say, not only did they live in misery and 
want, but were treated cruelly by the allied forces. Tajaddud 
protested against this situation in the following words: 
11 
••• Young men of the South! shame on you who are co-operating 
with foreigners. Are you not traitors to the country?! 
Be aware that the democracy of Iran is not going to forget 
traitors to Iran. There has occurred an unbelievable 
incident which has saddened your hearts. Two days ago 
while a 15 year-old boy vJas. s. ell .i.n.g bread, he was 
stopped by some British soldiers who attempted to rape 
him. The boy resisted so one of the soldiers cut his 
throat. When some Shirazis appeared who were passing 
by chance, the soldiers left the boy but unfortunately he 
soon died. This is a definite proof about these 
gentlemen who are fighting in the name of humanity and 
democracy and supposed to be protecting a poor nation's 
rights." 2 
The opposition of the Azerbaijan Anjuman to the government 
continued. Although more telegrams were sent to Tehran and vice 
versa, Khiyaban1 in a telegram in which he urged the government 
1. See Iranschahr, No.l4 (Berlin 1926); M.Q. Hidayat, Kh.Kh., p.309. 
2. Tajaddud, 12/8/1296 (22.10.1917). 
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to fulfill the demands of Azerbaijan and to pay particular 
attention to the present situation declared, 
11 We did not think that the government representatives 
were such negligent and thoughtless persons in 
regard to the truth. I would like to notify you 
that most Azerbaijanis have noticed that the 
present anarchy is caused by some reactionary 
statesmen in the Cabinet. That is why we have 
opposed the government and demanded our rights. 
But unfortunately, the Cabinet openly tried to 
ignore our needs. We would like to ask for the 
formation of a Cabinet in which honest politicians 
will take part as quickly as possible. Otherwise 
we would think that the Cabinet is not interested 
in Azerbaijanis• affairs. I am disappointed in 
this policy and worried by this situation. 
- - - l Khiyabani. 11 
Khiyabani received a reply to his telegram from Tehran which 
admitted that there were reactionary elements in the government but 
urged him to be patient; 
.. , ........ ~-: .. · .... I am very surprised that although 
you have been in the ea pi tal for a few years, ... · ·. 
nevertheless you are complaining of the situation, 
and similarly other Azerbaijanis do not look 
seriously at the situation in Tehran. I do not deny 
that there are some reactionary elements in the 
Cabinet, but the spirit of freedom will never die 
down and no pressure will be able to spoil the truth; 
our kind and nationalist Shah, in particular will 
- -- 2 meet Iranians• demands. Zanjani ... 
l. eA. A~ari, Q.Kh., p.l63. 
2. eA. A~ar1 ,' QE_.cit., p.l63. 
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Khiyaban1 and other democrats in the Azerbaijan Anjuman 
demanded the dismissal of the Cabinet in which nationalist 
and honest statesmen had not taken part. After the passing 
of some time the government not only had not met its promises 
to the Azerbaijanis, but had delayed the holding of Majlis 
elections in Azerbaijan. The communications between Azerbaijan 
and the government were described by various newspapers in 
Tehran. Khiyaban1 and other democrats were condemned by the 
press. Kawkab-i Iran on December 9, 1917 described 
Khiyaban1•s activities as anarchy and declared: 
•• ... how can we des cri be the existence of two 
governments within one country? The answer 
is very clear, anarchy, lack of government and 
f d 1 . ..1 eu a 1 sm ... 
Nawbahar writes: 
..... we do not believe in this government; there 
has been a protest in Ra~t; a rebellion took 
place in Azarbayjan... We must await other acts 
of opposition from other parts of Iran ..... 2 
Like other papers, Sitara-yi • Iran anxiously warned the 
government not to give further opportunities to the opposition 
1. Kawkab-i Iran, December 7, 1917 (16.9.1296). 
2. Nawbahar, December 8, 1917 (17.9.1296). 
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and suggested that the Iranian government must pay more 
attention to the situation. The government it stated 
should show firmness and take drastic action against the 
rebellions. 1 
Iran in an article wrote: 
11 ., .Iran is passing through abnormal days and, 
in order to establish a powerful government, 
she needs to form her cabinet from wise and 
learned politicians ... 112 
In the meantime in Tabriz there was another meeting on 
Monday December 22, 1917 at Tajaddud. First a short speech was 
- - - - c made by Mirza Taqi Khan-i Raf at, the second editor of Tajaddud, 
addressing the Azerbaijanis and talking about their unfortunate 
fate which had been caused by the plundering, killing and harsh 
conditions to which they had been exposed. The second speaker, 
M1rza Ismac11 Nawbar1 spoke about the democrats' activities in 
Tabriz, stating that the activities of the democrats naturally 
hindered the reactionary plans which the central government wanted 
to carry out. Finally Karbala'1 cA11 Har1r1 gave another short 
speech and mentioned the effective and useful role of the democrats 
in the fall of the Cabinet. 
Following this meeting a telegram was sent by the Committee to 
Tehran in which the previous demands were once more repeated. 
1. Sitara-yi-Iran, December 8, 1917 (17.9.1296). 
2. Iran, December 11, 1917 (20.9.1296). 
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However the government was involved in the First World War and 
had little time to devote to internal policy. This development 
was nevertheless obviously disturbing to the Cabinet. Russia 
was absorbed with her revolution and struggling with World War I, 
and in response to this Great Britain had adopted a more active 
policy in Iran. - 1 According to Nawbahar British troops advanced 
in s1stan and increased their influence both in the East and the 
West of the country, filling the vacuum created by the departure 
of the Russians and establishing new bases. Five thousand 
British troops were involved in Kirman, ~1raz, sirjan and Bandar-i 
c -Abbas. Tajaddud on Wednesday February 27, 1918 wrote: 
..... Britain was running a Cabinet in Tehran which 
intended to destroy the country. But Azerbaijan 
did not give them the opportunity and instead 
demanded its rights. The reactionary religious 
groups hatched satanic plots; tribes started to 
create anarchy in the countryside; Britain was 
effectively involved in the capital ... 11 
Azerbaijan 1 s opposition to the government and members of the 
Cabinet was not superficial or based on likes or dislikes of 
personalities, but was based on a political stand, being opposed to 
the ruling government and their self interest . 
..... Azerbaijan is not going to be an idle spectator 
of the capital 1 S politicians; instead, she will 
rebel without any hesitation ... 112 
1. Nawbahar, (12.3.1918). 
2. Tajaddud, February 27, 1918. 
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In Tehran, according to the Sitara-yi Iran, the following 
demands were put to Sir Charles Marling the British Minister 
Plenipotentiary: to leave the running of the Police in the South 
to the Iranian Government and recall the British officers from that 
area; to release all the currency belonging to Iran which was kept 
at the Shahanshahi Bank, to evacuate Iranian territory as soon as 
possible. 
The situation in Iran was most unsatisfactory. On the one 
hand the political atmosphere in the capital had caused instability 
throughout Iran and on the other hand insecurity, lack of law and 
order, famine and above all involvement in the World War I, had made 
life difficult in general and in Azerbaijan in particular. 
Khiyabani•s activities were interrupted by the Turkish invasion 
of Azerbaijan in 1918 which resulted in Khiyabani and two other 
democrat leaders, Badamch1 and Nawbar1, being banished to Qars 
in Turkey. This Turkish aggression coincided with a miserable 
famine in which about ten thousand Iranians died. Despite these 
circumstances in which every grain of wheat was equal to the life 
of a human being the Turks nevertheless forcibly obtained their 
requirements directly from the city granary without paying its price. 
It became clear that the Turkish plan was not only to arrest and 
punish the Assyrians, but to pursue their Pan-Turkist ideas. A 
1. See The Sitara-yi Iran, March 18, 1918. 
man called Yusuf Ziya Bayg was appointed by the Turks to establish 
the Itti~ad-i Islam (Pan Islam). The intention was to unite the 
Turkish speaking people of Russian Azerbaijan, Iranian Azerbaijan and 
the Turks of Turkey under the Turkish flag, into a new country in 
the name of Pan Turkism. The people of Tabriz led by Khiyaban1 and 
his comrades resisted the Turkish demands. 
Badamchi and Nubari were arrested and sent to Urumiyya. After two 
months they were banished to Qars prison in Turkey and sentenced to 
fifteen days in jail. They were then released and sent to Tabriz 
as a direct result of the defeat of the central powers with whom 
Turkey was allied. When Khiyaban1 and his colleagues were once more 
among their fellow-citizens he declared: 
11 I would not wish to be born again, but if I were 
I would prefer to be born among the hungry and 
rejected people so that I can share their rejection 
and humiliation. I would not wish to deny my fel-1 
To\'t co·untrymen even if I were to be cut in pieces. 11 
In conclusion we must observe that during the period between 
1908-1919, two major foreign intervention took place in Iran. 
This period began with Tsarist Russia's attack against the 
Constitutional Revolution and ended with the Anglo-Persian Agreement 
of 1919. Tsarist Russia, opposing the Constitutional Revolution 
and taking its opportunity from the weak state of the Iranian 
government, attacked the Majlis, killing many democrats in Tehran, 
1. SeeR. Ra'is Niya, D.M., p.234. 
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- -c while in Tabriz Samad Khan-i ~uja al-Dawla who was closely backed 
by Tsarist Russia killed or hanged many constitutionalists. 
Tsarist Russians in fact had a direct role in the killing of eminent 
members of the Constitutional Revolution like ~iqat al-Islam. 
Khiyaban1 strongly opposed· the Russian ultimatum of 1911 and left 
Tehran after the closure of the Majlis. Findinq himself unsafe 
both in Tehran and Tabriz he had to go to Petrovsk where he stayed a 
couple of months before returning to Tabriz. Due to the presence 
of Samad Khan-i Shujac al-Dawla as governor of Azerbaijan, a bitter . - -
enemy of the Constitutional Revolution, Khiyabani could not take part 
openly in political activities, and for the time opened a shop in the 
Bazar where he could communicate with freedom fighters. The start 
of World War I and the invasion of Azerbaijan by the Turks caused 
more anarchy and disorder in Azerbaijan. ~hiyabani, who opposed 
Pan-Turkism in Azerbaijan, was arrested by the Turks and sent into 
exile in Turkey. The ending of the First World War and the return 
of Khayaban1 from exile, together with the evacuation of Iran by 
the Russians followinq the October revolution, paved the ground for 
further political activities and formation of the Anjuman-i Ayalat1 
va valayati in Azerbaijan by Khiyaban1. 
starting point of Khiyabani•s uprising. 
This can be regarded as the 
In these circumstances 
Britain decided to fill the vacuum in Iran by making the Anglo-
Persian Agreement of 1919 by which Britain proposed to supoort the 
Persian Central Government against internal democratic movements like 
the uprising of Khiyabani in Azerbaijan. The nature and aims of this 
agreement will be discussed in the following chapter. 
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Chapter 3 
THE ANGLO-PERSIAN 1919 AGREEMENT 
The outbreak of World War I and the weakness of the Iranian 
government destroyed for the time being any prospects of 
democracy or progress in Iran although by the end of the war 
circumstances had changed so radically that the atmosphere was 
once more suitable for the revival of political and democratic 
activity. Although Iran had declared its neutrality in 1914 
this was ignored by the combatants. Britain and Russia continued 
to maintain large numbers of troops on Iranian territory, and in 
1915 signed a new treaty whereby the whole of Iran was occupied, 
by Russia in the North and Britain in the South. In 1916 identical 
notes were presented by the two powers to the then Prime Minister, 
Sipahdar, demanding that Persian finance and customs and the Persian 
army should be under joint Anglo-Russian supervision. The first 
Majlis was dissolved on June 23, 1908 because of L~yakhov•s 
bombardment of the Parliament; the second Majlis which was convened 
on November 15, 1909 was shut down on December 1, 1909 due to the 
Russian ultimatum; the third Majlis election took olace in June 1914 
but did not meet because of the Russian occupation of Iran. 
In effect Britain and Russia were the real masters of Iran during 
these years. The fact that the nominal Iranian government had no 
real powers inevitably led to the spread of anarchy throughout the 
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country, with a breakdown of law and order, the interruption of 
normal commercial life and widespread hunger, 1917 in particular 
being a year of famine. The first revolt against this situation 
took place in 1916, when an anti-British movement was led in 
Bushihr by Shaykh Husayn Khan-i Chah Kutah1 which was assisted - --. - -
by Wassmuss, a German agent. This revolt which was directed 
against the British-raised occupation force, the South Persia 
Rifles (S.P.R.), was not suppressed until 1921. 1 
The collapse of the Tsarist regime in 1917 changed the situation 
in Iran drastically. The bulk of Russian troops simply made their 
way back to Russia, although a number of units remained loyal to 
the Tsar and remained in Iran, where they later entered the service 
The disappearance of the Russian armies on her 
Eastern front led to a brief Turkish occupation of Azerbaijan, in 
which a number of German agents were involved. 
This sudden disappearance of Russia from the North of Iran 
inevitably led to a state of anarchy in the region. British troops 
were insufficient to occupy the whole area, and after a brief 
attempt to occupy Baku in order to prevent the Bolsheviks from 
establishing themselves there they only played a minor role in the 
North of Iran, since British public opinion was now strongly 
opposed to further military ventures. For the meantime the Iranian 
army was too weak to occupy these areas effectively itself. A 
striking example of the weakness of the Iranian government at this 
1. For more details see H. Makki, Q£·cit., Vol.l, pp.22-24, and 
M.Q. Hidayat, Kh.Kh., pp.273-280. 
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period is the ease with which Isma c11 s1mitqu, with his Kurdish 
followers was able to create serious disturbances in Urumiyya, 
Salmas, Khuy and Lakistan, plundering and killing, and on·one 
-
occasion, setting fire to Urumiyya, as a result of wh·ich six 
thousand one hundred people are said to have died. 1 The central 
government did not merely fail to take any measures against him, 
but actually appointed him to maintain order in Western Azerbaijan. 2 
The disappearance of the Russians did not lead to any lessening of 
the autocratic style of government of A~mad Shah. In 1918, 
recognising the realities of the new international situation, he 
appointed as Prime Minister the pro-British politician Vu~uq al-Dawla ... 
Britain was now the most influential power in Iran and was determined 
to maintain this position. In order to do so it was necessary for 
her to co-operate with anti-democratic forces such as Ahmad Shah and 
Vu~uq al-Dawla, since it was clear that the nationalist and democratic 
forces within Iran would never agree to the domination of Iran by any 
outside power, Britain or any other. If we consider the position of 
Britain in the Persian Gulf and the Indian subcontinent, British 
support of the Iranian government seems very logical. This in turn 
Cl - - -explains why Democratic Movements such as that Khiyabani fell victim 
to this co-operation. 
1. Tajaddud, 25, 12,1296 (18.3.1918). 
\ 1 _. -
2_ For more details see, F. Nur1-i IsJw~~~~::tr,r, Rastakhiz-i Iran, 
c - -: (Tehran 1957), pp.50,61,111 and A. A~ar1, Q.Kh., pp.ll2-118. 
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British interests may be discussed under three headings, 
political commercial and financial. Britain's political interests, 
apart from the maintenance of her previous dominant position in Iran 
in general, were the protection of Mesopotamia and the defence of 
India. In addition there were British commercial interests in Iran, 
such as the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, the Imperial Bank of Persia, 
and finally the British Financial interests in Iran which at that 
period consisted of the Iranian debt to the British Government of 
several million pounds. To keep these interests in Iran, Great 
Britain had need of a secure guarantee by which not only the British 
interests in Iran were safeguarded but also her interests in 
Mesopotamia, India, the Persian Gulf on the one hand and prevention 
of Russian expansion to these areas on the other. This briefly 
accounts for British interference in Iranian internal affairs and 
her permanent support of the Iranian Shah, Prime Minister, Cabinet 
and other politicians. 
Lord Curzon, the British Foreign Minister and Vu~uq al-Dawla 
both played an important part in the activities of this time. In 
1918, Vu~uq al-Dawla was the Iranian Prime Minister, and was making 
preparations to sign a convention with Great Britain. To this end 
the British Plenipotentiary in Tehran was instructed to reach a 
mutual agreement with Vu~uq al-Dawla in order to maintain British 
influence in Iran. Lord Curzon affirmed British responsibility for 
supporting Mesopotamia, because Great Britain did not wish to 
jeopardize her Middle East interests in the future and·also did not 
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want to cause financial and political discord between India and 
Mesopotamia .1 
Faced by revolution in Russia and political upheavals in 
Iran, Britain decided to prop up the government of Ahmad Shah and 
indeed exerted a great deal of pressure upon it. Lord Curzon 
wrote in 1919: 
"Very urgent: The Persian Minister for foreign affairs 
thinks that the Shah should be urged to take energetic 
action without delay, to prove possibility that he 
supports Prime Minister, that for this purpose he 
should issue a proclamation urging that order and 
security be maintained and warning the people against 
2 dangerous propaganda .... " 
In order to keep in power the government of Vu~uq al-Dawla, which 
was regarded by Britain as being in her interests but was not 
democratically elected by the majority of Iranians, the British 
government was prepared to use what can only be described as bribery. 
As long as Ahmad Shah kept Vu~uq al-Dawla in power and supported him . -
and his cabinet, he received monthly payments from Britain: 
" ... A persona 1 payment of Ts. 15,000 a month to the 
Shah, to be continued so long as he keeps Vu~uq 
a 1 - Da w 1 a ' s cab i net i n power . . . . " 3 
Ahmad Shah's greed for money is commented on very explicitly . -
in the following telegram: 
1. See Public Record Office [114911/150/34] Memorandum by Lord Curzon 
on the Persian Agreement, 8.9.1919. 
2. See F.O. No.311 [201530/150/34] Tehran, June 7, 1920. 
3. Public Record Office No.371/4927, London, August 15, 1919. 
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~~ ... He is now thoroughly well disposed towards 
us and determined to work with us in his own 
rather odd way. Best method of keeping him 
in this frame of mind is to give him as much 
money as we can for that is what he loves most 
in the wor 1 d. . . . 111 
Lord Curzon's report to the British Cabinet contains a clear 
statement of British Policy and her interests in Iran: 
" ... A year ago, when our fortunes in the Western 
theatre of operations were drawing towards a 
successful issue, and when Persia herself ceased 
to contemplate a German victory, a leading 
Persian statesman named Vu~uq al-Dawla who had 
always been friendly to British interests, was 
appointed by the Shah as the head of the Ministry. 
With him in the Persian Cabinet were two other 
Ministers equally convinced that the future of 
Persia lay in friendly reliance upon ourselves. 
The Shah himself adopted the same line and backed 
his Ministers. Simultaneously we had sent to 
Tehran as our Minister Sir Percy Cox, for many 
years British resident in the Persian Gulf, and 
latterly chief political officer in Mesopotamia. 
His object and his instructions were to come to 
some arrangement with the Persian Government by 
which British interests in that part of the world 
should be safeguarded in the future from a recurrence 
of the recent shocks, and by which Persia, incurably 
feeble and unable to stand by herself, should be 
given the support that would enable her to maintain 
her position among the independent nations of the 
1. F.O. No.417 [206097/150/34] Tehran, June 25, 1920, Vel .XIII, 
pp.538-39. 
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world. The negotiations which have. proceeded 
during the last nine months, and which have now 
reached a satisfactory conclusion, are the 
result of the joint efforts of the Persian 
Government and Sir Percy Cox. What they mean 
in practice is this: not that we have received 
or are about to receive a mandate for Persia 
on the contrary, the attempts of the Persian 
representatives in Paris to be heard by the 
peace conference have been attempted by uniform 
failure; not that Persia has handed over to us 
any part of her liberties; not that we are 
assuming fresh and costly obligations which will 
place a great strain upon us in the future; but 
that the Persian Government, realizing that we 
are the only neighbouring Great Power closely 
interested in the fate of Persia, able and 
willing to help her and likely disinterested in 
that object, have decided of their own free will 
to ask us to assist Persia in the rehabilitation 
of her fortunes... . .. 1 
THE 1919 AGREEMENT 
We shall attempt to show in this chapter how Khiyaban1 reacted 
against the 1919 Agreement, and what were the reasons for his 
vigorous attack upon this agreement, and we shall also attempt 
to study the reaction of foreign powers to this agreement, 
particularly as expressed in the press, and the reactions of the 
1. F.O. [114911/150/34] August 9, 1919, Vol.IV, pp.lll9-1122. 
60 
Iranians themselves. We must therefore study the contents of 
this agreement closely and also examine the letters and documents 
which are to be found in the British Foreign Office. This will 
show that the reaction of Khiyaban1 against this agreement was 
wellfounded and rational. 
In order to understand Khiyaban1•s political thinking and his 
objection to Vu~uq al-Dawla and his conduct of Iranian affairs we 
need to examine the policies of the government inside Iran and her 
foreign policy as regards agreements with foreign powers, and also 
study the reaction to these policies and agreements. The enmity of 
the Iranian ruling circles to Khiyaban1 is understandable only in 
this context. 
Vu~uq al-Dawla, having established a secure position in Tehran, 
decided to organize a strong administrative system and a powerful 
government in Iran. This seemed impossible with an empty treasury, 
and so he approached Great Britain which was the strongest neighbour 
of Iran at that period. 
During the Summer of 1918 the situation was tense, but the end 
of World War I and the collapse of the monarchy in Russia removed all 
possibilities of outside intervention from that quarter for the 
moment and left Great Britain without a rival in Iran. It was in 
these circumstances that the 1919 agreement was formulated. 1 The 
story of this agreement has been told in several works, but the 
l. For the full text of the agreement see Appendix No.:. 
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results which would have been achieved by the two countries, Great 
Britain and Iran, have not been analysed in any detail. A study 
of the articles of the agreement reveals the extent of Iran•s 
dependence upon Great Britain. By the conclusion of this agreement 
four objects were contemplated by the Foreign office: the 
reorganization and control of the Iranian army by British officers 
and experts; the loan of the services of such advisors as might be 
necessary to effect a similar control of the police and civil 
administrations; the revision of the existing customs tariff; 
and the development of communications, railways and roads in 
particular. Although this agreement was not approved by the Majlis 
and was therefore not valid in terms of article 24 of the Iranian 
constitution, the British began actively planning to implement it. 
A team of staff officers headed by General W.E.R. Dickson planned 
the reorganization of the army; the customs tariff was revised by 
a joint commission; a senior treasury official, Mr Sydney A. Armitage 
Smith was appointed to reform the Iranian financial system and the 
first instalment of the proposed loan was paid over. However the 
government of Iran was not able to spend it directly and independently; 
rather she was obliged to spend it under the direct supervision of the 
British advisor: 
..... That instalment of the loan cannot properly be 
made till the British Financial Advisor has taken 
up his duties in Tehran ...... l 
l. Public Record Office 371/4927, August 14, 1919. 
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The Shah of Iran was invited to London, where the British 
Government was confident of the ratification of the agreement. In 
London he received a magnificent welcome from the British 
Government and King George V, who gave a speech at a reception in 
which he declared: 
..... We welcome your Majesty•s present visit here as 
a renewed proof of the close ties of friendship which 
have united our two countries for more than a century. 
We welcome it more especially at the present moment, 
when the relations between Persia and Great Britain 
have become even closer than they have ever been, 
and we are about to embark upon a collaboration in 
the field of material and administrative progress 
which will ensure to your country a future not 
unworthy of its famous past ...... l 
Although Vu~uq al-Dawla had signed the agreement personally he 
still needed to have it passed by the Majlis before it could become 
valid. The weakness of his position was recognized by the British 
Government, who while determined to give him every assistance were 
realistic enough to offer him asylum should this be necessary: 
11 Your Highness. It gives me much pleasure to inform 
Your Highness that His Majesty•s Government authorise me 
to intimate that, in view of the agreement concluded 
this day... They are prepared to extend to Your 
Highness their good offices and support in case of need, 
and further to afford Your Highness asylum in the 
British Empire should necessity arise ...... 2 
1. The Times, November 1, 1919. 
2. Copy of a letter, dated the 9th August, 1919, from His Majesty•s 
Minister to their Highness Vossough-ed-Dowleh, Vol .XIII, pp.ll41-42. 
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However Vu~uq al-Dawla pressed on and ordered an election, 
though taking the precaution of engaging in corrupt practices, 
thus becoming the originator in Iran of an unfortunate tradition 
of fraud, partiality and violence in the pursuit of political 
aims. Mustawfi says, writing of these elections and Vu~uq al-Dawla's 
actions that the chief of the Damavand Gendarmerie region said: 
" ... I have done my job well and I have obeyed 
whatever the government has ordered. With this 
~hip I hit the people so that they would vote for 
a representative who was recommended by the 
t .. 1 governmen .... 
He also states that fifteen thousand ballot papers were sent 
to Shiraz and Kirmanshahan for the elections, although the number 
of Sh1raz voters was twenty five thousand and that for Kirmanshahan 
was twenty two thousand. In Kirmanshahan every Lur with a rifle 
in one hand and a dozen votes in the other one came to the Anjuman 
and entered his votes, without any rejection by the election 
supervisory council . 2 A telegram sent by the people of S1rjan to 
Vu~uq al-Dawla illustrates how openly Vu~uq al-Dawla allowed elections 
to the Majlis to be manipulated: 
"Dear Prime Minister, According to an order issued by 
the Governor General of s1rjan, the people who do not 
take part in this election will be charged Ts.lO. 
Because of our fear of the governor and of the 
penalty we were obliged to take our ballot papers 
1. eA. Mustawf1, QE.cit., p.92. 
2. Ibid., p.96. 
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and hand them over to the governor. He kept 
them all and on the day of election we were all 
called and had to cast the ballot papers which 
had already been written out and prepared by 
the governor in the presence of the election 
supervisory council. Now a person has been. 
elected who is an absolute stranger in our city 
and whom we do not know. The consequences of 
this, good or bad, are the responsib1ity of the 
Prime Minister ... 
In order to ensure approval for this agreement, Vu~uq al-Dawla 
realized that he would have to impose martial law in Tehran, as 
otherwise the opponents of this agreement would be too dangerous 
for his cabinet. Spying on the people was thoroughly organized and 
a firm censorship of the papers was established. Vu~uq al-:Dawla 
also used religion as a political means, and his attempts in this 
field were reported by Mr Norman from Tehran to Earl Curzon as 
fo 11 ows: 
..... Prime Minister also spoke this afternoon ... 
He told me in confidence that he was also about to 
send secret mission to Holy places in Mesopotamia 
with a view to inducing the religious authorities 
there to issue a fet~a condemning Bolshevism as 
contrary to Islam, a step which I myself had been 
intending to advise ...... 2 
1. Ibid., p.96. See also,~· Makk1, op.cit., p.l7. 
2. F.O. No.465 [C830/56/34] Tehran, July 7, 1920, Vol.XIII, 
pp.559-60. 
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Vu~uq al-Dawla received monetary payment from the British 
to aid his efforts to get the agreement passed by the Majlis, 
although this proved somewhat counter-productive: 
11 Imperial Bank of Persia have supplied me with 
following particulars of transaction:-
Amount paid was 400,000 tomans, and equivalent 
in sterling £131,147, and not £250,000 as I 
had been told. On 11th August, 1919, 10,000, 
a~d on 13th August 90,000 tomans were handed to 
Sarem-ed-Dowleh in cash by the then chief 
manager of the bank. On 19th September, 1919 
balance of 200,000 tomans was credited to 
Vossugh-ed-Dowleh and a credit note sent to him .... 111 
Indeed British attempts to dominate Iran by bribing a dishonest 
and corrupt King and Prime Minister aroused opposition throughout 
Iranian society . Norman in another telegram states: 
..... We are in the meantime also alienating 
sympathies of other sections notably rich 
reactionary landowners by our failure to 
carry on what they regard our moral obligations 
towards Persia in the matter of her defence ... 
We are now identified with most autocratic elements 
. t .. 2 1 n coun ry... . 
Britain had in fact established her own government within 
Iranian territory. In other words she had her own troops and her 
own administrative organization in Iran where she was able to do 
whatever she wished. In these matters the Iranian Government had 
1 0 F.O. Norman to Earl Curzon, No.754, [Cll774/82/34] Tehran 19.11.1920. 
Vol.XIII, p.639. 
2. F.O. No.393 [204748/150/34] Tehran, June 18, 1 920. Vol.XIII, 
pp.526-27. 
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no power to do as they wished, but were obliged to consult the 
British Government before taking any step. We see this in 
Lord Derby•s telegram to Lord Curzon: 
11 Very urgent, Persian Minister of Foreign Affairs has 
been to see me... What advice does British 
Government give as to their proper conduct? 
Shall they enter into negotiations with Soviet 
Government~ ...... l 
THE 1919 AGREEMENT AS SEEN BY THE FOREIGN PRESS 
The Anglo Persian Agreement was openly criticised by European and 
American Press and Politicians. Thus the New York Daily News 
stated: 
..... Persia had died; the death certificate was 
the Anglo-Persian Treaty; this treaty was 
completed for the exclusive interest of 
G t B •t . ..2 rea r1 a 1 n... . 
The Washington Post of October 5, 1919 declared of the agreement 
and the British role in it; 
..... none of those who have oaid attention even superficially 
to the Treaty signed on the 3rd [9th] August between 
Great Britain and Persia can fail to see that Great 
Britain has struck a blow, voluntarily or involuntarily, 
at the League of Nations whose creation is now proposed. 
1. F.O. No.602 [199077/150/34] Paris, May 20, 1920, Vol .XIII, 
pp.491-2. 
2. Daily News, 29.8.1919. 
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Before the ink was dry on Great Britain's 
ratification of the Treaty of Peace even while 
the British Parliament was discussing the 
covenant of the League of Nations, negotiations 
at Tehran had reached a point where the 
independence of Persia was surrendered and where 
the control of the Persian nation was transferred 
to British hands .... 111 
Like the American Press the Government of the United States 
were opposed to the Anglo-Persian Agreement. Congress passed a 
resolution calling on the State Department to communicate the text 
of any correspondence between His Majesty's Government and United 
2 States Government with regard to the Anglo-Persian Agreement. 
Both American politicians and the American Press supported the 
Iranian nation and it~ rights and blamed the British policy and the 
Iranian Government. The Americans indeed wanted to follow the 
declaration of Woodrow Wilson who had said on February 11, 1918: 
11 ... People and Provinces should no longer be 
bartered for among Governments like cattle 
or like the pawns on a chess-board .... 113 
In the hope of heading off American opposition to the Anglo-
Persian Agreement, Britain offered America the opportunity to 
participate in it by sending advisors to take part in financial and 
administrative reforms. Viscount Grey gives his views on this 
subject in a telegram sent to Lord Curzon, from Washington: 
1. Washington Post, 5.10.1919. 
2. F.O. No.26 [170326/150/34] Washington, January 13, 1920, Vol.XIII, p.433. 
3. F.O. No.960 [1176/150/34] Paris, August 17, 1919, Vo1.IV, p.1135. 
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11 
••• Embassy here tell me that subject has not attracted 
much attention in press, but feeling in State 
Department is very strong; they think move has been 
kept in the dark intentionally, and represent 
agreement as a policy of virtual annexation of Persia 
but friendly senator has spoken of it with 
regret in this sense. 
I shall tell United States Government history 
of Agreement and draw attention to your Lordship's 
speech on Persia. But I propose to explain our 
policy is not one of annexation but encouraging a 
strong independent Persia as a buffer state on Indian 
frontier. 
In fact I should propose saying we should be glad 
if United States Government would become partners in 
this loan and in accompanying conditions of agreement. 
American Policy will never be aggressive against India 
and no doubt Americans in Persia would secure at any 
rate moral influence of United States Government against 
any revival of aggression from Russia or elsewhere ...... 1 
However, the United States showed no interest in this offer and 
continued to be opposed to the agreement until its final collapse. 
SOVIET REACTION TO THE ANGLO-PERSIAN AGREEMENT 
The Russians also opposed the 1919 Anglo-Persian Agreement, and 
declared that the Soviet Government refused to recognize its 
validity. They regarded this agreement as a serious threat to 
1. F.O. No.l392 [134895/150/34] Washington, September 28, 1919, 
Vol.IV, p.ll85. 
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the independence and sovereignty of the Iranian people and at the 
same time declared all unjust agreements between Russia and Persia 
from 1907 to 1915 null and void. A translation of an extract 
from a Caucasian newspaper, sent by Sir Percy Cox from Tehran to 
Lord Curzon illustrates the Russian point of view: 
11 0ne of the first and firmest opinions of the 
Russian Republican Soviet of Labour and Peasantry 
has been to declare that all nations, weak and 
strong, independent, or forced to be under other 
powers, must be free and must not be under 
foreign influence, and no government should bring 
them under its own authority by force... The 
Russian Nation will return to Persia whatever has 
been taken from her by the Imperial Russian 
generals. The Persian Government has, on the other 
side, declared all such treaties null and void. 
Under these circumstances we expected Persia to 
have a new political life and to put an end to the 
oppression of savage foreigners. Now that the 
victorious, but cruel, English are s(angling Persia 
and want to bring her under their yoke the Russian 
Republican Soviet of Labour and Peasantry most 
emphatically declares that it will not recognize the 
Anglo-Persian Agreement, which will lead to the slavery 
of Persians. Russian labour considers the Persian 
labourers as their sincere friends and brothers and 
that they must share its liberty. The Russian 
Republican Soviet of Labour and Peasantry regards 
that weak agreement as a scrap of paper having no legal 
validity. The agreement shows that the Persian 
statesmen have sold themselves and the independence of 
their nation to the oppressive English. We have 
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cancelled all the guarantees which the Persian 
Government, under pressure, had undertaken 
towards the Russian Imperialism. Henceforth 
the Russian Government will not interfere in 
Persian affairs. The Caspian Sea has been cleared 
of the formidable ships of English Imperialism and 
commercial ships, under Persian flags, will sail on 
that sea with full liberty. All Government 
privileges will be abolished. The extra-territorial 
rights will be abolished, the Banque d'Escompte in 
Persia, railways, roads, buildings, harbour 
administrations, telegraphs, and telephones will be 
handed over to Persia. All Russian administration 
and arrangements which may interfere with the domestic 
affairs of Persia will be abolished and cancelled." 1 
The new Soviet Government was soon to become involved in 
Iranian affairs itself, but for the present it is sufficient to 
note Russian disapproval of the 1919 Agreement. 
THE REACTION OF THE FRENCH PRESS 
The publication of the Anglo-Persian Agreement evoked a storm of 
protest in France. In the French press, British policy in Iran was 
examined closely and when the terms of the agreement were released 
the general response was that the British Empire had, in fact 
received another territorial extension. Thus Paris-Soir proclaimed: 
1. Part of a translation of an extract from an unspecified Caucasian 
newspaper, sent by Sir P. Cox to Lord Curzon, F.O. No.l69 
[154949/150/34] October 21, 1919, Vol .IV, pp.l207-09. 
71 
..... A territory nearly three times the area of 
France, very rich in undeveloped natural 
resources and possessing oil deposits of very 
great value to the British navy, passes, to 
all intents and purposes, under British 
t 1 
,,1 con ro . . . . 
2 On the other hand, Le Temps maintained that it appeared that 
the new Anglo-Persian treaty explicitly preserved the integrity and 
independence of Persia. These expressions of course had been 
previously used in the 1907 Anglo-Persian agreement3 and to this 
extent British policy in Iran had not changed. 
Liberte wrote: 
" ... it is to guard India that Great Britain went to 
Egypt and stayed there, that she protects 
Afghanistan, instals herself in Mesopotamia, intends 
to keep Palestine, and disputes with us Syria, which, 
nevertheless, was assured to us by the treaty of 1916 ... 
such is the treaty of independence which our allies have 
imposed on Persia. It is not said that to do this 
they ask for the least mandates from the League of 
Nations, nor even that they intend to submit the 
agreement to the executive council of the League, 
as the statutes enjoin .... "4 
1. Paris-Soir, August 24, 1919. 
2. Le Temps, August 17, 1919. 
3. The Anglo-Russian Agreement of August 31, 1907 began with the words: 
"The Government of Great Britain and Russia having mutually 
engaged to respect the integrity and independence of Persia ... ~~ 
4. Liberte, August 15, 1919. 
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. Jean Herbette, the Foreign Editor of Le Temps, describes on 
August 17, 1919 'the wonderful geographical position of Persia' and 
says 
"Persia lies at the cross-roads of three influences, 
English, Russian and German, which have opposed one 
another in the East ... it is impossible to calculate 
the advantages which Persia in twenty or thirty years 
may bring to a power which employs modern methods of 
exploitation there." 
The writer says that the new Anglo-Persian Agreement explicitly 
maintains the integrity and independence of Persia, but that the 
same expression was used in the preamble to the Anglo-Russian 
Agreement of August 31, 1907, the object of which was to divide 
Persian territory into a British and a Russian zone. "The same 
words integrity and independence now reappear, and it is difficult to 
give them in 1919 a different meaning to that attached to them in 
1907, namely a purely oratorical precaution." 
On 14th August 1919 Le Temps and D~bats published articles in 
which British policy and the Anglo-Persian Agreement were criticized. 
Debats especially made a bitter attack, describing the agreement as, 
"placing Persia on the footing of Egypt". The writer added that 
"the agreement was not well received in Persia by public opinion". 
Eventually, however, the French government not only did not 
follow up her nation's rejection of the Anglo-Persian Agreement, 
but even co-operated with the British. She did not make any 
unfavourable comments on the Anglo-Persian Agreement and even 
apologised for not publishing the full details in France. 
explains this in the following telegram, 
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Lord Curzon 
11 The French Ambassador called at this Department 
on October 27th and read to Lord Hardinge of 
Penshurst a despatch which he had just received 
from his Government, offering excuses for the non-
publication in France of the complete text of the 
speech which I made on September 18th on the 
occasion of the dinner given to his Highness 
Nosret-ed-Dowleh. Monsieur Paul Cambon also 
read at this interview telegrams which had been 
despatched to Monsieur Bonin, instructing him 
to co-operate with you closely and directing that 
no unfavourable comments on the Anglo-Persian 
Agreement should be allowed. 111 
This meeting took place after the French Ambassador to Tehran 
had shown 'unfriendliness• in his attitude to the Anglo-Persian 
Agreement. Subsequently he had to modify his attitude and act in 
accordance with his government•s instructions. The following 
telegram illustrates this; 
11 
••• A strong representation has been made to the French 
Embassy regarding your French colleague•s unfriendliness ... 
The French Government have been asked to instruct him to 
alter his attitude. The French Charg~ d 1 Affaires assured 
me that the attitude complained of was not in accordance 
with the instructions or wishes of the French Government 
which were to an altogether contrary effect, and 
undertook to report the matter at once to French 
Government. I gather that the French Government are 
not unaware of M. Bonin's activities. 112 
1. Lord Curzon to Sir P. Cox (Tehran), No.236 [147145/150/34] 
Foreign Office, November 1, 1919, Vol .IV, p.l218. 
2. Lord Curzon to Sir P. Cox (Tehran), No.443 [116167/150/34] 
Foreign Office, August 19, 1919, Vol.IV, p.ll36. 
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THE REACTION OF THE BRITISH PRESS 
Predictably, the attitude of the British press was very different 
from that of the other countries considered. Thus the Daily Herald 
described Iran as 'an orphaned Persia', and on August 20, 1919 
stated: 
" ... the disappearance of Imperial Russia has enabled 
us to act for the first time without the fear of 
local opposition in Persia. In 1907 we divided it 
into sphere of influence with Russia. Russia is gone, 
and to an orphaned Persia we must now endeavour to be 
father and mother both .... we alone may appoint the 
advisors who will assist Persian Ministers to 
reorganize their country while we also will appoint 
the officers who will command the troops, who will 
see that our advice is respected .... "1 
In a similar but more restrained vein The Times wrote; 
"The Anglo-Persian Agreement which was signed on the 
9th inst., provides for the restoration of Persia 
through British brains and money. British experts 
are to be supplied for the Civil administration and 
British officers and equipment for the new force that 
is to be raised for the maintenance of order .... "2 
The Times was naturally aware of French opposition to this 
treaty, and a few days later wrote; 
" ... naturally quite a number of the French arguments 
in both the Syrian and the Persian discussions are 
debatable. There is on more than one point a conflict 
of evidence and information, but the whole development 
1. Daily Herald, August 20, 1919. 
2. The Times, August 16, 1919. 
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of the Near Eastern situation seems to show that 
the time has come when events themselves will 
force even the Peace Conference to bestir 
itself .... 111 
Clearly at this period The Times was hoping that it would be 
possible to overcome French opposition to British policies in the 
Middle East by presenting France with a fait accompli, both in 
Syria and Iran. This is commented on also from a somewhat 
different point of view by Foreign Affairs; 
"The anger of the French imperialists leaves us 
cold. They are angry because our imperialism 
snatches at the Persian peach, while objecting 
to French imperialism devouring the Syrian fig. 
What matters is not the irritation of French 
imperialism, which cares nothing for Persia qua 
Persia, but the steady moral declension, 
of which Persia is the latest example, of 
British policy. 112 
In general, however, the attitude of the British press at this 
period was one of unqualified enthusiasm. This contrasts sharply 
with the disillusion of the press a year later, as we shall see 
below. 
THE REACTION OF THE IRANIANS TO THE 1919 AGREEMENT 
The Agreement was most unpopular in Iran and was rejected by the 
mass of Iranians. It was believed that with this agreement 
1. The Times, August 19, 1919. 
2. . Foreign Affairs, London, November, 1919. 
76 
Vu~uq al-Dawla had sold Iran to the British Government. This is 
explained by Mr Norman in a telegram which was sent on August 6, 
1920 from Tehran to Lord Curzon in London; 
"It does not appear to be realized at home how 
intensely unpopular agreement was in Persia 
and how hostile public opinion had become to 
Vosuq's Cabinet before it fell. It was 
believed in Persia that notwithstanding pledges 
given agreement really aimed at destruction of her 
independence and that Vosuq and those acting with 
him had sold their country to British for fact 
that money had been received by them for 
signing agreement could not be kept secret." 1 
The 1919 Agreement had its supporters however as well as its 
opponents in Iran. The people who were pro-Agreement, were from 
the rich landowners and politicians in the capital and Tabriz, 
people such as cAyn-al-Dawla, Mu~ir al-Dawla and his brother in 
Tehran,2and the merchants of Tabriz. 3 The opponents of this 
agreement were from the rest of the Iranians; some of these are 





"1. Extreme demands headed by well-known individuals, 
Mudarris and Imam Juma Khoi. 2. Political enemies 
of Prime Minister, and certain politicians out of 
work who have little to expect from us. 3. Officers, 
Russian and Persian, of Cossack division. 4. French, 
American and Russian Legations, as far as they can 
oppose it with safety. "4 
F.O. No.562 [C3302/82/34] Tehran, August 6, 1920, Vol.XIII, p.585. 
F.O. No.595 [123784/150/34] Tehran, September 1, 1919, Vo1.IV, p.ll50. 
F.O. No.570 [120553/150/34] Tehran, August 22, 1919, Vo 1. IV, pp. 1139-40. 
F.O. No.569 [120074/150/34] Tehran, August 22, 1919, Vol .IV, pp.1138-39. 
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Internal opponents were threatened with banishment if there 
was any further activity against the agreement. Meanwhile some 
individuals were warned and some politicians were deported, for 
example Mumtaz al-Dawla, Muc1n al-Tujjar, Mustashar al-Dawla, 
Mumtaz al-MuJk and Muhtasham al-Saltana. 1 
Despite the unpopularity of this agreement, so readily 
recognized by his successor Norman, Cox continued to believe that 
the agreement was widely acceptable in Iran, as shown by a telegram 
sent in August 1919 to Lord Curzon in which he summarises the 
reports of British Consuls in various provincial towns: 
..... Tabriz. Merchants and respectable ... s2 very glad. 
... Kazvi n. Better class of landowners and merchants 
favourable ... 
Rasht. This unfavourable comment (sic] but details of 
agreement not generally known to public. 
Hamadan. Agreement popular where majority are 
concerned and accepted by all. 
North Arabistan. Agreement most favourably received. 
Khorassan. Large public meeting held on 18th August. 
Terms of Agreement which we had published were read 
and unanimously appreciated. 
Shiraz. Reception generally favourable - full 
details not yet published. 
Kerman. Public feeling in favour of agreement, which 
is on the whole approved by all classes particularly 
b 
. ..3 us 1 ne ss men . . . . 
1. F.O. No.618 [127632/150/34] Tehran, September 10, 1919, Vol.IV, 
pp.ll60-61. 
2. The text here is uncertain. 
3. F.O. No.570 [120553/150/34] Tehran, August 22, 1919, Vo1 .IV, 
pp.ll39-40. 
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Despite Cox's optimism however, a demonstration against the 
agreement and Vu~u q al-Dawla was held in Tehran on 31 September 
by the Tehran students, on which occasion they were quickly seized 
by the police. This student demonstration was described by 
Sir P. Cox as follows; 
..... it attacked Vussugh and agreement; called on 
clergy to drape the mosques in black, and on all 
patriotic Persians to rise and demand its 
cancellation. Meanwhile the members of gang 
continued to meet at each other's houses and 
hatch plans ...... l 
Opposing this agreement Khiyabani wrote: 
..... As long as this agreement has not been 
ratified by the Majlis, we regard it as 
nothing more than a piece of paper and do 
not regard that agreement as effective .... 112 
A further cause of discontent was furnished by Ahmad Shah's visit 
3 to Europe, which further drained the depleted Iranian treasury. 
On the day of his return (3.6.1920) the students of Tehran held a 
demonstration of which they shouted 'long live the Shah, death to 
the English and the agreement•. 4 
1. F.O. No.618 [127632/150/34] Tehran, September 10, 1919, Vol.IV, 
pp.ll60-61. 
2. Tajaddud, 16/5/1298 (12.8.1919). 
3. About 10,000,000 Francs, see F.O. No.l89 [191064/150/34] Tehran, 
April 9, 1920, Vol.XIII, pp.463-64 and No.388 [189321/150/34] 
Paris, March 30, 1920, Vol.XIII, pp.459-60. 
4. F.O. No.332 [201783/150/34] Tehran, June 3, 1920, Vol .XIII, p.502. 
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This unnecessary and financially ruinous journey to Europe . 
attracted unfavourable comment from Khiyabani; 
.... nobody asks where the King goes to, nobody 
asks why he does so. Nobody asks why this 
kind of expenditure must be taken from the 
impoverished Iranian treasury. While the 
people are suffering from hunger, Ts.40,000 
are being spent for the celebration of the King's 
t f E .. 1 re urn ram urope .... 
The position in the cities in general and the capital in 
particular was very difficult. The press were warned not to write 
any article about the agreement, about troop movements or about 
Bolshevism and martial law was proclaimed in Tehran. 2 
Although Vu~uq al-Dawla had openly interfered in the elections, 
nevertheless in Azerbaijan six out of the nine who were elected to 
the Fourth Majlis were from the Democrats. 
himself, Mirza Muhammad Taqi Tabataba'i, Fiyuzat, Sayyid al-. . . 
Muhaqqiqin, Nazim al-Dawla-yi Diba and Muctamad al-Tujjar. . . 
According to H. Makki, Vu~uq al-Dawla realized that if Khiyabani 
and the other democrat deputies from Azerbaijan attended the Majlis, 
their determined opposition to the 1919 Agreement would make its 
ratification impossible. For this reason he delayed summon1ng the 
Majlis. 3 The growth of the movement in Tabriz was perhaps the main 
reason for the downfall of the Cabinet of Vu~uq al-Dawla on the 
l. Tajaddud, 3/5/1299 (26.7.1920). 
2. For more details see, F.O. No.509 C2158/82/34 Tehran, July 20, 
1920, Vol .XIII, pp.568-69. 
3. See H. Makki, QE.cit., Vol .1, p. 17 and also seeR. Mihraban1, 
Gushaha'laz Tarikh-i Mucasir-i Iran (Tehran, 1982), p.l1. 
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25th June 1920, despite the fact that he was positively and directly 
supported by Great Britain. Due to his personal unpopularity and 
his political dishonesty, e.g. his attempts-to rig the elections 
to the 4th Majlis and to ensure the return of his own followers in 
order to ratify the 1919 Agreement; his establishment of martial 
law in Tehran during the latter part of his period in office and 
his banishment of political opponents and suppression of newspapers, 
he was ultimately forced to resign and to give way to Mushir al-
Dawla. 
When Vu~uq al-Dawla realized that he was unable to carry out his 
policies, he had no choice except to resign. Winston Churchill 
states in a memorandum on the Persian situation; 
..... Mr Norman succeeded Sir P. Cox at Tehran on 
June lOth and found that it was useless to 
continue to support Vusouk-ed-Dowleh, who had 
become very unpopular and had determined to 
withdraw from office. A. because the Shah did 
not like him. B. because we did not support 
him, and C. because he was ill and tired of 
ff . ..1 o 1ce .•.. 
Nevertheless after Vu~uq al-Dawla's resignation, he received 
a telegram which was sent by Lord Curzon on July 1, 1920. The text 
runs as follows: 




Please convey to his Highness Vosouk-ed 
Dawleh a personal message of thanks and 
appreciation from me for the eminent 
services he has rendered to his country 
and to our joint interests from the date 
he took office as Prime Minister in 
August 1918 until his retirement after two 
years of strenuous labour. I hope that 
his health will benefit by the rest he 
so much deserves and I feel sure that he 
will assist His Majesty's Legation whenever 
required with his valuable advice and 
guidance in matters concerning the 
. t f t . ..l 1nteres so our two coun r1es .... 
The Times writing· on June 28, 1920, shows its anxiety about 
the worsening situation in Iran, due to this agreement and the 
failure of British imperial policy; 
11 
••• The impending resignation of the principal 
Persian author of the Agreement, following 
on the departure of Sir Percy Cox, raises 
large issues. If he had been supported, 
he could have put into effect the Anglo-
Persian Military Commission's report ...... 2 
The Times makes firm suggestions in regard to the change of 
Persian Cabinet members in order to achieve the ratification of the 
agreement. 
1. F.O. No.353 206083/150/34 Foreign Office, July 1, 1920, 
Vol.XIII, p.554. 
2. The Times, June 28, 1920. 
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..... A cabinet more Nationalist in colour but 
willing to continue the Anglo-Persian 
Agreement, is being sought. If found, such 
a cabinet would probably ordain fresh 
elections, involving the further postponement 
of the Majlis and an indefinite delay in 
giving effect to the Anglo-Persian Military 
Report. . . . .. 
While suggesting this The Times was aware of the unpopularity of the 
agreement in Iran, but was hoping that the nationalists could be 
persuaded to support the agreement: 
..... But undoubtedly the Agreement needs 
popularizing and it will expire unless the 
Nationalists extend to it the support to 
which, on its merits, it is entitled. One 
of the objections offered to it, namely, the 
absence of a time limit, can doubtless easily 
be met. 111 
The opinion of the British Government of the new Prime Minister 
of Iran, Mu~ir al-Dawla~ is made clear in a speech by Lord Curzon 
which is summarised in a memorandum on the Persian Question made by 
Mr Ovey; 3 
..... His Majesty•s Government have little 
confidence in the ability of this 
statesman whose character is weak and 
"11 t. ..4 vac1 a 1ng .... 
1. Ibid. 
2. See Appendix 7. 
3. He was a member of the Northern Department of the Foreign Office. 
4. F.O. [206831/150/34] June 25, 1920, Vol.XIII, pp.541-42. 
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In the same memorandum Lord Curzon notes; 
11 
••• whoever succeeds Vussagh-ed-Dowleh must 
be a single-minded supporter of the Anglo-
Persian Agreement on which conditions alone 
it is possible to continue to grant to Persia 
the financial assistance which Persia 
requires to •carry on• ul 
Following this change, Britain made her demands on the new 
Prime Minister as follows, 
11 (A) To continue the policy of Anglo-Persian 
co-operation on the basis of the agreement. 
(B) To summon the Persian Parliament (•Majliss•) 
and submit the agreement to it for approval. 
(C) To consider the agreement in abeyance till 
this has taken place. 
(D) To govern Persia on constitutional lines 
with a Parliament. 
(E) To gain popularity in Persia by including 
notorious Nationalists in his cabinet. 
(F) To ask for British financial support. 112 
Despite this the 1919 Agreement was now in practiceadead 
letter, for the Majlis had not met to ratify it. Because of it 
Britain had become unpopular in Iran; Mr Norman in a telegraph·sent 
from Tehran to Lord Curzon describes the reaction of the people to 
this agreement as follows; 
l. Ibid. 
2. F.O. [C4966/82/34] Foreign Office, July 9, 1920, Vol.XIII, 
pp.562-63. 
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..... On my arrival I fou~d in power a government 
almost universally detested and entirely 
subservient to a Prime Minister to whom ill-
health had left only energy required to 
increase his private fortune at the public 
expense. His policy had caused Azerbaijan 
practially to separate itself from Persia and 
had driven Mazandaran into rebellion. Gilan 
was in possession of Kuchik Khan and his 
followers who were allied with Bolsheviks. 
Capital was seething with Bolshevik intrigue 
and invitations to occupy it were being sent 
to Resht from many influential quarters. Had 
Bolsheviks responded in time their advance 
might well have been assisted by a rising here, 
and they would, failing an occupation of Tehran 
by British troops, ha.ve received welcome from a 
large section of population chiefly of lower 
class. Anglo-Persian agreement was nominally 
in force but in practice remained a dead 
letter and Government neither intended nor dared 
to summon Madjlis to ratify it because they 
feared its rejection by that assembly. Policy 
of his Majesty's Government and their intentions 
as expressed in agreement were widely distrusted, 
not so much on account of terms of that 
instrument itself, as of manner of its 
conclusion and personality of its Persian 
signatory whose unpopularity Great Britain shared .... 111 
This unsettled political situation in Iran, especially in Tabriz, 
(Sir P. Cox called it 'a dangerous situation in Tabriz'fwas of vital 
l. F.O. No.654 [C7228/82/38] Tehran, September 25, 1920, Vol .XIII, 
pp.610-ll. 
2. F.O. No.297 [199405/150/34] Tehran, May 22, 1920, Vol.XIII, 
pp.493-4. 
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concern to both the Iranian and British Governments. One must 
realize that the defeat of the Tabriz uprising was the prime concern 
of both of these governments. The British regarded ~iyaban1 and 
the Tabriz democrats as a serious threat to their 'own interests as 
well as ... those of Persian Government' . 1 
Sir P. Cox, in his telegram from Tehran to Lord Curzon, 
expresses his anxiety with regard to the situation in Azerbaijan 
and Khiyaban1's movement; 
" ... as before stated principal danger spot is 
Persian Azerbaijan where conditions are 
already thoroughly bad. If this province 
succumbs or secedes by deafult of Central 
Government effect on general situation in 
Persia will be disastrous enough. Cabinet 
will certainly fall and policy including 
t "11 b . d" d 112 agreemen w1 e Jeopar 1se .... 
In order to protect British interests, and to keep the Iranian 
Government in power, it was urged that the movement in Tabriz must be 
stopped by military force as soon as possible: 
" ... There is still some chance of saving situation 
if following measures are taken at once, and to 
save it is urgently in our own interests as well 
as in those of Persian Government: but nothing 
can be done without considerable expenditure. 
1. Ibid. 
2. F.O. No.271 [198025/150/34] Tehran, May 14, 1920, Vol.XIII, 
pp.479-80. 
86 
Prime Minister makes following propositions on 
hypothesis that His Majesty's Government are 
still not prepared under any circumstances to 
send any reinforcements of British troops to 
Tabriz. 
1. That garrison of gendarmes now at 
Ispahan should be withdrawn and replaced by 
detachment of South Persia Rifles from Kerman 
or failing that by a Bakhtiari garrison. 
2. That gendarmes thus released plus Central 
Brigade and such other units as can be spared 
from Capital to total number of 3,000 be sent 
urgently to Tabriz ...... l 
In the event these gendarmes were not transferred and Khiyaban1's 
c 
rising was suppressed by locally-based Cossaks. 
" 
Although we shall 
describe the defeat of Khiyaban1 in the following chapter, it remains 
rather difficult to explain why this and similar movements were 
defeated if we only take into account political factors in Iran. 
British Foreign Office documents however shed a great deal of light 
on this problem. The archives show that political movements such as 
that of Mirza Kuchik Khan, were suppressed with the direct interference 
and assistance of Britain. 
Sir Percy Cox in a telegram sent from Tehran to Earl Curzon on 
November 21, 1919, makes the following comment: 
..... In Gilan situation is thoroughly unsatisfactory. 
Although a few months ago our troops in co-operation 
with Persian Government stamped out Jangali 
movement yet behaviour of Cossack detachments sent 
to occupy various points has been so atrocious and 
1. Ibid. 
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incompetency of Persian (? administrative) 
officials so complete that peasantry would 
welcome the return of the Jangali regime, 
and movement is gathering head (? word 
omitted) again in close collusion with 
Bolshevist and Turkish elements in Baku .... 111 
The nature of the British involvement in Tabriz will be 
discussed in the following chapter. 
BOLSHEVIK PROPAGANDA IN IRAN 
In the middle of 1920 the Red Army crossed the border into Iran in 
pursuit of the White Russian forces under Denikin who had been forced 
to take refuge in Iran. They occupied G11an, and for a while 
Russian influence in certain Iranian towns, particularly Tehran and 
Rasht, was strong. If Tehran were to fall into the hands of the 
Bolsheviks, it would mean not only that British interests and policy 
in Iran would be harmed but that, at least in the overwrought 
imagination of Norman, wholesale murder of Europeans and destruction 
2 of European property at Tehran, would take place. 
An announcement made by Sultan Zada and Fathullayev, of the 
cAda1at Party (Persian Communist Party) shows the Bolshevik point of 
view in Iran. They describe the Iranian Government as •The criminal 
governors of the Kajar dynasty•, and proclaim that there is only one 
way to destroy the power of the Shah and liberate Iran from poverty 
1. F.O., P. Cox to Lord Curzon, No.747 [154739/150/34] Tehran, 
November 21, 1919, Vol .IV, pp.1241-42. 
2. F.O. No.468 [695/56/34] Tehran, July 7, 1920, Vol.XIII, p.558. 
88 
which is the Communist Revolution. The Democratic Party which 
was in power at the time is called 'a toy in the hands of the 
universal brigand, England'. The text of this cAdalat Party 
declaration runs in part as follows: 
"In Persia, the Government of the Shah of Iran, has 
by its grab1ing policy, reduced the Persian people 
to penury, and, for centuries, has squeezed dues 
and taxes out of the pockets of the peasants, in 
order to support the Shah's harem, and his 
innumerable lackeys, and contemptible satraps and 
officials, who purchase their posts by generous 
bribery, and, with the connivance of the mullahs, 
are leading the popular masses of Persia to 
utter ruin. The criminal governors of the Kajar 
dynasty have done nought but indulge in 
bacchanalia and robbery, and have never even tried 
to take interest in popular education or to free 
the country from hereditary oppression... The 
Shah Ahmad Mirza himself, having received several 
sacks of English gold, has left for a tour in 
Europe: all ministers and officials receive their 
salaries from the English treasury... The 
democratic party, which is at present in power, is 
simply a toy in the hands of the universal brigand, 
England. . . In genera 1 the merchants have ruined 
industries in Persia, by bringing in foreign 
goods, thus hitting the small producers, transforming 
them into proletariat and semi-proletariat. All 
town centres are overcrowded with these unfortunate 
victims of the colonial policy of the Imperialists. 
How many of them have left their homes to find work 
under a foreign sky?... Only the Communist 
Revolution can liberate for all time the poor in 
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town and village, from the sufferings of continual 
hunger. Only the Communist Revolution with its 
firm hands is able to destroy the power of these 
tyrants, and hand over the country to the rightful 
people, and free it from taxation and dues, which 
have reduced it to state of beggary... A little 
more force and the edifice of hereditary oppression 
and slavery, will be demolished under the pressure 
of the revolutionary people. Away with the foreign 
brigands. Down with the traitors of the working 
classes. Long live free Persia. Long live the 
Persian Communist Party Adalat ... l 
The reason for British troops remaining in Iran was explained by 
Lord Curzon, Foreign Secretary of Great Britain, who maintained that 
British policy in the Middle East must always be affected by the 
consideration of Mesopotamia. In justifying the presence of 
British -troops in Iran he wrote as follows, 
..... the troops in North-West Persia were there 
because their disappearance would simply open 
the door to invasion, partly by the Turks and 
partly by the Bolshevists, which would bring, 
in all probability, the Persian Government to 
the ground, and would destroy almost in a breath 
the whole policy which we have been building up 
in agreement with Persia in the last few years, 
and which might recoil with very serious menace 
on Mesopotamia itself. That was why we were 
th .. 2 ere .... 
1. Announcement signed by Sultan Zada cAli~anov and Fath a11-ayev, 
members of the Organising Committee. See Foreign Office, 
Public Record Office 371/4927. 
2. R. Machray, .. Mesopotamia and Persia .. Fortnightly Review, 108, 
1920, pp.618-19. 
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A memorandum1 on the Persian Question which was submitted 
by Mr Oliphant of the Central European and Persia Department of 
the Foreign Office in 1920, also illustrates this belief; 
" ... to withdraw British forces from Persia and to 
shut down supplies, thereby stultifying the 
agreement, would, in present circumstances, produce 
almost certainly the following results. 1. The 
Bolsheviks, who are reported to have already turned a 
part of the Ghilan into a Red republic, may be 
expected to spread their virus into Tehran and 
other parts of northern Persia, whose unruly 
elements would fall an easy prey to Bolshevik 
propaganda. The present pro-British Cabinet of 
Vossug at [al] Dowleh would fall and thereupon, 
the agreement would inevitably collapse while 
in the opinion of H.M. Minister at Tehran, no 
other government friendly to the agreement would 
be found willing to replace it... 2. The probable 
direct result of increased confusion in Persia would 
be that our position in Mesopotamia would be 
threatened at once, and the possibility of maintaining 
ourselves as far up as Bagdad even would be a matter 
for earnest consideration. 3. An indirect and most 
probable, though perhaps not immediate, result would 
be that the state of disorder and troubles in Persia 
would centre on the East in general, beginning with 
Afghanistan and the Baluchistan border with a 
consequent risk of its spreading to India ...... 
1. F.O. [204900/lSL/34] Foreign Office, June 14, 1920, Vol.XIII, 
pp.517-18. 
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To maintain her interests in the East and her position. in 
Iran in particular, Britain needed to take urgent steps. 
Accordingly she produced fresh ideas as a result of which her 
interests could be preserved. Mr Oliphant continues as follows: 
..... Should it, therefore, be decided to continue our 
previous policy, certain further expenditure as may 
be required for military measures, and for supporting 
the Persian Government politically, would appear to be 
the following:- 1. that such forces as, in the opinion 
of the military authorities, may be required to 
strengthen our present lines in Persia from railhead 
at Quraitu to Kazvin should be supplied, 2. that 
such funds as are required to assist the Persian 
Government may be sanctioned. They would be (a) to 
maintain the administration which has recently 
received the assistance of a British financial advi~or, 
i.e. continuance of monthly subsidy of Tomans 350,000 
until September next: 
Bolshevik propaganda. 
(b) to assist in counteracting 
3. to enable the Persian 
forces, as suggested by the Persian t~inister and 
persistently supported by Sir P. Cox, to proceed 
from Kerman to Isfahan and thence to Azerbaijan. 11 
Although Britain had made a huge expenditure1 on Iran in order to 
preserve her interests there, a maintenance of the status quo in 
Iran would protect her other interests in other parts of the region; 
..... The risks to Mesopotamia and India, should Bolshevism 
overrun Persia, would be of such a nature as to 
outweigh the present commitments ... 2 
1. i.e. £3,000,000 a year for the upkeep of the Cossacks in Tehran; 
£6,000,000 for the upkeep of the British troops in Khorasan; 
Tomans, 180,000 a year for the King of Iran and Tomans 1 ,200,000 
for the upkeep of the Cossack Division. See the telegraph of 
[204900/150/34] F.O. June 14, 1920, Vol.XIII, pp.517-18. 
2. Ibid. 
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RISE AND FALL OF MIRZA KUCHIK KHAN'S MOVEMENT 
On June 4, 1920 the Jangali movement under the leadership of 
- - - - l Mirza Ku~ik Khan was reorganized. They rebelled against both 
the Iranian government and British influence in Iran. The 
Jangali's programme can be outlined under the following heads. 
l. The people should be sovereign. 
2. Elected representatives should hold executive power. 
3. Civil rights for all people irrespective of their caste 
and creeds. 
4. Abolition of all sorts of privileges given to certain people. 
5. Abolition of indirect taxation. 
6. Establishment of schools and universities. 
7. Free education for all children. 
8. Better conditions for working people. 2 
The committee engaged as instructors for its armed forces a 
number of German and Turkish officers of whom G a o k· -.. " acted as a 
close military advisor to Kuchik Khan. 
l. Mirza Kuchik Khan was born in Duzakh near Rasht, and was educated in 
religious schools in Tehran and Isfahan. During 1905-ll, he took 
part in the Constitutional Movement, and during World War I he joined 
an organization called Ittihad-i Islam (Islamic unity). In this 
organization rich people and traders of rural background were in the 
majority. For a full account of Kuchik Khan's life and activities 
consult I. Fa~ra'i, Sardar-i Jangal (Tehran 1965), and the archives 
of the British Foreign Office Documents (1920-21). 
2. See A. Bennigsen and M. Bro~up, the Islamic Threat to the Soviet 
State, (London 1983), p.99, X.J. Eudim and R.C. North, Soviet Russia 
and the East, 1920-27 (California 1958), pp.l77-181, and the 
newspaper Jangal, June 6, (Ra~t, 1920). 
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The programme of the Jangalis gained much popularity among 
the people due to the misrule of the Shah and foreigners. A 
newspaper, Jangal (forest), was printed and acted as the organ of 
the committee. The Jangal1 movement expanded to Mazandaran and 
other Caspian regions. The Jangalis managed to capture a few 
Britons, among them Captain Noel, an intelligence officer who was 
on his way back from Baku, and Quakshot, the manager of the 
British Bank in Rasht. 1 
The Times, referring to Kuchik Khan•s movements, wrote, 
11 Kuchik Khan was well known to the Dunsterville force. - --
In the spring of 1918 General Dunsterville advanced 
from Kermanshah towards the Caspian, reaching Kazvin 
on June 1, where he joined the Russian Partisan troops 
under Bischarakoff. The further advance of the force 
to Ra~t and Enzeli was unsuccessfully opposed by the 
Jangalis under Ku~ik Khan, but no serious trouble 
arose until July 20, when Kuchik Khan•s followers 
attacked the small British force stationed at Rasht. 
The Hampshires and Gurkhas, however, gave the Jangalis 
a severe drubbing - over lOO were killed and after this 
Kuchik Khan gave the British little trouble ... 2 
By the end of his uprising, Kuchik Khan had fallen out with his 
erstwhile allies and caused harm to the people. At the end of 1921 
the ~ah•s army led by Riza Khan attacked Ra~t and destroyed the 
Gilan movement. After the collapse of the republic Kuchik Khan 
fled to the forest with one of his close associates, Gaok, a German 
1. See Lenczowski, Russia and the West in Iran, (New York, 1949), 
pp.54-5. 
2. The Times, January 10, 1920. 
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agent, but because of snowfall and rain, he could not go much 
further with his followers, and was found frozen to death on 
the Talish mountains. 1 
Akhwund Zada says of Kuchik Khan's character, 
11 He was a demagogue and promise-breaker and his 
thinking was more backward than that of Ihsan 
A .11 ah Khan. Kuchi k Khan exploited the re 1 i gi ous 
sentiments of his fellow men in order to cheat 
them. He always kept a Tasbih (prayer-beads) with 
him and whenever he wanted to do anything or take 
any decision he used to take at random a part of 
the tasbih and begin to tell the beads calling 
them good, bad, good, bad one by one. This was 
his peculiar method of taking a decision. If 
the last bead coincided with 'bad' he used to tell 
his followers, 'God did not ordain it'. 112 
The fall of the G1lan uprising had at least one benefit, in 
that it caused the people to realise that the leadership and 
ability of Iranian society needed to be greatly improved. 
c 3 According to the newspaper Ra d, on June 15, 1920, a representative 
from the 11 Gilan Republic .. arrived in Moscow. Although the greatest 
sympathy for this fraternal Government was shown, he however sensed 
vexation in the mind of the so called specialist in the Soviet 
Ministry of Foreign Office. Vozniesensky, head of the oriental 
section in the Foreign Office, maintained that Kuchik Khan's 
1 . M1rza M. Akhumd Zada, A~arbayjan Ruznamas1n1n Nashr1yyas1, 
(Tabriz 1974), p.78. 
2. Ibid. 
3. c Ra d, June 15, 1920. 
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Government was not at all Communist, but that it was composed 
solely of petty bourgeois and of nationalists and that its 
programme was merely anti-British. 
In conclusion we may observe that the 1919 agreement provided 
yet more evidence of the weakness of the Iranian state during this 
period. The Iranian treasury was empty, the country was ravaged 
by warfare in which Ottomans, Germans, British and Russians had 
totally ignored Iranian neutrality, the provinces were in a state of 
anarchy and rebellion, and Iranian statesmen were so demoralised 
that it was possible for one of their number, Vusuq al-Dawla to see 
the only hope for improvement as lying with an agreement with 
Britain that would have turned Iran into a virtual pro~ctorate, 
despite British claims to the contrary. In order to achieve this, 
Britain was prepared to offer administrators and loans to the Iranian 
-
treasury, but also paid subsidies to Vu~uq al-Dawla and Ahmad Shah 
which in practice were hard to distinguish from outright bribery, and 
were certainly perceived as bribery within Iran. In return, Britain 
would receive security for the borders of India and Mesopotamia, be 
able to prevent Communist influence from spreading from Russia, and 
would be in a position to benefit from Iranian resources once that 
country had been provided with a European-style administration. 
It is not surprising therefore ~hat this agreement was opposed 
even by Britain's allies, while it was completely unacceptable to 
nationalist-minded Iranians. Particularly opposed to it were the 
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constitutionalists, and in order to impose it it would have 
been necessary to bypass the Majlis and any kind of democratic 
procedures. Vu~uq al-Dawla in fact attempted to do this by rigging 
the election of 1919, but even then did not dare to actually convene 
the Majlis. Eventually Vusuq al-Dawla had to resign, and with the· 
replacement of the chief British architect of the scheme, 
Sir Percy Cox, by the much more pragmatic Norman, the entire 
project was allowed to lapse. 
In the meantime, however, various revolts had broken out in 
Iran. Some like the Jangal1 movement in G1lan, were inspired by 
more than opposition to the 1919 agreement, and the main 
constitutionalist opposition came from Tabriz and from Khiyaban1, 
the leading spokesman for Tabriz at this time. As we shall see 
in the following chapter the government in Tehran for propaganda 
purposes accused Khiyaban1•s movement of being separatist and of 
being supported by the Bolsheviks. This has since become a stock 
reaction to any provincial movement demanding reform in Iran, but 
nevertheless this claim needs to be investigated to see whether it 
rests on any fact. In the fo 11 owing chapter we sha 11 study the 
history and political demands of the Tabriz uprising in an attempt 
to answer these and other questions. 
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Chapter 4 
CAUSES OF THE UPRISING 
Before studying the Tabriz Uprising it is necessary to examine the 
various elements which were to provoke it. Although there are 
different ideas concerning these elements, a study of some of the 
opinions of the witnesses, who had been active and had participated 
in this uprising, will make it possible to understand the main 
reasons behind this event. 
Muhammad cAli Badamchi, the close assistant of Khiyabani and an 
active member of this movement discusses the elements which caused 
the start of Khiyaban1 1 s Uprising, in an article published in Berlin 
in February 1924 in Iranschahr. We should also study the valuable 
writings of Ahmad Kasravi who had different opinions and views from 
Khiyabani and did not agree with him on many points. 
A study of foreign historians 1 opinions would also be helpful 
although we should study them with reservation since they have often 
merely copied from one another and have not even attempted to record 
correctly the names of the leadership of the uprising, 1 or have 
1. For instance see C. Skrine, World War in Iran, pp.63-64 and 
G. Lenczowiski, Russia and the West in Iran, p.61. 
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1 hardly mentioned the uprising at all or have not even given 
the right date of the movement. 2 
Some of the reasons were directly felt by the people, and 
have roots in the history of the area. In addition, there were 
other external causes which we should study as well. 
M.cA. Badamch1 points out that by this time Vu~uq al-Dawla had 
signed the notorious 1919 Agreement with Britain. The Democrat 
Party of Tabriz was unable to oppose this directly at the time, 
since elections were not called until after this date, but 
Tajaddud, the official newspaper of the Democrat Party, condemned 
this Agreement, and wrote, 11 Without the ratification of the Majlis 
we do not recognize it as more than a sheet of paper ... 3 
Vu~uq al-Dawla knew that it would be impossible to obtain 
the Agreement's ratification by a Majlis which contained Khiyaban1 
and the other five members of the Democrat Party, who had been 
elected as deputies for Tabriz for the fourth period of the Majlis. 
Thus Vu~uq al-Dawla sent two Swedish police officers, 
Marshal Bjorling and Fokl Klo accompanied by a detachment of 
Iranian police to Tabriz. 
1. For instance N. Nicholson, Curzon: The last phase, 1919-1925, 
(Edinburgh 1934); L.P. Elwell-Sutton, Modern Iran, (London 1941); 
W.Z. Laqueur, The Soviet Union and the Middle East, (London 1957), 
2. For instance L.P. Elwell-Sutton, A Guide to Iranian Area Study, 
p.l51, (Michigan 1952). 
3. Iranschahr, No.l4, (Berlin 1926). 
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According to Azar1 the orders of these officers were to 
overthrow the Democrat Party and kill its leaders. 1 In the words 
of Badamch1, one of the officers who was drunk at a party said to 
the others .. according to our orders we are to eliminate all 
2 Democrat leaders and destroy the Tabriz Democrat Party... While 
sending these officers to take action against the latter party, 
Vu~uq al-Dawla put the contents of the Agreement into action 
without the consent of the Majlis. The British advisors and 
officers arrived in Tehran and started working, and the Tabriz 
Democrat Party decided that in these circumstances to remain silent 
would be a great treachery to the country. 
Kasrav1 however, gives a different explanation of the causes 
The Bolsheviks were gaining strength in 
Russia and the Red Army were sweeping away their opponents, 
especially in the South, and Vu~uq al-Dawla was worried about the 
advance of the Soviet army to the Iranian borders, particularly to 
the Azerbaijan region. A Bolshevik centre was established by 
Kurt Wustrow in the German Consulate in Tabriz where a lot of weapons 
and ammunition were stored. 3 The Consulate was ordered by 
1. CA11 Azar1 states 11 VU~uq al-Dawla informed the Governor-General of 
Tabriz that Marshal Bjorling was coming with two or three officers 
to take over the Tabriz Police Headquarters, but when we found out 
that the latter Marshall had brought forty four police and officers, 
we knew that a plot was being prepared ... For more details see, 
c - -A. A~ari, Q.Kh., p.238. 
2. Iranschahr, op.cit., No.l4. 
3. These had remained in Tabriz since the final days of the First World 
War. They had been brought by the Ottomans who were allied to the 
Germans. See A. Kasravi, T.H.S.A., p.863. 
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Mukarram al-Saltana, the then Governor General of Tabriz to hand 
over the weapons and ammunition in accordance with British demands, 
but Wustrow not only did not accept this request, but sent the 
following ultimatum: 11 if there is any further intervention, I 
shall blow up the consulate and whatever is hidden there 11 • He also 
warned Mukarram al-Saltana to evacuate all the people who lived in 
the neighbourhood of the consulate building. Beside this, he 
started to conduct propaganda for communism and spread a rumour 
that he and others were going to take over the town and establish a 
Bolshevik Government. 
Because of this Vu~uq al-Dawla wanted to protect Tabriz 
against a possible Soviet invasion and against communist sympathisers. 
On February 13, 1920, he therefore sent Marshal Bjorling to the 
Tabriz Police Headquarters to reorganize the police and prepare them 
to face a Soviet invasion. The first Police Headquarters in Iran 
had been founded during the early years of the Iranian Constitutional 
Movement under the strong discipline of Ijlal al-Mulk in Tabriz. He 
was able to organize and establish a regular and responsible police 
force there which contributed to the security of the city. When 
the Tabriz Headquarters was taken over by Bjorling, there was a 
strong reaction from the police. The reason for this was that some 
of them would lose their jobs because of this change. There was 
another factor, Kasrav1 adds, which was dissatisfaction among the 
meMbers of the financial department. Vu~uq al-Dawla sent Tarjuman 
al-Saltana to organize a new system and he established reform in the 
financial department of Tabriz. These two actions, namely the 
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moves against the police and financial employees in addition to 
an incident which took place in the early days of the Iranian New 
Year 1299 (April 6, 1920) brought the uprising to a boiling point. 
Some democrats and their supporters had been recently arrested. 
Among them was Mirza Baqir, a supporter of the Democrat Party of 
Tabriz who was arrested and kept in detention at the Nawbar Police 
Station. Mirza Baqir had refused to go to the police station 
because the man in charge of the police was not a Muslim, and this 
incident in fact became the spark which set fire to the movement 
and was used by the Democrats as a pretext for the uprising. 1 
Finally we must consider Khiyabanf•s own account of these events, 
which was published in Tajaddud and gives very clear reasons for the 
uprising. Khiyabani writes, 
11 There is a great deal of insecurity, anarchy and 
public disorder in our society which is threatening 
our lives and properties. It is as if government 
has approved of the existence and continuation of 
this situation in our country. vJe are not receiving 
any benefit at all from the resources and facilities 
of our country. The chains of feudalism are still 
hanging from the hands of the despotism, which has 
not allowed us to organize our democracy. Our 
workers, peasants, businessmen and merchants have 
no security. due to the wild thieves and barbaric 
highwaymen. Due to the disobedient and violent 
people, the life in the cities is under their direct 
influence. Plundering, aggression and corruption are 
common occurrences nowadays, and are even believed to 
be natural in this country. But we declare and warn, 
1. See A. Kasrav1, T.H.S.A., pp.862-868. 
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that this is not a natural situation, this is anarchy 
which has been established and developed by the 
despotic and reactionary Vu~uq al-Dawla. Fourteen 
years ago, Iranians rebelled and attempted to drive 
out all feudal landlords, parasites on society and 
the bourgeoisie and banish them from society for 
in fact they were the elements of despotism, 
oppression and anarchy. Then they established 
constitutional law in response to their country's 
demands. They held many demonstrations for their 
freedom, independence and equality in society, made 
many sacrifices, and asked for help from internal and 
external powers in order to achieve their demands. 
Iranian troops who were conscripted from the suffering 
nation used their weapons against liberals, freedom 
fighters and Constitutional Law. We would like to 
drive all backward thieves and wild brigands out of 
our country; we would like to destroy the doctrines 
of oppression, plunder and insecurity for ever in 
Iran; we would hope to preserve the lives and 
properties of Iran's democracy. But now we observe 
that not only have none of these wishes been met, 
but also that our freedom, freedom of speech and 
individual immunity which are provided by the 
Constitutional Law are violated by a group of plunderers 
and disobedient people. No! this treacherous plot 
will not succeed in the face of the Constitutional Law. 
The Constitutional Law will be alive, as long as 
Azerbaijan and its liberals are alive, Constitution 
will never be abandoned! Hands off our Constitutional 
Law! The liberals of Azerbaijan have rebelled to 
put an end to this abnormal situation and to wake up 
the people who have forgotten the sound of 'Long Live 
Constitutional Law." 1 
1. Tajaddud, April 26, 1920. 
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In a telegram to the Democrat member for Tehran and future 
l - - -governor general, Mu~bir al-Sal~ana, Khiyabani described the 
difficult siutation both in Azerbaijan and other parts of the 
country. Then he pressed on Mukhbir al-Saltana the consequences - . 
of delay in the Majlis elections: 
..... in view of our common aim, I advised A~arbayjan1s 
to be patient and not engage in opposition any more. 
But because of the baseless and false propaganda of 
the central government against us, we would like to 
take serious action and declare that the A~arbayjan1s 
are dissatisfied with this delay which has caused the 
Majlis elections not to take place ... do take a 
serious step otherwise there will be more anarchy if 
power falls into the hands of the reactionary central 
leaders, who are traitor to both country and nation, and 
there will be no country with the name of Iran in 
f t .. 2 u ure .... 
Mukhbir al-Saltana realized the important position of Iran for 
foreign powers and urged both political leaders and the Iranian 
government to consider this. He believed that if the government 
was disinterested in the fate of the country, the external powers 
would not treat the internal politicians seriously. 
declared; 
..... the Great Powers were determined to preserve 
their interests in this part of the world ...... 3 
Thus he 
However, apart from advising Khiyaban1, to be patient and obey 
the central government, he took no action which might have calmed 
the situation in Tabriz. 
1 . See Appendix No.3. 
2. See M.Q. Hidayat (Mukhbir al-Saltana) - . Kh. Kh. , p.314. 
3. See M.Q. Hidayat (Mukhbir al-Saltana) Kh. Kh. , p.320. - . 
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THE UPRISING 
On Tuesday, April 6, 1920 a meeting was held by Khiyabani and the 
Democrats in the Tajaddud building. During the last few days the 
police had started to arrest some of the Democrats. These arrests 
were carried out on the direct orders of Bjorling who was worried 
about the violence and demonstrations. A group of Democrats were 
instructed by the committee to go to Nawbar Police Station and 
release all those who had recently been arrested. This group of 
about fifty people released the prisoners after a little argument 
with the police and finally with the help of Sardar Intisar, the 
Deputy Governor of Azerbaijan who was in the area at that time. 
This incident was reported by an officer to Bjorling who then sent 
his deputy Fokol KlB with a group of police to recapture the 
released men. In order to reach the insurgents and demand the 
return of the prisoners, he surrounded the Tajaddud building. This 
gave Sardar Intisar the opportunity to go to the building and calm 
an escalating situation, which he did by ordering Fokol Klo to return 
to Police Headquarters. Kasravi states that it was due to 
Sardar Intisar•s assistance that Khiyaban1 was successful and that 
- - - 1 of course this event strengthened Khiyabani and his followers. On 
Wednesday April 7, 1920, the majority of the Tabrizis joined the 
Democrats and the Bazar closed. The students of Tabriz marched 
through the streets, carrying the Iranian National flag. In 
1. See A. Kasravi, T.H.S.A., p.870. 
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Qoyun Maydani, (Sheep Square) they burnt down all the gallows 
which had been set up by Mukarram al-Saltana, the previous 
Governor General in Tabriz, on whose orders many liberals and 
democrats had been executed. They then carried one.of the 
burnt gallows to Tajaddud where they were gladly received by the 
other people who were gathered there. 1 Kasrav1 writes of this 
event, "the students went to the Bazar and forcibly closed all the 
shops, and then set the gallows on fire, on which some of Khiyaban1's 
assistants had been executed". 2 Following this a meeting took 
place to discuss the matter of the unpaid salaries of the soldiers. 
The Insurgents collected some money and the soldiers were told to 
collect their money at Tajaddud. When this news reached the police, 
who had not been paid for the last few months they also went to 
Tajaddud and were paid as well as the soldiers. This had a fruitful 
result for the Insurgents, because when the Democrats wanted to take 
over the Police Headquarters there was no resistance by the police. 
Following this Bjorling and his companions had to leave Tabriz for 
Tehran. Khiyaban1 then made a speech in the presence of more than 
twenty thousand Tabrizis. The brief outline of his speech is as 
follows; 
"The Constitution was achieved by sacrificing our 
best young liberals. Now we are struggling under 
the harsh pressure of a treacherous government. 
c - -1. See A. A~ari, Q.Kh., p.265. 
2. See A. Kasrav1, T.H.S.A., pp.870-71. 
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I hereby notify the inhabitants of the world that 
we have rebelled against this government which has 
accepted the Agreement between Vu~uq al-Dawla and 
Britain. Tabriz is the place of freedom fighters 
and has sacrificed its liberals for the sake of 
Iran's independence. Thus we may call it 
Azad1s~an rather than Azerbaijan, and we would 
like to call for its recognition ... l 
The Committee in its demands declared that state officials must 
submit to the rule of freedom in the country, and must without delay 
respect and carry out the constitution. The main tasks of the rising 
as set out by the public committee were as follows; 
To put an end to the predatory activities of foreign 
imperialists; to dismiss local parasites out of 
Azad~~tan; to put the constitution, which was obtained 
by the people in 1905-11, into practice, and to fight 
for peace and democracy against external interference 
and Iranian reactionaries. 
On Thursday 9, a manifesto was published in Persian and French, 
by the committee, and communicated to all foreign Consulates General 
in Tabriz as follows, 
11 The Liberals of Tabriz, prompted by the reactionary 
tendencies which have been manifested in a series 
of anti -constitution a 1 acts committed by the 1 oca 1 
authorities and which have become extremely serious 
especially in the province of Azadis~tan, have risen 
to protest strongly against this. 
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The Liberals of Tabriz declare that their entire 
programme consists of obtaining complete 
satisfaction as regar·ds the government respecting, 
on its part, the· Constitutional Laws. The 
Liberals recognize the extreme importance of 
maintaining at all costs public order and peace. 
The Liberals programme consists of the following: 
To establish a system for social welfare and to 
put the Constitutional Laws from theory into 
practice. 11 
Directing Committee for meetings, Tabriz, 9th April 1920. 1 
THE DAY OF UPRISING 
The first day of the uprising was described in a letter written by 
cAli Akbar Agah 2 in 1949 which has been quoted by A~ar1; 
11 
••• I was informed that a man had come from Tajaddud 
to notify all the staff of the governor•s office 
that they should leave the office and attend a meeting 
in Tajaddud at which all the people of Tabriz were 
invited to be present... I asked my servant to get 
some news from the Ark and I went to the Bazar to 
find out what had happened. The most notable thing 
which attracted my attention was the students who 
l. See Appendix No. ~-
c - - -2. Ali Akbar Agah was an eyewitness of the uprising, and in his 
letter he states that this information was original and exclusive 
to him, but that he had kept it to himself for fear that it might 
be misrepresented. Agah was an employee of cAyn al-Dawla and 
was present in Tabriz during this period. For more details see 
eA. A~ari, ~-, p.237. 
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were marching through the Bazar and carrying two 
burned gallows, saying that Mukarram al-Saltana had 
executed Mujahids on these gallows. Some other 
people were encouraging people to close down their 
shops and attend the meeting in Tajaddud. All 
Tabriz offices and governmental buildings were 
closed and the staff were directed to the 
Tajaddud building. At that time Badamch1 and 
Ganja•1 arrived at the Ark in a coach and went 
into the office and delivered Khiyaban1•s demands 
- c - ---1 for Mi r ~1uhammad A 1 i • s re 1 ease. I telephoned the 
Police Headquarters to ask for M)r Muhammad cAli•s 
release and then went to Tajaddud where Khiyaban1 
was giving a speech in the presence of twenty 
thousand Tabrizis ... 
Khiyaban1•s brief speech was as follows; 
11 \~e people, who have gained our freedom and constitution 
with a great deal of our brave young people•s blood 
are struggling under difficult conditions and under 
the pressure of the reactionary central government. 
I hereby announce to the people of the world that 
we have rebelled against a government which has 
agreed to Vu~uq al-Dawla•s destructive pact with 
England. Since Tabriz has been the place of 
freedom lovers and has offered many Mujahids in 
order to gain her freedom we change the name of 
A~arba1 jan to Azad1 s;tan 2 and now announce its birth. •• 
1. M1r Muhammad cAli, whose name is given by most sources as 
M1rza Baqir, had been arrested for distributing anti-government 
leaflets in Tabriz a few days before the uprising. 
2. We will discuss this in the fifth chapter where Khiyaban1•s 
speeches are analysed. 
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At that time Mir Mu~ammad cAli came along with Sattar Khan•s 
son, both of whom were welcomed warmly by the people. I left for 
the governor•s office at lOa.m. and later on Badamchr and Ganja 1 i 
came in and delivered another of Khiyabanr•s demands in which he 
asked for the dismissal of the Swedish Police Officers from Police 
Headquarters because these officers had not carried out their duty 
properly. He asked for command of the police to be handed over 
to Sardar Mukarram who had previously held this office and in whom 
the people of Tabriz had full trust. Following this action 
Bjorling was asked to leave Tabriz for Tehran, but he stayed in 
Basminj (a town in the countryside two miles outside Tabriz). 
Sardar Mukrram took office and all Swedish officers left Tabriz. 
Khiyabani then asked the people to go and carry on with their daily 
activities, open their shops and be sure that there was no 
insecurity from now on throughout the city, because a trustworthy 
l man was now in charge in the Police Headquarters. 
According to the London Times: 
11 ... The Tabriz Democrats once more have had their 
way and the opponents of British Policy and the 
Anglo-Persian Agreement here are quick to take 
advantage of the situation .... 112 
l. For a full account, see eA. Azari, Q.Kh., pp.28l-82. 
2. The Times, May 19, 1920. 
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THE ORGANIZATION OF THE UPRISING 
To lead the movement the Hay•at-i Ijtimac1 (public committee) was 
formed under the leadership of Khiyaban1. The Insurgents seized 
all the administrative centres in Tabriz, including police stations, 
post office and financial office. All power in Tabriz fell into 
the hands of the Democrats and the town became the centre of the 
National Liberation Movement of Azerbaijan. The Hay•at-i Ijtimac1 
announced to the population that they had rebelled against the anti-
democratic policy imposed by the central government. They then 
dismissed all government officials from their posts and expelled 
them from Tabriz. The Hay•at-i Ijtima•1 considered the question of 
the reorganization of the various administrations in Tabriz and 
appointed trusted local members of the Democrat Party to take over 
police, finances, education and posts and telegraphs. Khiyaban1 was 
anxious to organize a gendarmerie and strongly recommended young 
insurgents to join it. He also formed a National Guard in Tabriz 
to defend the countryside where there had been an invasion of the 
tribes. 1 
The rising began to embrace an ever wider area. Thus within 
Iran a number of movements took place. 
rebelled. 
c - - - -In June 1920, a movement led by Muhammad Ali Bashmaq~i flared 
up in Zanjan in which the whole population of the town took part. 
1. See eA. A~ari, Q.Kh., p.216. 
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In Ahar and Mara~a, the Democrats rebelled against the Shah and 
central government, and established a connection with the Tabriz 
Insurgents. In Khuy government officials were driven out and 
power fell into the hands of Democrats. Ardabil also established 
links with the Tabriz rebellion and revolted. The Insurgents 
organized a National Democratic Committee which was supported by 
the population. 
These events are described by Tagiyevaas follows; 
... The situation in Ardabil was very tense, and British 
took the necessary measures for the Cossack force of 
lOO men and another armed unit to be continually 
prepared for retreat. The workers of Ardabil, filled 
with a great hatred of the British and of the Persian 
reactionaries, attentively followed the struggle of the 
workers of Transcaucasia. 1 
On June 23rd it was decided to form a National Government on the 
basis of the Hay'at-i Ijtima~i and the headquarters of the public 
commission were moved from the Tajaddud building to the cAli Qarv 
(the seat of the government before the uprising). 
newspaper Kumunist 
According to the 
"The National Government newly created in Azerbaijan 
was guided in its activities by the principles of 
government of a democratic republic. It was composed 
of 20 men of whom the president was Khiyaban1 and who 
l. See Sh.A. Tagiyeva, Natsionalnoe-Osvoboditelnoe Dvizhenie 
V Iranskom Azerbaidzhane V 1917-1920 godakh (Baku 1956) 
"The National Liberation Movement in Persian Azerbaijan 1917-192011 
(Baku, 1956), p.89. 
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were all members of the Democratic Party of 
Persian Azerbaijan and belonged mainly to the 
merchant bougeoisie. There were also among 
them representatives of small landowners, the 
clergy and intelligentsia. 111 
During the Uprising Khiyaban1 established full and regular 
security throughout the town. A mission was sent by the Armenians 2 
of Azerbaijan to convey their satisfaction and happiness with the 
state of security which had been established by Khiyaban1 in Tabriz. 
The main forces behind the revolutionary movement in Tabriz were 
the poor and the petty bourgeoisie, craftsmen and small traders. 
In June 1920 the nomads 3 belonging to the Shahsuvan tribes 
joined the rebels. The reactionary section of the feudal 
landlords and the clerics who owned property on a large scale 
ranged themselves on the side of the government in Tehran. The 
movement in fact was led by the commerical bourgeoisie, small 
landowners and representatives of the lower clergy who did not 
share the view of their superiors that the participants in the 
rising were enemies of Islam. 
KHIYABANI'S NON-POLITICAL ACTIVITIES 
Khiyaban1, in addition to his political activities, set up some 
important charitable institutions. He established an orphanage 
1. Kumun1st, September, 1920 Baku. 
c - - -2. A. Azari, Q.Kh., p.270 and H. ~·1akki, Q.e_.cit., p.l7. - -- . 
3. These nomads lived in the North and North West of Azerbaijan. 
113 
with the assistance of Hajji Rahim Badkuba'1, Hajj1 cA11 
A~~ar Shujac1 and ~ajji Mirza cAli Akbar Bafta•i in a pleasant 
part of Tabriz at the foot of the Qulla mountain where Khiyaban1 
and his associates provided full equipment and facilities. 
Medicine and a permanent doctor were also provided for this 
establishment. A few members of the Democrat Party were chosen 
as teachers and trained the children in the orphanage in carpet-
making and weaving in addition to school work. 
cAli Haydar Zad~ a democrat and a close friend of ~iyabani, was 
chosen as the chairman of this institution. At Khiyabani's 
urging a hospital was established under Or Pilusiyan in the Majid 
al-Mulk Garden at Maralan in Tabriz. This was later known as the 
Mar1i Khana-yi Shir-u Khur~id (Lion and Son Hospital) which became 
one of the famous hospitals of Iran. Khiyaban1 also established a 
poorhouse for the disabled and those who were living in bad 
conditions, where they were provided with the necessities of life. 
An attempt was also made to establish a charitable institution in 
Tabriz to develop the provision of social services. -c- - -Isma·il Aqa 
Amir Khizi and Mirza cAli Asghar Khan-i Sartip Zada were chosen to .--
be in charge. The foundations of the theatre in Tabriz were laid 
by this institution. Khiyabani was interested in the theatre and 
believed that it was 11 0ne of the causes of cultural progress ... 
One of the best services provided was the establishment of a 
leper colony in Tabriz. These people were living uncared for and 
rejected in the village of ~rpa D~r~si, one and half miles outside 
Tabriz. Khiyaban1 attempted to look after them, and some of the well 
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known doctors of Tabriz such as Or Sayyd Muhammad Khan Tabataba'i, 
Jalil Khan Nasir al-Hukama, Fath Allah Khan Fakhr al-Atibba, - . . . - - . 
cAbd al-~usayn Khan Rukn al-Hukama and Or Pilusiyan used to work 
regularly at this village to treat them. 
1 free of charge. 
These doctors worked 
The Uprising took a few steps to improve the living conditions 
of the town. An end was put to arbitary rule in Tabriz. The 
price of food came down, and fixed prices for rice, wheat, sugar, 
kerosene and other goods were established. In the interests of 
the small traders, craftsmen and peasants, measures were taken to 
improve trade between Tabriz and surrounding towns, and a commission 
was appointed to work out projects for reforms in agriculture, 
education, finance, medicine, law and social services. 2 
This commission first turned its attention to a reform of 
agriculture and a system of taxation, and according to a new project 
various heavy taxes and duties imposed by the government on the 
peasants were abolished, and it was proposed to exact only income 
tax. In the plan for land reform worked out by the commission, it 
was proposed to distribute unconditionally among the peasants all 
Khalisa (state land) which, however, represented only four per cent - . 
of the land suitable for cultivation. Most of the privately owned 
land remained in the hands of the big landowners and clergy; but it 
1. The material used in this section is drawn from an article in the 
newspaper Mardum (March 1981 - Tehran) by Z. Qiyam1, who was an eye 
witness of the events of Khiyaban1's Uprising. 
2. See Gh Mammadli, QE.cit., pp.81-82. 
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was planned to advance loans from the agricultural bank to the 
peasants for a certain period so that they might buy land from 
the landlords; the commission also envisaged that the peasants 
would buy Waqf (pious foundation land) in the same way. 
Distribution of the state lands among the peasants however only 
took place in certain parts of the Arvanaq-Anzab and Dih~arqan 
(Modern A~ar Shahr) regions of the province, and the new reforms 
failed to settle the agrarian problem satisfactorily. 
The problem is analysed as follows by a Soviet writer; 
11 The correct solution to the agrarian question in an 
agricultural country like Iran was of enormous 
importance for only in this way was it possible 
to draw the peasantry into the revolutionary 
struggle. In this way it would have been possible to 
cause the National-Liberation movement to develop 
into a bourgeois-democratic revolution, since it is 
the agrarian revolution which forms the basis and 
content of a bourgeois-democratic revolution. 111 
It is worth mentioning here that M.S. Ivanov states that nothing was 
done in the field of agricultural reform; 
11 The agrarian project worked out by the commission 
did not touch the interests of the landowners 
and did not improve the hard position of the 
peasants. 11 2 
1. See Sh.A. Tagiyeva, op.cit., p.97. 
2. M.S. Ivanov, Ocherk Istorii Irana, (Moscow, 1952), p.277 and 
Sh.A. Tagiyeva, QE.cit., p.97. 
116 
It was also proposed by the commission to study the possibility 
of exploiting the mineral resources of Azerbaijan province. The 
committee paid a great deal of attention to education, various 
new schools were opened, including one for girls in Tabriz. 
Special importance was attached to the liberation of women and 
their participation in the socio-political life of the country. It 
was also proposed to organize an unarmed national guard of twelve 
thousand men. A military school was established to train an 
armed police force. This armed police force consisted of two 
thousand men to support the movement. It was also planned to 
organize elections to a town Anjuman. The National and Agricultural 
bank were founded and the former issued its own currency. 
In the words of Khiyaban1, the Democrats fought for the 
establishment of a free and democratic organization for the 
transformation of Iran into a powerful united country, and for the 
autonomy of Azerbaijan and other provinces, within a framework of a 
future democratic Iran. The leaders of the Tabriz rising aimed at 
extending it to the whole of Iran, their aim being to create in Iran 
a democratic government which would ensure the independence of the 
country, defend the constitution, carry out reforms without delay, 
abolish personal privileges, nationalize all businesses, and 
institutions, create a national industry, and ensure justice, equality 
of rights and freedom so that deputies elected to the Majlis should 
be true representatives of the people. 
During the Uprising a garden party was held in Tabriz and from 
its funds a cemetery was established to honour the freedom fighters 
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who were killed during the Constitutional Revolution in Tabriz. 
On this special day, Khiyabani and others gave speeches about 
Baskerville, an American volunteer who fought beside the Mujahidin 
and was killed during the Constitutional Revolution in Tabriz. 
Khiyaban1 and his followers decided to send a valuable carpet on 
which Baskerville 1 J picture was woven, to his mother in America. 2 
KHIYABANI 1 S WAY OF LIFE 
The following description of Khiyaban1 1 s personality was given to the 
author in the summer of 1983 by Ma~hadi Qanbar, then aged 84, who 
took part in the Tabriz Uprising and had many opportunities to 
observe him. 
Khiyaban1 had a robust intelligence and was dignified and modest. 
He thought deeply but spoke little. He always had a smile on his 
face. Since he had risen from the people he remained one with the 
people until his death. Because of his beliefs he respected the 
poor and the working class with a profound sympathy, sincerity and 
easy approach. Khiyaban1 regarded it as his duty to attend to the 
needs of his fellow men and thought that and his earthly needs 
should be the first consideration. Khiyaban1 was a remarkable 
thinker, a true patriot, a benefactor of society; he was a social 
man in the true sense of the word. Khiyaban1 was brave and always 
1. Baskerville was recognized as one of the local Mujahidin of the 
period of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution. The grave of 
this brave American is in the Laylava Cemetery in Tabriz. 
2. For more details see eA. Azari, op.cit., pp.308-9. 
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used to say that a timid person has many defects and that such 
people can damage society. He was an honest man and had a deep 
love of poetry and music. He respected great poets and admired 
each for his own particular approach and had faith in them. 
Khiyaban1 liked cheerful music, recognised its value and thus 
respected and encouraged musicians. He especially liked and 
enjoyed folk music but criticized mournful music and said it should 
brighten up. Sometimes he jokingly commented that such music 
was not music but dirges. Khiyaban1 was fond of horse riding and 
target shooting, whenever he had the opportunity. He regarded 
sport as very important and always emphasised its benefits,and 
he himself regularly used to take exercise twice a day. Early 
morning in Summer and Winter he used to walk for a long distance 
on the streets. It was through his efforts that the sports club 
was established in Tabriz. Khiyaban1 did his best to develop and 
expand culture. He was a founder member of the Culture Society 
and worked enthusiastically on its behalf. 
The following description of Khiyaban1's personality was 
taken from Dunya No.ll (Tehran 1975) where Z. Qiyam1•s ·article 
runs as follows: 
" ... ~iyaban1 lived in the ~iyaban district of Tabriz 
in a modest small house. At the entrance to the house 
there was a room which was used as Khiyaban1's library. 
In this room there were two book shelves, six chairs 
and a square table. The book shelves which ran all 
round the room and the shelves built in recesses in 
the wall were full of books piled on top of each 
other. In this room Khiyaban1 received visitors 
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with the utmost modesty and kindness. Khiyaban1 
had a small shop in the Tabriz Bazar at Haj1 Muhammad . . 
Qul1 Court. He used to sell cotton and 
haberdashery and thus earned his living. The shop 
was also a meeting place for his friends. 
Khiyaban1•s life was very simple and without 
ceremoniesr He wore a turban on his head but 
dressed in ordinary trousers and waistcoat, shoes 
and boots. He did not shave his head and had long 
hair. During my life I have seen three people with 
head wear like this. One was Khiyaban1, one was 
the famous freedom fighter Fa~r al-cArifin in 
Mazandaran, and the other was Abu al-Qasim CArif-i 
Qazvin1 the great poet. All these people were 
very clean and well-dressed. They always dyed the 
cloth of their turban light blue, and wore a clean cloak. 
Khiyaban1 regarded time as very important and was very 
conscious and attentive to it. He used to say that 
•anybody who does not keep to time, has no discipline 
in life and this is the first discipline for society ... • 
Khiyaban1 was very busy during the days of the 
uprising; nevertheless, from the beginning of the year 
1298/1919 he started writing a book about the great 
October Revolution of 1917, its influence on Iran, 
its world-wide beneficial results, Lenin•s support 
and help during the Constitutional Revolution, his 
sympathy to and friendship with the people of Iran 
and his generous and valuable concessions. This 
book was to be entitled Lenin and Iran. Khiyaban1 
had little time to spare from his preparations for the 
uprising, but nevertheless managed to spend a few 
hours a day on this book. He lost sleep over it, 
but did his best to finish the book as quickly as 
possible and to have it published. Only a few of 
his very close friends knew about his writing: 
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Hajj1 Muhammad cA11 Badamch1, Hajj1 Ismac11 Amir Kh1z1, 
Hajj1 M1~za cA11 Naq1 Ganja •1 Khan, r~irza Taqi Khan-i 
Rafcat and another man. Khiyabani was so attached 
to this book that he yearned to finish it and 
sometimes said longingly that 'it will be ideal if 
I have the chance to live and finish this book and 
publish it'. But he did not succeed. He had 
avowed that he wished to sacrifice his life in the 
service of the county and the people, and indeed was 
killed and this important work remained unfinished 
and disappeared ... 
THE DEFEAT OF THE RISING 
To quell the uprising which had swept over Azerbaijan, certain 
steps were taken by both Iranians and British. One group with 
which the British attempted to establish contact was that headed by 
Kasravi. Ahmad Kasrav1 (1890-1945) was born in Tabriz. He began 
his education at a maktab, but because of his unhappiness with his 
religious studies and his unwillingness to become a Mulla, he 
transferred to the American-run Memorial School where he studied 
modern subjects. 1 Kasrav1 was affected by the Iranian Constitutional 
Revolution and became a member of the Democrat Party of Tabriz in 
1915, being an active member of the party until he had to move to 
- - - 2 Tehran because of his disagreement with Khiyabani. 
1. See A. Kasrav1, Chihi1 Maqala, p.3. 
2. ·See M. Mujtahid1, R.A., p.l28. 
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His opposition to Khiyaban1 was more political than personal. 
Khiyaban1 believed that in order to defeat the enemy one should 
count on the support of the mass of the people and avoid 
ideological differences; whereas Kasravi was a democrat who 
believed that people with various political views should form 
the leadership. Of course one can argue that Khiyaban1 by 
avoiding different political views and indeed keeping people with 
different views out of his circle wanted to unite people against 
their common enemy but on the other hand this attitude had its own 
weaknesses. Although Khiyaban1 was supported by the masses of 
illiterate people, these people because of their lack of social 
and political consciousness were defeated quite easily after the 
In other words there were no leaders who could 
replace Khiyaban1 and continue his struggle. A conversation between 
Kasrav1 and Khiyaban1 reported by the former explains some of their 
differences. 
Kasravi addressing Khiyaban1 says, 
" ... The fault that they found in you and I myself agree 
with it is this, that the personalities who have 
struggled from the start of Constitutional Movement 
have been driven away by you, and instead you 
appoint person of bad repute and former enemies of 
freedom." 
~hiyabani answering says: 
"Those people whom you mention are the ones who 
stand up and impose their views. Whereas these 
people (i.e. his supporters) accept without 
12lb 
questions whatever we say. 11 11 But if a difficult 
time comes, 11 Kasrav1 replies, "the former due to 
their own beliefs and convictions, will stand 
up and resist. But the latter are not bound 
to anything, and as soon as they find the enemy 
stronger than you they will quickly sway towards 
it. 11 
Khiyaban1, disagreeing with Kasrav1, finally replies, 
11 You are still young and inexperienced. 11 
Kasravi makes no answer to this statement of Khiyaban1 and 
leaves him. 1 
Besides these ideological differences, there were also other 
differences between Kasrav1 and Khiyaban1. In regard to the 
meaning of nationalism and independence Kasrav1 seems more specific 
in his approach to the question of nationalism and language. 
Having a common language, culture and religion should not 
necessarily mean that we have common interests. Kasrav1 for 
example criticises Rafcat's support of the Turks, believing 
that speaking the same language does not necessarily mean having 
the same political views. Rafcat while associated with the 
democrats in Azerbaijan, praised the Ottoman military governor 
2 - - -Khal11 Pasha in his articles and poetry, while Khiyabani· and his 
1. See A. Kasrav1, Z.M., p.91. 
2. ibid.' pp.86-87. 
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friends were imprisoned by him in Qars. One of Kasrav1•s 
criticisms of Khiyabani was precisely his appointment of 
Rafcat as editor of Tajaddud. Kasrav1 in fact criticises 
Khiyabani on two grounds: firstly, his being rather autocratic 
and not encouraging other democrats to take part in decision 
making, and secondly his lack of carefulness in his choice 
of people for important positions. To put it briefly 
Kasrav1 and Khiyaban1 could have been ideal leaders if only 
they had combined their intellectual and historical experiences 
with their patriotism. 
It is perhaps ironic that Sattar Khan and Baqir Khan, 
both regarded as illiterate, could unite their efforts at the 
beginning of the Constitutional Revolution whereas more 
educated people like Kasravi and ~iyaban1 failed to do so. 
Thus we have to look for the reasons of failures in the 
weaknesses of individual leaders rather than in the nature of 
the uprising. 
Vu~uq al-dawla maintained connections with Kasravi•s 
group through Karbala'1 Husayn Aqa Fi~angchi. Fi~angchi 
l2ld 
met Kasrav1 and discussed with him a telegram in which Vu~uq 
al-Dawla declared that, if Kasrav1 would fight against Khiyaban1, 
the government would give him as much money as he wanted. As 
Kasrav1 states when describing this incident, 11 Fi~angch1, who 
was the agent of Vu~uq al-Dawla in Tabriz, met me and'asked if I 
would co-operate with him11 • 1 He later says, 11 I refused Fi ~angch1 11 
and said, 11 1 am not interested in this matter. Furthermore I am 
unable to manage this action 11 • 2 Fi~angch1 then met M1rza cAli 
Hay'at, a leading member of the Democrats who was in disagreement 
with Khiyaban1 on many points. They decided to fight against 
Khiyaban1 with the direct assistance of cAyn al-Dawla who had been 
recently appointed Governor General of Azerbaijan but was not 
recognized by Khiyaban1 and the Democrat Party of Tabriz, and with 
the help of a group of volunteers from Qara Da~ who would involve 
Tabriz and defeat the uprising. 
Khiyaban1 discovered this plot and ordered the arrest of all 
the leaders of this opposition group. Fi~ang~1 and Hay'at were 
arrested and Kasrav1 was obliged to leave Tabriz on the lOth of May. 
After the defeat of this opposition group and of other counter-
revolutionary groups who were preparing to oppose the supporters of 
Khiyaban1 with the support of landowners and people who had been 
driven out of Tabriz by the insurgents, the government of Vu~uq 
al-Dawla in its turn sent a detachment of the Cossack division led by 
1 . A . Ka s r a v 1 , T . H . S . A . , p . 8 7 9 . 
2. Ibid., p.880. 
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the future Shah, Riza Khan to put down the rebellion; but the 
attempt failed. 
Meanwhile, Britain managed to take some action through her 
intelligence officer, Major Edmond, who was sent to Tabriz from 
Headquarters in Qasvin to negotiate with Khiyaban1 and also some of 
On arrival he met Kasravi and asked for 
his co-operation. About this meeting Kasrav1 states, 
11 Due to a note in which I was asked to meet Major Edmond 
at the British Consulate, I went there and saw the 
latter British officer. He said, 11 I understand that 
you are a leader of a group which is opposed to Khiyaban1. 
I would like to ask you about the possibilities of your 
fighting against Khiyaban1 if you receive some help from 
the government... r- answered him, .. Because of the 
following circumstances we are unable to fight against 
Khiyaban1. Firstly most of our followers are 
tradesmen and could not fight properly; secondly, 
we have dispersec our followers from the beginning 
of the uprising and finally because of the uprising 
of Khiyabani who has rebelled for the sake of 
Azerbaijan, we would not wish to fight against him ..... l 
Major Edmond, realizing after a meeting with Kasravi that 
previous schemes had failed, met Khiyabani. 
to accept his conditions and urged him to withdraw the force of 
Indian Sepoys and also The Norperforce. 2 
1. See A. Kasrav1, T.H.S.A., pp.879-880. 
2. i.e. the British force in North Persia. 
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Since the British envoy Major Edmond had not succeeded in 
his meetings either with Kasrav1 or with Khiyaban1 and since it 
was realised that anti-British feeling was high among the insurgents 
and had a great influence in the city the British detachment at 
Tabriz, as a result of the following instructions from London, 
was forced to leave Tabriz: 
"War Office has no fresh news of movement of troops 
against Tabriz, but military position in North 
West Persia renders it impossible to maintain 
British detachment in Tabriz any longer and they 
insist that orders already issued for its 
withdrawal must hold good." 1 
After studying this background one still wonders if Kasravi, if, 
as he had mentioned in his meeting with Major Edmond, he had these 
conditions available he would have taken any serious actions against 
Khiyaban1? As Kasrav1 has stated himself, both the British offer and 
Fi~angch1's advice were~acceptable for him, and one crv; not see 
any reason for his reluctance taking action against Khiyaban1r~ther 
than being in a helpless position. 
Of course one cannot accuse Kasrav1 for being an anti·-'democratic 
movement in Azerbad.jan, hcwever it fs fair to criticize Kasravi on the grounds 
that if he was a genuine democrat then he should have informed 
Khiyaban1 of the existence of such a plot. S t i 11 the quest i on "vJ hy 
he did not inform Khiyaban1?" might remain unanswered. 
1. Earl Curzon in his telegram to Sir P. Cox on June 5. 
F.O. No.307 [201215/150/34] Foreign Office, June 5, 1920, Vol.Xlli, 
p.503. 
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THE END OF KHIYABANY'S UPRISING 
Meanwhile arrangements were being made by Mukhbir al-Saltana in - . 
Tabriz, with the assistance of the Central Government, to prepare 
the way for the final assault on Tabriz and the suppression of the 
insurgents. At the crucial moment two hundred armed supporters of 
the uprising had been sent out of the city to fight the counter-
revolutionaries at Ahar, and only a small force remained in Tabriz. 
In Ahar Am1r Arshad, the chief of the Qara Da~ tribe who were 
harassing the people of the countryside had declared against 
Khiyaban1, because the latter had arrested his brother. 
Mu~bir al-Saltana, after spending a few days in town and 
assessing the situation, went to the barracks where Cossack forces 
under the command of Meshtich 1 were stationed. Here he planned to 
overthrow the uprising. In his memoires, Mukhbir al-Saltana quotes 
the latter as saying that the uprising was not well protected and 
that the insurgents consisted of labourers. 2 Meshtich was 
subsequently ordered by the government to co-operate with ~lu~bir 
al-Saltana. There was also, however, an indirect interference by 
the British Norperforce (North Persia Force) which in fact supported 
the Cossack Brigade in wanting to be rid of the rebels. 3 
1. He was one of the Russian officers who chose to remain in Tabriz 
after the October Revolution. 
2. See M.Q. Hidayat, Kh.Kh., p.315. 
3. See C. Skrine, QE.Cit., p.64. 
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On the 12th September a sudden attack was made on Tabriz 
leaving the insurgents no time to unite. Khiyaban1 had to 
leave his house and went to the house of Hajj1 Shaykh Husayn . --. 
cAli Miyanaji, his neighbour. Miyanaji offered to negotiate 
with Mukhbir al-Saltana in an attempt to secure his safety, 
but Khiyaban1 replied, 
11 I have said whatever was necessary; we had 
a long discussion with him concerning our 
requests, but he rejected all of them and 
replied, 11 do whatever you wish 11 . You were 
witness to our activities, and the fact that 
we democrats have always supported Mu~bir 
al-Saltana. Whenever the government has 
wanted to appoint a governor general, we have 
offered Mu~bir al-Saltana this post. Now 
we understand Hazrat cA11•s order 
. ~~\L=-~~~,\&~J\' 
-/ / I 
(Fear that you may suffer ill at the hands 
of one with whom you have dealt kindly). 111 
Because of this anxiety for Khiyaban1•s life, Miyanaj1 
repeated his request, but this time Khiyaban1 became upset and 
replied, 
11 I prefer to be killed rather than give myself 
up. I will not kneel before the enemy. I 
am a son of the Iranian Constitutional 
Revo 1 uti on. I am a descendant of 
1. See eA. A~ar1, Q.Kh., p.491. 
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- - 1 Babak Khurram-Din, who in the presence 
of the Arab Caliph displayed such 
bravery and greatness. 112 
Finally on the information of a young girl the hiding place 
-c- -Isma il Qazzaq with other soldiers 
raided Miyanaji's house and after a brief struggle Khiyabani 
was shot dead. Mukhbir al-Saltana in his book declares, 
" ... in the afternoon a report was received. 
According to information given by a young 
girl, Khiyabani was hidden in the cellar of 
Miyanaji's house. After a few shots 
Khiyabani was injured and then a bullet which 
struck his head caused his death. It was 
said that he had committed suicide. In a 
letter which was found later, Khiyaban1 said, 
.. Goodbye friends; since I am alone and have 
decided not to give myself up I have killed 
myself. Follow our goals and do not be 
disappointed. Look after my family; I have 
nobody to take care of them. Such is 
Mukhbir al-Saltana•s liberalism. 
Mu~ammad Khiyaban1, 14.9.1920 ... 3 
l. The great Iranian revolutionary and peasant·leader of the Ninth 
Century, who was cut into pieces alive by the Caliph al-Muctasim in 
228 A.H. in Ba~dad. For more details see, s. Nafisi, Babak 
Khurram Din, Dilavar-i A~arbaijan, (Tehran 1333); Z. Safa and 
M. Azizi, La domination Arabe et L'~panouissement du Sentiment 
National en Iran, (Paris 1938); The Book of government or Rules for 
Kings, The Siyasat Nama or Siyar al-Muluk of Ni~am al-Mulk, Tr. from 
the Persian by H. Darke (London 1960), pp.238-245, and Bulletin of 
the School of Oriental and African Studies, No.3/l5, V. Minorsky, 
11 Caucasica, IV 11 (London 1953), pp.504-29. 
c - -2. See A. A~ari, Q.Kh., p.491. 
3. See M.Q. Hidayat, Kh.Kh., pp.319-20. 
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The present writer was told that this letter is kept by a 
person who is living in Tehran. Though I several times tried to 
obtain a copy, the owner has so far proved unwilling to produce 
the letter. 
The whole question of Khiyaban1's death and this alleged 
suicide note presents many prob 1 ems. Quite apart from the 
psychological improbability of Khiyaban1 choosing to kill himself 
in this way, we can not understand how, having been wounded several 
times by a Cossack detachment specifically sent to take him, he 
would then find the time to write this letter and shoot himself 
before the soldiers arrived. Even had he decided to choose death 
we would have expected him to do so by confronting the Cossacks 
in person, furthermore, as we shall see below, Mukhbir al-Saltana 
on another occasion stated that his troops had killed him. Thus we 
need to ask about the nature of this elusive letter, and point out 
that it is at least possible that it was a forgery which was placed 
on his body after his death. 
Pi~avari, in an article published in the newspaper A~arbayjan 
on 26.6.1324, gives some additional information on these events 
which casts further doubts on the claim that. Khiyaban1 committed 
suicide and quotes Mu~bir al-Saltana as having said: 
" ... it is true that I killed him, but this is a 
great service, since Khiyaban1 committed 
treason. . . . " 
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Furthermore several other historians state that Khiyaban1 was 
killed when he was involved in a conflict with the Cossacks. 1 
Finally C. Skrine the British Consul for Tehran and 
t1a~h2Jwho lived and worked in Iran during both World Wars and 
from time to time between them has another version, i.e. that 
..... Khiyaban1 was duly caught and executed ...... 2 
Miyanaj1's grandson, speaking of Khiyaban1•s last moments 
declares: 
..... Khiyaban1 promised my grandfather that there 
would not be shooting in his house on his part. 
My grandmother was crying and begging Ysmac11 
Qazzaq and the others not to kill Khiyaban1. 
Finally Khiyaban1 collapsed and his arm was 
cut off by Ysmac11 Qazzaq and his body was 
carried on a ladder towards cA11 Qa?u where 
Mukhbir al-Saltana was awaiting them. - . 
Khiyaban1•s body was buried at Madrasa-yi 
~iqat al-Islam in Tabriz ...... 3 
h 
1. For instance, Iranschar, No,l4, 1/8/1926; A. Kasrav1, T.H.S.A. 
p.897; eA. A~ar1, Q.Kh., p.494; M. Mujtahid1, R.A., p.74; 
G. Lenczowski, Russia and the West in Iran, 1918-1945, a study 
in Big-Power Rivalry, (New York 1949), p.62; Fortescue (L.S.) 
Military Report on Tehran and adjacent Provinces of North-West 
Persia, (London 1921), p.353, and 
~·M~M~a.Jiy .. op.cit, f.to.8. --2. See C. Skrine, ~.cit., p.64. 
3. See eA. A~ar1, Q.Kh., p.492. 
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When the Cossacks plundered Khiyaban1's house, they were 
shocked at Khiyaban1's way of life. 
"where is the life of luxury which has been talked about among 
the peop 1 e". 1 They managed ho\-Jever to get seven 1 i ras and a few 
rugs, and also took away the doors and windows of Khiyaban1's 
house and ruined the building, even taking the rafters. They 
also took the earrings, necklace and bracelets of Khiyabani's 
wife and the earrings of his seven year old daughter. They then 
paraded Khiyabani's family, the oldest child being only seven, 
through the streets. On this day on the direct order of 
Mukhbir al-Saltana more than three hundred of the insurgents were 
killed, their property seized and their houses destroyed. 
Norman, the British Consul, in a report sent on 19th September 
1920 from Tehran to Earl Curzon, says, 
"Situation in Persian Azerbaijan which has long given 
cause~ for anxiety has been now cleared up by 
energetic action of Mukhber us-Sultaneh, new 
Governor General. Town of Tabriz had been long 
dominated by a party under leadership of Sheikh 
Khiyabani who styled themselves democrats but whose 
object was separation of Azerbaijan from rest of 
Persia. They were prepared to invoke 
Bolshevik aid to this end. Their authority 
extended, however, to no more than a mile or two 
beyond city and active hostility of rural population 
and tribesmen disturbed peace of Province. In 
Tabriz they had seduced police and gendarmerie from 
c - -1. A. A~ari, Q.Kh., p.504. 
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their allegiance and late Governor General, 
Prince Ain-ed-Dowleh, who was helpless 
against them, was obliged to leave the 
province and return to Tehran. Acting 
Governor, whom he left behind, was compelled 
to defer to Separatists in all things. On 
arrival of Mukhber-us-Sultaneh, Khiyaban1 
refused to recognize him as Governor General 
or to call on him and told his Majesty 1 s 
Consul that he would no longer recognize 
authority of Prime Minister unless the latter 
recognized him as dictator of Azerbaijan. 
Consul vainly endeavoured to induce him to 
adopt a more reasonable attitude. Early on 
the morning of September 13th Mukhbar-us-Sum(s1c) 
with help of Cossacks, who have remained loyal, 
seized heir apparent 1 S palace, citadel and other 
strongholds of separatists and, after four 
hours fighting, dispersed their forces killing 
fifty, wounding over one hundred and recovering 
all guns and machine-guns and most of rifles 
and ammunition which had fallen into their 
possession. Cossack losses were one killed 
and one wounded. Khiyaban1 was discovered 
later in the day hiding in cellar of his house 
and was shot dead on offering resistance to 
Cossacks who attempted to arrest him. Arrest 
of other Separatist leaders is said to be only 
matter of time. Town is now quiet and people 
have been greatly pleased at turn which events 
have taken. Governor General is to be 
congratulated on success of his coup. 
Addressed to Foreign Office. Sent to 
India No.642, Baghdad No.303. 111 
1. Public Record Office 371/4927, September 19, 1920. 
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c 
Having received some local complaints about the Cossaks 1 
brutality Mu~bir al-Saltana replied that victorious forces are 
allowed to do whatever they wish for three days. Thus the 
region of Amir Kh1z due to its location was badly damaged as a 
result of Cossack pillaging. 
Having inspected Khiyaban1 1 s body, Mukhbir al-Saltana sent it 
for burial at the Madrasa-yi ~iqat al-Islam. 
After Khiyaban1 1 s death, Mukhbir al-Sal~ana published a 
public notice which read as follows: 
11 People imagined that the uprising of these 
gentlemen in Tabriz was really for establishing 
Constitutional Law. I myself who do not need 
any kind of introduction in Tabriz have undertaken 
the task of serving the people and have come to 
Azerbaijan with enthusiasm and all possible haste. 
From what I have observed between Jamal Abad 
and Tabriz, I have not seen a trace of democracy. 
Everywhere, the working people were suffering 
and the peasants in distress and had nobody to 
come to their rescue. In Miyana I observed a 
pitiful situation; a state of insecurity prevails 
within one farsakh of the town, the whole province 
is in disorder, and in the town the people are 
miserable and lips are sealed by the threat of 
the rifle. During last week I tried to 
understand the wishes of these gentlemen by any 
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means possible but I did not find out anything 
except their personal views; I advised them 
but I did not receive any logical response. 
At a time when unity is the only remedy for 
the ills of the country, these gentlemen 
have chosen the path of disunity. To sit 
down and start reforms is better than rising 
up and creating anarchy in the country. The 
Police are hungry and the Gendarmerie is 
unprovided for and the roads are insecure, 
while these gentlemen are making speeches in 
the courtyards of the government. The 
insurgents have forced government officials 
to commit illegal acts and have dismantled 
the governmental machinery. Accordingly 
further waiting and patience are not 
acceptable. According to the power which has been 
entrusted -!:o·me I have ordered the army to save 
the city from this regrettable situation so that 
a start can be made in the reforming of internal 
and external affairs. The Police must be in 
charge of law and order as before, and the 
Gendarmerie must provide safe roads. We must 
keep their accounts in order so that they 
receive both salary and training. 
Mukhbir al-Sal~ana, 15.9.1920." 1 
The opponents of the uprising asked Mukhbir al-Saltana to banish 
the leaders of the uprising when he had suppressed the movement; 
1. See A. Kasravi, T.H.S.A., p.898. 
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..... the local merchants and aristocrats were 
pushing me to banish the leaders of the 
uprising. I disagreed but finally because 
of the pressure of the nobles, I sent the 
leaders to the countryside for a while ...... l 
After suppressing Khiyaban1•s Uprising Mu~bir al-Saltana was 
congratulated by A~mad Shah and the Prime Minister ~1ushir al-Dawla, 
from whom he received the following telegram; 
11 Dear Governor General, 
We have received your report. The King 
has been most happy because of your 
excellent services. Accordingly he 
sends a medal of honour with a special 
sash to express His Highness• regards. 
I would like to take this opportunity 
to congratulate you. With best wishes. 
- 2 
Mu~ir al-Dawla, 17.9.1920. 11 
Khiyaban1•s uprising was openly suppressed by both central 
government which Mukhbir al-Saltana, an appointed governor general - . 
who accompanied along the Cossacks and also by the British 
government who backed the Iranian governme.nt by sending her 
Norperforce to suppress the uprising: 
..... The Triumvirate fell and were replaced by a 
Nationalist government led by Mushirud-Daula, 
who sent a strong Governor General to 
Azerbaijan with an adequate escort to restore 
the situation. With the support of 
Norperforce the Cossack Brigade put the rebels 
to flight ...... 3 
l. M.G. Hidayat, Kh.Kh., p.320. 
2. M.G. Hidayat (Mukhbir al-Saltana) Kh.Kh., p.319. - . 
3. See C. Skrine, Qg.cit., pp.63-4. 
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According to Kasrav1, Khiyaban1's death left a great deal of 
dissatisfaction, both in Tabriz and Tehran. 1 Papers blamed 
Mukhbir al-Saltana and condemned him for his action. r~1 rza 
Taq1 Khan-i Rafcat, a close friend of Khiyaban1, committed suicide 
in Arvanaq-Anzab where he and some other democrats took refuge; 
some others allied themselves with Ismac1l s1m1tqu and rebelled 
against Mukhbir al-Saltana; in Ahar, the insurgents led by Qiyam1 
called themselves 11 Qiyamiyyun-i Intiqamiyyun .. (revenge insurgents) 
and carried on a violent struggle against the central government 
for a couple of months. On Khiyaban1's anniversary in Tabriz some 
freedom fighters and democrats celebrated his first anniversary. 2 
Two years later, in February 1922, the followers of Khiyaban1 
rebelled and called themselves 11 Partisans of freedom .. and .. enemies 
of despotism .. and carried on their opposition to the central 
government. 3 On the occasion of Khiyaban1•s death the following 
Iranian poets wrote about him: Abu al-Qasim-i cArif, ~·1uhammad 
cAl1 Safv.at, cAl1 Akbar-i l~ah and Malik al-Shucara-i Bahar. 4 
It is very often the case in Iran that a movement which has 
not received any support from an external power, is either defeated 
by its own central government or is suppressed by external 
intervention. In countries such as Iran, which lies in a strategic 
l . See 
3. See 
lj. See 
.. See , 
A. Kasrav1, T.H.S.A., 
P .213 of "fh·,~ worK. 
G. Lenczowski, R. W., 




2.. For tnore de tc;t i Is see~ t1. "· ~ a-f vat,~ 
oa sta n- ~ ou siti,.,, P.P. S2- 3. 
area and has rich natural resources, any such movement must have a 
bearing on the interests of foreign powers and social systems. The 
idea of belonging to neither East nor West which was espoused by 
Khiyabani was perhaps an impossible one at his time. ~·Jh i 1 e the 
central government and the enemies of the democratic movement in 
Azerbaijan, namely the big landowners and the rich, were supported 
by Britain, Khiyaban1 did not contemplate receiving any kind of 
support from outside forces. Khiyaban1 could easily have been 
supported by the only other existing power in the area, namely the 
Bolsheviks. In the case of the Constitutional Revolution 
democratic forces in Russia helped the constitutionalists in Iran 
and stood against Tzarist reactionary and military forces. As in 
the Constitutional Revolution, during Khiyabani's uprising there 
were two forces. One wanted democratic freedom, land reform, 
social justice and compulsory education and was headed by Khiyaban1. 
The other force which consisted of feudal magnates, businessmen and 
reactionary elements were working with the central government, backed 
by Britain. 
While ~iyaban1 was popular among progressive forces in Iran, 
the government media in Iran and the press in Britain were painting 
a negative picture of Khiyaban1. The London Times for example 
described him as the "virtual dictator" of Tabriz. 1 
There were many articles written in Iran, the government run 
press introducing Khiyaban1 as a dictator and separatist who had 
l. The Times, September 20, 1920. 
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achieved nothing but killing the people and plundering the rich 
by his uprising. On the other hand, there is another statement 
which completely differs from this: "there was neither killing 
nor plundering in Khiyaban1' s uprising" 1 Khiyaban1 not only did 
not behave as a dictator to his opponents but in fact guaranteed 
their lives in order to prove the existence of democracy in his 
movement. 2 Khiyabanl''s attitude and policy towards his opponents 
can be understood from one of his articles: 
" ... within these four months, we did not incline 
to harm anybody. After four months' activity 
there has been no anarchy; and while we have 
been obliged to take harsh measures, nevertheless 
we have not disturbed our opponents. We have 
banished and arrested our opponents in a 
civilized manner; we have forgiven our enemies 
d h d th . d . ..3 an ear e1r a v1ce .... 
Khiyaban1's strategy during this period is open to certain 
criticisms. The main one is perhaps that he did not take measures 
to organize large forces to protect the revolution. He had the 
opportunity to establish a considerable armed force, as there were 
many weapons and much ammunition at the German Consulate in Tabriz 
which had been taken over by Khiyaban1's followers after the death of 
Wustrow, the German Consul-General. If he had organized a strong 
army he would have been able to neutralise the local Cossack troops 
1. M. Mujtahid1, R.A., p.75. 
2. Tajaddud, 3/2/1299 (24.4.1920). 
3. Tajaddud, 24/5/1299 (16.8.1920). 
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and repel an attack by central government forces. He also did 
nothing about the Tabriz Barracks, where the Cossacks remained 
under central government control. Thus they were eventually able 
to defeat the movement and kill Khiyaban1's followers within 
four hours. It seems entirely possible that if Khiyaban1 had 
followed the example of Muhammad Taqi Khan-i Pisyan•s 1 military, . -
policy, it would not have been possible to suppress the revolution 
so easily. Indeed he did not discuss military matters with other 
leaders. Kar1m Tahirzada-yi Bihzad relates the following 
revealing account: 
"One day Khiyaban1 asked me to discuss the commander 
of the uprising force about whom he was interested 
in talking. He asked my opinion. I recommended 
Colonel Pisyan. Khiyaban1 said, .. I would like to 
appoint him as the commander of the uprising force" 
and then asked me to write a letter to Pisyan and 
invite him to Tabriz. After a while I received 
a letter in which Pisyan said, "I would be most 
grateful if Khiyaban1 himself could write dir.ectly 
to me, and I am ready to be at his service".· I 
met Khiyaban1 and told him what Pisyan wanted, but 
Khiyaban1 did not make any response. I met 
Khiyaban1 again later about the matter of the 
commander but he did not pay any attention. I 
heard after a while that Khiyaban1 had appointed 
Sayyid Murtaza D1ba who was an inexperienced 
military figure. "
2 
1. See Appendix No. ·6 .. 
2. SeeK. T. Zada-yi Bihzad, ~.cit., p.507. 
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It must be also said that Khiyaban1 was autocratic by 
temperament. He often made decisions independently rather than 
in co-operation with the other members of the committee. However, 
some historians maintain that Khiyaban1 did sometimes co-operate 
with other leaders, as for example in sending some two hundred 
national guards to fight Sardar cAshayir. 1 
Khiyaban1 was indecisive in some ways. He had a great 
opportunity to take advantage of the revolutionary situation which 
existed in other parts of Iran. If he had co-operated with other 
movements and co-ordinated their efforts he might have been 
successful in bringing about a fundamental change in the social 
structure of Iran. Nevertheless he deliberately ignored the 
opportunity of benefiting from this situation: 
11 
••• there is a great deal of co-operation from other 
parts of Iran, and they have asked for the uprising, 
b t k th t . t. t u2 u we as em o rema1n pa 1en .... 
Khiyaban1 wanted to carry on his uprising by two ways, firstly 
by giving daily speeches and writing articles in order to prepare the 
minds of the people, and secondly, by military preparations which were 
mainly based on the National Guards. Perhaps Khiyaban1 achieved 
more in the first way than in the second, as his National Guards were 
no match for the central government forces. In this case he became 
victim of his determined policy of pure nationalism, that is to say 
1. Ibid. 
2. Tajaddud, 13/2/1299 (4.5.1920). 
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complete reliance on the people and local forces. Probably he 
did this in order to avoid being accused by his enemies of being 
a separatist and the puppet of foreigners. But in reality, those 
who were accusing ~iyaban1 of separatism\IJerethemselves receiving 
help from foreign power, namely Britain. Bearing in mind all these 
circumstances and the aggressive policy of the central government 
of Iran, we may conclude that Khiyaban1's uprising and democratic 
movement would have lasted longer and had much deeper influence if 
he had received help from other democratic forces. 
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Chapter 5 
KHIYABANI AND HIS POLITICAL SPEECHES 
A few Iranian Historians studied political figures such as Khiyaban1 
on an abstract level, that is to say their writings on Khiyaban1 have 
been outside his social and political context. Here, however, we 
shall attempt to study Khiyaban1 in his socio-political context. 
Khiyaban1 made one hundred and one speeches during his uprising of 
which sixty one were delivered at the Tajaddud Building while the 
c- - - ·-rest were given at Ali Qapu and published in Tajaddud, a weekly 
paper in Tabriz. Tajaddud was published for the first time on 
~pril 9, 1917. It was edited by Fuy~±at up to number thirteen; 
later on he was assisted by Abu al-Fath Khan-i cAlavi and they 
jointly published Tajaddud until number fifty eight. After this 
number Rafcat became the chief editor until number eighty six. The 
last editor-in-charge was Shaykh Muhammad Khiyaban1 who continued -- . -
until number two hundred and two. The only existing copy of 
Tajaddud is to be found in the National Library of Tabriz in Iran but 
even here some numbers are missing. Khiyaban1•s speeches explain 
the reasons for his uprising and help us to find out more about his 
ideology. This in turn helps us to understand his actions, the 
comments of his opponents and the social circumstances and political 
situation in which Khiyaban1•s Uprising took place. 
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The purpose of this chapte~ is two-fold. Firstly we shall 
try to introduce the socio-political outlook of Khiyabani through 
his original speeches and writings. Secondly we hope to show that, 
contrary to official views in Iran that his uprising was based on a 
separatist movement, Khiyaban1 was a patriot with a deep love and 
respect for his country, especially Azerbaijan, and for his people. 
His deep patriotism and love of Azerbaijan and Tabriz does not 
necessarily mean that he did not love the rest of Iran. We shall 
attempt to show how his patriotism and interest in democratic 
movement has been misinterpreted by biased historians and by a 
hostile press. 
Khiyaban1 in his speeches and writings has discussed or touched 
on a number of socio-political .issues which we shall explain and 
discuss chronologically. In this chapter Khiyaban1's aims in the 
Tabriz Uprising, his views on national revival, on monarchy, the 
Constitutional Law of Iran, discipline, the concept of 'freedom', his 
concept of government and his patriotism on the bases of freedom 
and independence of Iran will be illustrated. 
1. KHIYABANI AND HIS AIMS IN THE TABRIZ UPRISING 
Khiyaban1's Uprising was not an individual movement or even a local 
rebellion. He indeed wanted to set up a movement in which an 
unbreakable bond would be created with other parts of Iran. In 
other words his uprising was a national rejection of reactionary and 
despotic rule in general, and of the existing situation of Iran in 
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particular. In short 11 The Tabriz Uprising has a deep bond and 
interest with the other parts of Iran ... our uprising has taken 
place against the existing reactionary situation .... 111 fb_iyabani 
then asks his fellow revolutionaries to pay particular attention to 
common interests rather than thinking of individual benefits. In 
this connection he believed that one must not sacrifice one•s fellow 
countrymen•s interests for one•s own interest. 
think of one's 0\vn individual benefit .... 112 
11 ... 0ne must not 
Khiyabani, explaining the aims of the Tabriz Uprising, indicates 
that whoever wants to rule despotically in order to keep himself in 
power, is a person who is against enlightenment. He compares his 
own ideas with those of his opponents and central government as 
follows: 
11 ... we demand a common brightness to cover all 
our country. Of course in order to create such 
a light, a clean and progressive programme is 
essential. It is the characteristic of despotism 
to act against enlightenment and freedom ... we 
freedom lovers will fight on the bases of our 
principles, to develop freedom and expand 
enlightenment in this field .... 113 
Khiyaban1 in another speech analysed the aims of the insurgents 
and the Tabriz Uprising. He reminds his listeners that we must be 
aware of our requirements and must not be impatient. He points out 
1. Tajaddud, 2/2/1299 (23.4.1920). 
2. Ibid. 
3. Tajaddud, 3/2/1299 (24.4.1920). 
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the benefits of discussion of political issues and warns the people 
to be aware of those who want to misuse their honesty and 
sincerity: 
" ... we must understand what we want, but this 
understanding is the result of troubles that 
one must bear; we must look and then with 
patience must see and hear and must acquire 
confidence and trust. In order to understand 
properly one must avoid being deceived and not 
fall into the valley of bewilderment .... "1 
Khiyaban1 then talks about his opponents and those who are 
against him. He regrets that those dishonest people who left Tabriz, 
following the insurgents activities, were appointed to other posts by 
the Tehran administration. He is unhappy to see that those who were 
known as absolute dictators in Azerbaijan and who were banished 
from the province have been reappointed in different parts of the 
country by the central government. Khiyaban1 argues that the aims 
and demands of the uprising in Tabriz are not restricted to an 
individual interest or limited to Azerbaijanis only. He assures 
his fellow countrymen that they will establish a comfortable life 
and permanent peace, and promises them that they will prevent Iran 
from falling into anarchy: 
11 
••• The aim of our uprising is to put an end to this 
anarchy and disorder and to cut off the hands of 
those who are traitors to the country; we shall 
not forgive those who are against. this uprising; 
1. Tajaddud, 11/2/1299 (2.5.1920). 
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there will be no place for this kind of traitor 
in Iran. Those thieves who are thrown out of 
Tabriz should not get any post in Tehran. Those 
criminals who have run away should not be given 
any post in other parts of Iran, because all the 
sacred soil of Iran has a right to democracy. We 
do not think of and seek only our requirements 
and demands; we are not limited to Azad1 Sitan; 
we have not planned an individual programme ... 
we know that our voice, at the moment, is kept 
unheard beyond Tabriz, but we will not be 
disappointed, because we have thought of this 
before and are prepared for this time ... finally 
we shall carry on our activities until the 
establishment of a permanent democracy in Iran ... 
we shall appoint those people who do not dare to 
destroy our nation and destroy our rights. We 
are going to establish a democracy in which both 
internal and external peace and relationships 
d 1 .. 1 eve op... . 
Khiyaban1 strongly emphasises reform which will cover all 
parts of Iran. He does not wish to fulfil his aims only within 
Tabriz. In other words he is interested in establishing a new 
and advanced democracy throughout Iran: 
11 
••• we would like to put the Constitutional Law into 
practice ... we will run Iran in accordance with 
the present progressive laws and establish a 
government in keeping with our time's advanced 
laws ... the freedom which this uprising wants to 
establish is not limited to the Azerbaijanis, but 
. f 11 I . 112 1s or a ran1ans .... 
1. Tajaddud, 12.2.1299 (3.5.1920). 
2. Tajaddud, 16.2.1299 (7.5.1920) 
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~iyaban1 then argues that those reactionary people who are 
against their time are anti-enlightenment and are indeed backward 
looking. He blames those statesmen who have not managed any 
reforms since the Iranian Constitutional Revolution and have wasted 
valuable time. Khiyaban1, emphasizing the necessity of compulsory 
education in Iran, regrets that no serious attention has ever been 
given to such an important issue: 
11 
••• There are forces which want to keep our nation 
in error and ignorance forever, and do not want 
to open these schoo 1 s for our chi 1 dren: a · 
compulsory education is one of the most essential 
articles of our programme which we have formally 
put into practice since our uprising. 
Unfortunately there has been a deliberate attempt 
to prevent the fulfillment of this programme; 
since the Constitutional Revolution no positive 
step has been taken in regard to education and 
the authorities have intentionally tried to 
ignore this matter .... 111 
Khiyaban1 addresses school pupils and assures them of a sure 
future in regard to their ambitions; 11 ••• You, our young students, be 
sure that your parents and elders will sacrifice themselves so that 
you can live in comfort and freedom .... "2 Khiyaban1, again 
explaining his aims in this uprising, addresses his fellow-citizens, 
asking them to pay particular attention to the fact that this 
movement ha~ taken place in order to gain independence, democracy 
1. Tajaddud, 19/2/1299 (10.5.1920). 
2. Tajaddud, 21/2/1299 (12.5.1920). 
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and freedom. In other words he invites the people to work hard in 
order to establish permanent freedom in Iran: 
..... This uprising has taken place only to gain our 
freedom, democracy and independence: all the 
principles of this uprising must ~e used for the 
success of our aims; nobody is allowed to abuse 
the power of this uprising for individual interests, 
and all personal problems and interests must be 
forgotten. Today, in the view of all individuals, 
only one aim and one interest must be seen, and 
that is the freedom and democratic independence of 
Iran and nothingelse ...... 1 
Khiyaban1 stresses the point that he and the other real freedom 
lovers had been prepared themselves for an honourable death rather 
than living an unhappy life; he asserts that he would sacrifice his 
life in order to set up a permanent democracy and a stable future 
for the coming generation, rather than living in a reactionary and 
despotic society. For Khiyaban1 life had no value if there was no 
freedom and democracy in Iran. He had indeed thought of this fate 
and perhaps knew his destiny; nevertheless, for a man such as 
Khiyaban1, life, freedom and democracy had a different meaning than 
for ordinary people in Iran. The people did not have a clear concept 
of freedom and democracy as did Khiyaban1. Khiyaban1 knew that his 
life was permanently under threat, he had prepared himself for this 
kind of event. He was obviously a determined and revolutionary 
personality who was devoted to building real democracy and freedom in 
Iran. This is perhaps the most powerful driving force behind his 
movement: 
1. Tajaddud, 23/2/1299 (14.5.1920). 
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..... We die so that the democracy of Iran shall live ... 
this uprising wants to save Iran; Iran and its 
democracy must remain alive and firm forever ... 
we have to rise up and carry out this uprising 
so that our sons• future will be secure; we 
are in fact the devotees of our children; we 
shall die so that they can live freely and 
independently .... 111 
Although ~iyaban1 was a revolutionary man and had a clear 
concept of freedom and democracy in Iran, he, nevertheless believed 
that without full participation of the masses in the uprising and 
that without realizing their own power and ability in forming a 
new society, the uprising could not succeed. He blames previous 
rulers for this. lack of confidence and social and political 
awareness among the people. The successive governments of Iran 
tried to keep the people in subjection and prevented them from forming 
political parties. Thus their social and political consciousness 
did not truly develop to the extent that they could spontaneously 
respond to present developments . 
..... in Iran the people had never been given a chance to 
form their own government. Now the nation wishes to 
establish a government whose authority will be fully 
and unconditionally in the hands of the nation, and 
the policy of such a government will be the one 
which our time requires .... 112 
1. Tajaddud, 11/3/1299 (2.6.1920). 
2. Tajaddud, 13/3/1299 (4.6.1920). 
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Khiyaban1 in most of his speeches stresses 'revival • and 
wants to adapt his ideas to the requirements of his time. He 
often talks about the present reactionary and despotic government 
and remarks that he and his followers will never disregard and 
ignore the present era of progress and advance. He urges his fellow 
countrymen to be honest and dedicated to human causes in the 
present century . 
..... We are the sons of the present century; we 
will not be disinterested in our time; we have 
rebelled against a reactionary and despotic 
government, not against our time. We shall be 
successful and true children of our time if we 
carry out our firm determination .... 111 
Khiyaban1 in his speeches wants to make it clear to his fellow 
countrymen that if they wish to have a democracy in Iran, it is their 
duty to practice it within society rather than contemplate theory and 
abstract ideas. He asks them to study and assess the achievements 
of other nations to find out the reasons for their successes and 
failures. He wishes the people to think about this fact, that a 
few ministers and a King have no authority to manage their affairs. 
In other words he addresses those who are aware of social and 
political issues and expects them to enlighten others who are 
ignorant. 
Khiyabani wishes to establish the authority of the people in 
running the country, so that Kings and ministers would be dictated to 
by the interest of the people. If they wish Kings and ministers to 
1. Tajaddud, 25/2/1299 (16.5. 1920). 
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be changed or be replaced they can do so without any difficulty. 
This sense of democracy must be taught to the people. Democracy 
is not born with us but is acquired through understanding and social 
requirement: 
" ... We must replace our old and backward habits with 
new progressive ones. We must not allow an 
unrepresentative government to rule us; this 
uprising will make it clear that you must rule 
your country by yourselves. You must learn from 
other nations and understand how they are ruling 
their countries. You must understand that a few 
ministers and a King have neither power nor authority 
to impose their demands upon you and rule you in 
regard to their interests. They have to obey the 
will of the nation. You are asked to transfer 
whatever you know to those who do not. Without 
propaganda you will be unable to carry out your 
policy; you are asked to develop your advanced 
and democratic ideas among your nation through 
propaganda. The will of the nation must be 
above everything: if necessary they can dethrone 
the King; and if they so wish and consider it better 
to replace it with a republican regime they must 
do so; and if they dislike the parliament they 
can dismiss it and be able to do anything ...... l 
Khiyabani wishes to build up a system of government which has 
benefited other advanced countries. He wants a government in Iran 
which can devise laws which will protect the interest of the masses 
and which will be suitable for the twentieth century. In other 
1. Tajaddud, 16/4/1299 (8.7.1920). 
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words he refuses to live in the past and let his fellow countrymen 
be fed on centuries old superstition and subjected to inhuman 
practices· such as imprisonment, torture and execution merely 
because of having different political views from those of the 
existing ruling class. He assures his fellow countrymen that 
they can attain such a democratic system and promises them a 
social order which others have already gained. 
major programme, a vital ambition, is to lead his fellow countrymen 
towards a civilized society: 
..... I hereby announce that the uprising committee 
leads you all in the way of a complete and 
proper freedom; whatever is accepted as a freedom 
and democracy in the world we certainly want to 
use and adopt ourselves in the same way so that 
we can reach the same level of civilization in 
the world. . . . .. l 
Every country has its own peculiar circumstances and social 
conditions according to which their social leaders suggest or apply 
their policies and ideas. All these social circumstances and 
conditions form their conviction that if a change is needed in their 
society, this change must be carried out by the people who live and 
experience the reality. Perhaps we might describe this conviction 
as a quality of that nation which is not necessarily better or worse 
than others, but it is an important and decisive factor in changing 
and shaping the social system in any given nation: 
l. Tajaddud, 14/5/1299 (6.8.1920). 
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11 
••• every nation., during its 1 i fe, fo 11 ows a certain 
policy. The Germans believed that 'brave men are 
the owners of the world'. The English say that, 
'great hearts are never defeated'. We must 
have both that braveness and this great heart 
because we have assumed the burden of 
establishing a democratic government in Iran. 111 
~iyaban1 realized that in order to establish a democratic 
government in Iran mere changes in the governmental system were not 
enough. In order to apply a democratic system in the country 
new favourable conditions and a favourable economic climate must 
be created first. The most important obs tac 1 es on the way to 
democracy, according to Khiyabani, were the existing feudal system 
and big land ownership in Iran. Therefore, Khiyaban1 believed that 
the feudal system in Iran must be abolished and that large land 
holdings must be distributed among landless peasants. Khiyaban1 
knows that the big land owners are bitter enemies of his uprising 
because they would lose their interest. In fact he regards these 
feudal magnates as more dangerous to his uprising than his political 
opponents in the government. Therefore he was convinced that the 
revolutionaries must take the threat from feudalists very seriously: 
11 
••• it is understood that this uprising will not allow 
the feudal system to remain in this country for ever. 
The feudalists have started to plunder and kill in 
- 2. 
the name of the Shah Suvan and have started an 
attempt against the uprising; these people will 
receive punishment but their punishment will not 
1. Tajaddud, 21/2/1299 (12.5.1920). 
2..e.i a tr\be In Aze,-ba(jan. 
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be the same as that of state criminals; on the 
contrary we will deal with them under martial 
l 11 1 aw .... 
Khiyaban1 wished to act forcefully on land reform, to make it 
clear that whoever is interested in common interests must accept 
that every peasant has a right to have his own land. However there 
were many feudalists who had a different view on the matter. They 
believed that the continuation of Khiyaban1's uprising was against 
their individual interests, and that he and his uprising would not 
allow them to go on enjoying their wealth. Khiyaban1 regrets that 
no step has been taken in regard to land reform in Iran since the 
Iranian Constitutional Revolution. For this he blames those states-
men who.were among the biggest landlords who talked a lot about 
freedom, democracy and nationalism but in practice did nothing in 
the interest of poor people and peasants: 
" ... What has been done? We had an article in our 
constitutional laws about land reform, none of which 
has been put into practice during the past fourteen 
years. The development, progress and achievements 
of the nation depend on the land on which the people 
l . 11 2. 1 ve... . 
Besides feudalists who were against Khiyaban1's uprising, the 
big merchants also were not pleased with the uprising. As a whole 
the rich upper class people including big landowners and merchants, 
together with the central government, were against Khiyaban1: 
1- '7lja..JJ u J .) 3; 5; 12.9~ ( 2 (,. ].1.920) 
2.- Ta.. ja.Jducl .~l4t'-4t\2J' ( l (,. 7· 19Zo) 
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11 
••• there is a part of the nation in general and 
merchants in particular who are seeking their 
security, but are not thinking at all of how 
nation, including the majority of tradesmen and 
the lower class are suffering. We must ask 
them, •what do you want?• why are they unhappy 
and why do they show resentment about national 
movements or any activities which lead to 
these movements?1 
This shows that Khiyaban1 took a radical stand against the 
interests of the existing ruling class in Iran. He was convinced 
that a small part of society, which formed the ruling class, were 
opposed to any radical movements in Iran. Khiyaban1 had realized 
that this social conflict could not be solved and that there could 
not be a national unity without the elimination of hostile and 
reactionary forces such as big land owners from society. He did 
not like to see the majority of the Iranian peasants living in 
misery and poverty because they had neither their own land for 
cultivation nor the right to use the land which belonged to big 
land owners: 
•• ... the manifestations of feudalism must be 
eradicated and destroyed in this country .... 112 
Khiyaban1 wanted to build a society in which corruption, 
injustice, illiteracy and oppression would be rooted out. He had 
recognized that these social shortcomings were man made, in other 
words, they were imposed upon the people by the ruling class. In 
1. Tajaddud, 10/3/1299 (1.6.1920). 
2. Tajaddud, 22/l/1299 (12.4.1920). 
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order to root out these social maladies, he believed that social 
parasites and corrupt government officials must be dealt with 
radically: 
..... it is obvious that radicalism requires deep, 
speedy, decisive fundamental change and programmes 
so that the manifest social deficiencies may be 
completely rooted out, thus freeing the people 
for good from the effects of such shortcomings... . .. l 
Khiyabani encouraged the people to resist and gave them hope 
for victory: 
..... not only will you be able to resist the enemy 
in a harsh climate, under the hail and snow, but 
you will also maintain your unbending resistence 
and patience under the shower of fire, blood, 
bullets and mortar-shells .... 112 
Khiyaban1 believed that if a deputy to parliament is elected 
by the machinations of governmental officials, he is not a real 
representative of the people, but a traitor against the people. 3 
Although Khiyaban1 had a deep trust in the authority of the 
people he was nevertheless aware of the pitfalls which are often 
created along the road to revolution by the enemy's taking 
advantage of the illiteracy and ignorance of the people: 
..... In our country, the enemies of change and reform 
often seek an opportunity to mislead the people by 
crying wolf on behalf of the nation and the 
1. Tajaddud, 28/1/1299 (18.4.1920). 
2. Tajaddud, 30/l/1299 (20.4.1920). 
3. Ibid. 
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government. When an office is closed for 
reorganisation and improvement they take 
advantage of this closure and try to defile 
the image of those who support reform and 
change. We ought to be aware of these 
sudden attacks and predict the time of the 
attack of these enemies who try to create 
confusion and troubles. We should follow a 
policy which will neutralize their attacks 
at the outset before they can threaten or 
defeat us. Having knowledge of these 
processes determines the position of 
individuals who should not ignore their 
essential aims and should not give up their 
resistance when confronted by temporary 
noise of opposition. On the contrary they 
ought to side firmly with their leaders 
and representative~ in order to create an 
undefeatable line of resistance ...... l 
Khiyaban1 believed that a democratic government must be declared 
in Iran, which would put the Iranian Constitutional Laws into practice. 
Referring to such a government he said: 
..... the uprising of the freedom-loving people 
of Tabriz, must take a definite and firm 
form so that they can replace the accumulated 
mistakes by reality in order to improve the 
existing conditions ... the Tabriz uprising 
aims to establish a free and democratic 
government within the framework of the 
1. Tajaddud, l/2/1299 (22.4.1920). 
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country•s laws ... accordingly the Tabriz 
uprising has a solid and deeply-rooted 
link with all cities and parts of Iran ...... l 
When Khiyaban1 talks about the change of the social system in 
Iran he, in fact, wants to say that the achievements of the 
Constitutional Revolution were not translated from theory into 
practice. Khiyaban1 wished to revive the Constitutional Laws and 
on this base defend the freedom and independence of the people and 
of Iran. In other words his uprising was intended to restore the 
law and protect human lives against a selfish, aggressive and 
lawless ruling class. Khiyaban1 revolted against the jungle law 
which negated every kind of civil liberty and the constitution 
itself. The Shah, the landowners, the rich and the army ruled 
without control: 
11 ••• Our uprising aims to achieve independence and 
freedom and we wish to respect and protect the 
Constitutional Laws. The travels of the Shah, 
the waste of the budget, and decisions which are taken 
without the consent of the nation or without 
consulting the people, all are against the 
Constitutional Laws .... 112 
Khiyaban1•s movement was a radical one and he wanted to change 
the whole social system of Iran: 
..... this movement of yours is not an ordinary 
social gathering for debate, meeting and 
applauding. I have mentioned this over and 
1. Tajaddud, 2/2/1299 (23.4.1920). 
2. Tajaddud, 9/3/1299 (31.5.1920. 
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over again, that this movement wishes to 
change the regime of Iran. In earlier 
revolutions in Iran, personalities such as 
Mu~ammad cAli were replaced by personalities 
like Nasir al-Mulk. But this most recent 
uprising either will end in the death of all 
freedom fighters or will turn the system of 
Iran upside down .... ul 
In the past the poor and the working class took part in the 
revolution and died, but only the intellectuals or influential 
leaders benefited from these uprisings. In other words the 
revolutions were betrayed and no fundamental change took place in 
society. The rich and the land owners remained in their positions; 
the people made sacrifices but their leaders stayed behind and 
remained safe and well. Khiyaban1 was not this kind of leader. 
He wished to lead the people and if necessary to die for them. He 
encouraged the leaders of the uprising to take part in the struggle 
and walk in front of the people: 
11 ••• In the past the lower class faced death and 
the influential personalities of the revolution 
reached higher positions by benefiting from it. 
But our uprising has this advantage and quality 
that whenever death is inevitable its leaders 
will die before the people .... 112 
Khiyabani did not want to become a hero by his own death. He 
was against hero worship and heroism. He believed that the success of 
1. Tajaddud, 9/3/1299 (31 .5.1920). 
2. ·Tajaddud, 9/3/1299 (31.5.1920). 
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leadership depends on the support of the masses and that the leaders 
should not exclude themselves from the aspirations and wishes of 
the masses. If they face death they face it altogether. 
word Khiyaban1 was against individualistic uprising: 
" ... before we die we shall convey our aim and 
philosophy with the utmost determination and 
forcefulness; we shall talk, we shall fight 
and we shall finally let every one be rewarded 
accordingly... . .. l 
KHIYABANI•s VIEW OF •GoVERNMENT• 
In a 
The driving force in Khiyabani•s political vision is the unity of all 
freedom fighters in Iran. His speeches have two distinct 
characteristics: firstly he talks not only for Azerbayjanis, but 
for the entire people of Iran. In other words he does not separate 
the freedom of Azerbayjan from the rest of Iran. Secondly he 
stresses on the importance of the masses regardless of their religion, 
language and origin. He regards Iran as a whole and wishes to see 
the creation of a government which can fulfil the needs of all people 
in the country. Khiyabani believes that in order to create a 
government of the people all political forces must be united on a 
common ground. Only by this unity of interest and aim will the 
freedom fighters in Iran be able to overcome her problems: 
1. Tajaddud, 9/3/1299 (31.5.1920). 
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~~ ... All freedom fighters of Iran must become 
united in one view point and avoid division, and 
acquire a great spiritual capital, and be guided 
by powerful and well-informed leaders; and form 
a government which should not rule either by 
the will of a single person or despise the 
people, but on the contrary, the will of the 
nation must be the moving force behind the 
government and the originator of laws .... 111 
Khiyabani knew that without respect and regard for the interests 
of all people in Iran a genuine freedom and political stability can-
not be achieved: 
11 ••• The present duty of the Iranian nation is to 
achieve a place in the world of humanism and 
reach to a true and real freedom.. This is not 
possible unless the interest of the public is 
b d 112 o serve . . . . 
This duty can be fulfilled by establishing a democratic government. 
The failure of governments in Iran in carrying out a radical change 
was due to their wrong and selfish policy. Khiyabani argues that a 
government either works from her own limited interest or works for 
the interest and welfare of all. The former leads to despotism and 
social injustice and sufferings but the latter results in social 
welfare and political democracy. All Iranian governments, Khiyabani 
is convinced, have been despotic and selfish. They had very little 
interest in the people and public opinion. Khiyaban1 wanted to 
1. Tajaddud, 26/4/1299 (18.7.1920). 
2. Tajaddud, 5/5/1299 (28.7.1920). 
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replace such unrepresentative government by a democratically 
elected government in Iran; 
..... \~e want Democratic government ... from the 
people's viewpoint (public interest) there 
are two kind of governments: one is an inferior 
government which seeks only its own interest and 
regards this its duty. Another government is 
of a superior kind which not only works for the 
interests of the whole community but also tries 
hard to provide for the needs of the people 
constantly and works hard for their security. 
We had a government which was hostile and a 
plunderer. Whenever we reminded it of the 
needs of the people they kept ignoring our 
demands... For this reason we decided to say 
'down with such a government' and such 
governments must be destroyed .... 111 
Khiyaban1 did not believe that the removal of an individual 
or individuals from power would solve the problems of Iran. He 
rather wanted to change the system of government and above all the 
persons who represent the people. He argued that the representatives 
of the people must be those who know the problems of Iranian society 
and have experienced the sufferings of the people. Unless members 
of a governing body have lived among the people and experienced 
the real shortcomings in society, they cannot be sympathetic to the 
sufferings of poor people: 
1. Tajaddud, 24/2/1299 (15.5.1920) and 1/3/1299 (23.5.1920). 
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..... the government in Iran must be formed of 
the persons who seek the interest of the people, and 
whenever the people are unaware of their own 
interests they must make the people aware of them; 
the government must not take advantage of the 
ignorance of the lower class and commit a crime 
in regard to the past, present and future of a 
great nation ... there should be no longer such 
persons as 'al-Dawlas' and 'al-Saltanas' (rich 
aristocrats and upper class) holding the destiny 
of our freedom in their hands .... "1 
Although Khiyaban1 was a patriot and a nationalist, he had a 
deep respect for and awareness of social and political developments 
in Europe. He admired the democratic achievements of European 
people through Parliament. Khiyaban1 had noticed that Iranian 
governments have been copying European democracy only in form but 
not in content and meaning. In Europe, for example, the 
government cannot ignore the opinion of the members of Parliament 
whereas in Iran the government or King can rule without control or 
interference from the Parliament. In other words the Parliament 
in Iran is nothing more than a show of democracy: 
..... most European people are used to national 
regimes; and democratic institutions have taken 
root in their social and political organizations. 
The National Assembly in Europe has held a 
governing status. European governments cannot 
ignore the opinion of their people and the 
services of the parliament. They even call an 
1. Tajaddud, l/3/1299 (23.5.1920). 
162 
election in the middle of a war if they have to. 
They take elections seriously and assemble 
parliament as speedily as possible because the 
government needs the guidance and advice of the 
parliament and also wants to free itself from 
responsibility. In our country governments 
have opposite views. Firstly there is not 
an election: whenever there is an election they 
adopt a plan so that the election would not 
take place before four years ... the persons who are 
elected have been regarded as the 'butchers' of 
the nation. They have sucked the blood of the 
nation and will continue to do so as long as they 
can. Of course when one certain family have 
taken over a country's government and are not 
bound to any sort of discipline and consideration, 
they will trample on the rights of the nation. 
It would be surprising if they do not do this 
because such a government seeks only its own 
interest. We saw in the famous case of the 
ultimatum, that although the members of the 
parliament during exciting discussions in the 
Hall of Baharistan (The Iranian National 
Parliament Building) had decided to reject this 
ultimatum, nevertheless the rulers of the time 
went along and accepted the ultimatum .... "1 
Khiyaban1's main policy was to spread freedom and democracy all 
over Iran and Azerbayjan in particular. He believed that without 
freedom of thought and political activities the country cannot advance 
along the road of democracy. 
follows: 
He criticizes the governing system as 
1. Tajaddud 4/3/1299 (26.5.1920). 
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..... In our country a few people have taken the 
government and govern in a typical way. In 
their view a government is formed only of a 
minister who sits in his ministry and gives 
orders and issues decrees without thinking 
... we must abolish this policy and fight 
against the spirit of such a concept and 
outlook... . ul 
Khiyabani's idea of freedom and democracy is based on the 
government of the people. He knew that this cannot be achieved 
unless the people take part directly in the making of the society 
and elect their own ministers and governments: 
..... At the beginning of every governing system, 
many struggles for power are expected. The 
powerful side- takes over and forms a government, 
then general affairs of the country take their 
shape and natural order. But in Iran no 
government by the people and for the people has 
ever taken shape. The people have made a 
revolution but received only promises from 
ministers and questions such as 11 What are your 
demands 11 ?, the people are deceived and gradually 
lose heart in revolution... But now have risen 
in order to give a heart to the people, to prevent 
conflicts and ecnourage the people to choose or 
dismiss government .... 112 
1. Tajaddud, 15/3/1299 (6.6.1920). 
2. Tajaddud, 15/3/1299 (6.6.1920). 
164 
Expressing his views about democracy, various governments in 
the world and a democratic government in Iran, Khiyaban1 says: 
..... The Ancient Greeks had an abstract concept of 
Democratic government, whereas the English (Anglo-
Saxons) have shown a more indepdendent view of the 
concept of it. They never ignore the practical 
side of the concept. The former (Greeks) have 
advanced in their theory, but the latter (English) 
practically have a wider view of freedom and 
independence. We wish to establish a kind of 
democratic government in Iran that in particular 
will put the people in charge of their destiny, 
achieve complete independence and move towards a 
full freedom. The present understanding of we 
Iranians is that we must have a stable democratic 
government which continuously reflects democratic 
desires and the feelings of the people. The 
institutions which are created by democracy should 
not finally take over control and assume despotic 
power for themselves. The power that the masses 
entrust to the institutions and the government that 
they create should not finally work against their 
interests and take a strongly established and 
conservative form ...... l 
The government which Khiyabani wished to establish in Iran was 
not one which the central government could accept. Khiyabani wanted 
to set up a powerful and independent government, but central 
government wished to keep a government in power which could easily 
sell the country to strangers; Khiyabani wanted the people to :cntrol 
1. Tajaddud, 8/2/1299 (29.4.1920). 
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their government and have a right to accept or reject whatever is 
good or bad for their country, but the present government wanted to 
ratify its own interests and not pay attention to common interests 
even if they had to impose martial law and censorship in order to 
keep the nation's mouth closed. Khiyaban1 wanted to build up a 
government in which there would be no place for any traitor to the 
country or for thieves and opportunists, while the central 
government, following its own interests wanted to employ those 
whom Khiyaban1 condemned in this way. 
central government felt that its existence was at stake and was 
enrolling the aid of reactionaries, greedy feudalists and the wealthy 
in order to plot the suppression of Khiyaban1's uprising, an uprising 
which had no desire except to further the masses' fortune and 
ambitions and to establish Iranian independence and to strengthen 
the country. 
KHIYABANI AND THE CONCEPT OF FREEDOM 
Khiyaban1's concept of freedom is not an abstract idea but has to be 
sought within a society. Individual freedom without social freedom, 
in other words, without economic, spiritual and intellectual freedom, 
is not really freedom. A society which is based on the exploitation 
of one class by another class, is not a free society because it is 
unbalanced. In order to create freedom in a society, Khiyaban1 
advises us to bring about a radical and fundamental change in society, 
and thus allow wisdom and thought to develop: 
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~~ ... We cannot think of any kind of freedom which 
would allow us to be in error for ever. By this 
kind of freedom you will never be able to be free. 
The time of jungle freedom has passed. From now 
on it is the time for evolution and real reform. 
We must start fundamental and radical reforms 
and then let reason, logic, thoughts and ideas 
be our guide and leader .... 111 
Khiyaban1 had learned that in the class society of Iran, not 
only is material wealth in the hands of the ruling class, but the 
law and every sort of moral code and political view are also at 
their disposal. The ruling class often use the terms •freedom•, 
•democracy• and •equality• but in reality their practice is contrary 
to their teachings. Khiyaban1 had realized that those in 
government who talk about freedom are in fact the negators of freedom: 
11 ••• they hinder freedom by thousands of different 
kinds of threat, aggression and finally destroy 
it completely- still they say •we are free•. 
They talk about democracy on the one hand and 
create problems and push it towards an ultimate 
death on the other hand. Again they say •we are 
free•. They sell out their country to foreigners 
and still say •we are free•. They always talk 
about freedom, social welfare, democracy, 
advancement and the progress of the people and 
the country. They talk repeatedly of the 
principles of democracy but we have to consider 
who is talking, not what is he talking about; 
1. Tajaddud, 29/2/1299 (20.5.1920). 
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the most wicked traitors in the country regard 
th S 1 t f f d .. 1 em eves as supper ers o ree am .... 
Khiyaban1 believed that in order to be free and create a 
free society the social parasites and exploiters must be eradicated. 
This would give the people the opportunity to improve their living 
standards and develop their minds and their understanding. This 
sort of freedom, which means the protection of the interests of 
the people, can be achieved only by political discipline: 
..... Discipline is the major condition of success. 
The powerful political groups of Europe are noted 
for their discipline and their programme ... 
the Bolsheviks who were temporarily out of control 
became organized and effective under necessary 
discipline. After all these efforts, sacrifices 
and material losses we will realize that we have 
wasted all of our efforts and lives and that 
instead the enemy has succeeded, if we do not 
have correct discipline and definite and steady 
tactics. Freedom ought to be accompanied by 
reason and knowledge. Freedom means freedom 
to seek knowledge and understanding. We must 
raise the level of public understanding ...... 2 
Political freedom is meant to protect the people against any sort 
,_ 
of aggression. There is a difference between a freedom which 
suppresses, exploits and destroys the freedom of others and a freedom 
which liberates and defends the interest of the majority of the 
1. Tajaddud, 3/3/1299 (25.5.1920). 
2. Tajaddud, 9/3/1299 (31.5.1920). 
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people against a minority ruling class. Khiyabani had experienced 
this the former kind of freedom which prevailed in Iranian society, 
when the rulers were free to commit any crime against their 
subjects . 
.... . freedom is for the protection of civil and 
human rights and is to prevent anyone from 
causing harm and committing crime against the 
people in society. Freedom does not mean 
that all people are free to do whatever they 
like without any consideration and respect 
f h d . •t .. 1 or uman 1gn1 y .... 
Khiyaban1 argued that everyone in society is free according to 
the laws of the society and that these laws must be practiced on 
a basis of equality. The influential and the rich must not have 
privileges over the poor and working people. Without such laws 
and without the practice of equality in society the term •freedom• 
is meaningless: 
11 
••• freedom requires equality; when a porter or 
grocer is arrested and punished by a law then 
I must also be punished by the same law if I 
commit the same crime. No one is above the 
law. All are equal in regard to the law ...... 2 
Khiyabani•s uprising was directed against the enemies of freedom. 
He wanted to free the people from physical and intellectual exploitation. 
He repeated over and over again that his uprising was not to destroy 
law and order in society. He rather intended to create law and 
order in society so that everyone would be able to benefit from the 
1. Tajaddud, 12/3/1299 (3.6.1920). 
2. Tajaddud, 12/3/1299 (3,6.1920). 
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natural resources of the country. Social laws must punish those 
who seek only their own limited interest and protect those who work 
for the interest of society. In other words social laws must be 
the protector of the people. In order to achieve such a social 
condition Khiyabani believed that the people should fight for it: 
..... We are ready to sacrifice ourselves on the 
way to freedom. This road will not be without 
thorns. Disputes and struggle will take place. 
Some will lose their lives in this struggle but 
the rest of the people will benefit ... 1 
Those who fight for personal ends are not true 
freedom fighters... True freedom fighters 
are those who do not expect wages or individual 
rewards for their efforts ... everybody shouts 
'long live freedom' but we should understand 
what we mean by independence and freedom. 
Whoever has the thought of independence and 
freedom in mind must sacrifice his own wealth 
and soul - not seeking self-interest and making 
profits by these slogans .... 112 
Khiyaban1 wanted everybody to have a real and true freedom in Iran. 
He believed that a human being in this world must be free and that 
freedom must be provided for everybody. In other words if there is 
no freedom, it is the people who must rise and achieve it. In some 
countries which are under a dictatorship, government freedom and its 
legitimacy are stolen. Khiyaban1 believes that in this particular 
1. Tajaddud, ll/4/1299 (3.7.1920). 
2. Tajaddud, 21/4/1299 (13.7.1920). 
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circumstance, freedom will never be willingly granted so that 
the people themselves must rise and gain their freedom and rights. 
Even though constitutional law existed in theory in Iran and every-
body was supposed to be free,because of the greedy and aggressive 
policy of the King and court, feudal landowners and the rich, all 
these freedoms had been forgotten and had no meaning any more. 
This is why Khiyaban1 asks the Iranians to teach the meaning of 
freedom, independence and civil rights to their sons while they 
are children. A man who has no freedom is in fact a moving corpse. 
KHIYABANI AND HIS VIEWS ON MONARCHY 
Khiyabani was particularly against those who had no sympathy and care 
for his people. He was deeply saddened to see that those 
personalities who were in the government did not think of the 
present social disorder and did not object to the current injustice 
or react to the existing anarchy by taking some positive action. 
At a time when the Iranian economy was in ruins and the treasury 
was empty, the King had a desire to travel to Europe, where he and 
his companions spent a lot of money on their pleasure. At the same 
time the people suffered from starvation and most of them lived in 
intolerable conditions. In other words it was the Iranian poor 
who had to provide the King's expenses so that he could enjoy 
travelling and live in leisure and pleasure. Khiyaban1, reacting 
against this social injustice and the court's wasteful expenditure 
said: 
171 
..... nobody says 'where does the king go to? 
no one asks why he does! nobody asks why 
this kind of expenditure must be taken from 
the impoverished Iranian treasury! While 
the people are suffering from hunger, 
Ts.40,000, is being spent for the celebration 
of the king's return from Europe.. . . "1 
Khiyaban1 realized that as long as there was a king and his 
appointed ministers, there would be no comfortable life for the 
Iranian people. The King and his court often sacrificed the 
interest of the people for his own benefit. On the other hand 
the ignorance of the people played into the hands of the King who 
treated his nation as slaves and lived upon them. Khiyaban1 
believed that this would not have happened if the people were 
wise and conscious of their rights. This in fact was a direct 
result of a backward society which was being ruled by superstition 
and baseless habits. These caused the people to remain at this 
level of unawareness, so that they could not think of current 
events happening both outside and inside their country. 
11 
••• the king and his ministers always sacrificed 
the nation for their crown and throne. They 
2 have always looked at people contemptuously ...... 
Khiyaban1 wanted to make the people understand that they should 
not let the upper class and feudalists govern them. But he, 
1. Tajaddud, 3/5/1299 (26.7.1920). 
2. Tajaddud, 3/5/1299 (26.7.1920). 
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instead, asked them to think of their own power and rely on their 
own strength. Only in this way could they influence and direct 
their own socio-political affairs: 
11 
••• We should not let so and so al-Dawlas and 
al-Saltanas hold the destiny of our freedom 
,. n the,: r h d 11 1 own an s .... 
Khiyaban1 nevertheless condemns those people who are not 
interested either in their own personal life nor in their country's 
affairs. He is aware of his country's rich resources, but he does 
not wish Iranians to benefit from such valuable resources unless they 
can stand up and exploit them independently, that is to say, without 
foreign penetration into Iran's economic and political affairs: 
11 
••• We are aware of such valuable jewels which are 
taken away from us; we know much of the remaining 
valuable resources in our country; we will not, 
however, explore them until we make sure of our 
capability. We have so far spent our time in 
making a king, but now it is the time for us to 
leave this kind of nonsensical politics and not 
bend down in front of any king; on the contrary 
we must rise from this seat of defeat and 
humiliation and ascend the ruling throne .... 112 
Khiyaban1, assuring his fellow countrymen of their success against 
Monarchy, says: 
11 ••• An ignorant nation has always been afraid of 
the king and his ministers and worshipped them. 
But this uprising will not be afraid of anything 
and will put an immediate end to this disorder ... 
as long as ministers are chosen by the king's order 
our uprising wi 11 continue. . . . 113 
1. Tajaddud, 5/3/1299 (27.5.1920. 
2. Tajaddud, 11/4/1299 (3.7.1920). 
3. Tajaddud, 19/4/1299 (11.7.1920). 
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Khiyaban1 warns the people not to believe easily in what 
they are told by certain ministers or dignitaries. He was 
distressed to see that the people accept any word from a person 
who is called 'king• or 'minister• without any hesitation. He 
regards this as blind obedience and hero worshipping: 
11 
••• As far as a nation is not interested in her 
own freedom and independence; and has 
consented to worship despotic kings and accept 
whatever a minister wishes, it is impossible 
to take any step towards progress. In Iran 
hero worship and personal attachment have taken 
over all ideas and thoughts ...... l 
Khiyaban1 in another speech again addresses those who are 
indifferent to the affairs of their country and argues that it is 
indeed the indifference of a nation towards the burning social and 
political issues which reduces them to subjection and blind 
obedience. He regards this indifference a harmful and dangerous 
state of mind for a country. Therefore he encourages the people 
to think about their fate and believe in themselves and have the 
determination to declare whatever is good for their country. He 
wants his fellow countrymen to compare their fatherland with 
European countries and assess what is the difference between a country 
like Switzerland and Iran. He wonders how a foreign power manages 
to enter the country, influencing all aspects of life, economic, 
cultural and political. At the end he reaches the conclusion 
that the main disease must be inside Iran. The disease has been 
1. Tajaddud, 12/5/1299 (4.8.1920). 
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the minority ruling interests who have sucked, like parasites, the 
blood of the nation. If the body is healthy it will not accept 
such a disease. In order to make the body of a country healthy 
these minority ruling interests must be eradicated. Giving 
Switzerland as an example of a healthy country he declares: 
..... Although there were several million foreign troops 
all around Switzerland, not a span of this country 
suffered aggression and not even a fighter plane 
dared cross over her sky. Why can any aggressive 
power enter our country.and put it in such a 
disorder? Because there is no determination 
in our fellow countrymen. Now rise and become 
determined that Iran belongs to the Iranians, 
and then you will find out that no impudent 
and aggressive power will dare to enter into 
Iran. This uprising is determined to free Iran 
and it will do so ...... 1 
Khiyaban1, addressing the Iranian leaders who have imposed 
themselves upon the people as the 'guardians• of the nation, urges 
them not to treat Iranians as a backward nation any more. In other 
words one of the main purposes of Khiyaban1•s uprising was to get 
rid of all sorts of •guardianship' and 'God given authorities•, 
replacing them by educated and enlightened statesmen who could and 
would understand the problems of the people. Only the leaders who 
have lived, mixed with the people and shared their griefs and 
happinesses can be sympathetic to the people, and are able to 
understand the depth of their problems. When ~iyaban1 attacks the 
1. Tajaddud, 24/3/1299 (15.6.1920). 
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backwardness of the system in Iran he, in fact, attacks the nature 
of the relationship between the people and the government or 
leaders. The relationship between the rulers and the ruled is 
like the relationship between a slave owner and his slaves. For 
this reason he strongly objects to any 'guardianship' which the 
Iranian government had allocated to themselves. Khiyabani in 
conclusion says: 
" ... the unworthy leaders of Iran have trained 
people in such a way that they must need a 
guardian. Our purpose in this uprising is to 
dismiss such guardians and establish a new and 
advanced spirit which will be transferred to the 
others ... the majority of Iranians are unaware 
and have not yet adapted themselves to the 
thoughts of the present century, but you people 
of Tabriz are a deserving people and ready to 
accept a new advanced system.... Those who 
call you a savage and ignorant people will not 
have an excuse to keep you in captivity and dare 
to destroy your independence and freedom if you 
prove your ability in your own affairs and make 
them change their attitude to you and respect 
.. 1 you .... 
KHIYABANI AND HIS PATRIOTISM 
It is perhaps a manifestation if Khiyaban1's patriotism that in his 
democratic movement he does not want democracy and freedom only for 
1. Tajaddud, 18/5/1299 (10.8.1920). 
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Azerbaijanis, but for the entire country - Iran. His criticism 
of the minority ruling class, in the form of a government, has a 
far reaching implication and effect in the democratic movement 
of Iran. He argues that those in the court and government, who 
claim to be true nationalists and lovers of Iran, are in fact the 
worst enemies of Iran and the people, because the sign of love for 
one•s own people is care and affection towards that nation not a 
destructive and punitive attitude towards them. 
Khiyaban1 had experienced the king and ministers and their rea.ct\ondYj' 
religious backers all talk much about their devotion to and love 
of the people and country while in practice they did the opposite. 
The government frightened the people by terror and death~FJ · 
Khiyaban1 •heaven• existed in this world. It was his homeland, 
his city and his district in Tabriz where he lived. His •heaven• 
contrary to the •heaven• of the religious people, was located in 
this very world in which there are streets, houses, shops and people: 
..... A person•s desire is a driving force which depends 
on his knowledge, as all our desires and ambitions are 
manifest in a definite and real form, which are 
rooted in our daily experience. When we imagine 
a heaven we associate it with visions of worldly 
things, the heaven which is in our imagination is 
formed by streets which are similar to the streets 
and alleys of Tabriz ...... l 
l. Tajaddud, 8/2/1299 (29.4.1920). 
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Thus ~iyaban1•s patriotism and love of Iran was not in a 
verbal or abstract level. He had a deep love towards Iran and 
was a kind of nationalist who, by appreciating and acknowledging 
the importance of his own homeland - Azerbaijan, linked his love 
and feelings with the rest of Iran. He was convinced that unless 
one is a true nationalist and lover of one•s own country one cannot 
possibly be a true and determined freedom fighter. 
abstract thinkers and false patriots he states: 
Speaking against 
..... We believe that Iran is the best country among 
the others in the world because it is our home; 
and in the opinion of Iranians, Azerbaijan is 
the best province of Iran where we Azerbaijanis 
live; and in the opinion of Azerbaijanis, Tabriz 
is the best town of thi~ province, and eventually 
the best place of Tabriz is Tajaddud where we 
freedom lovers are gathered together .... 111 
The twentieth century with its outwardly advanced civilization 
has,nevertheless, some colonial and imperialistic laws. The 
capitulations were these laws which ruled Iran before and after 
Khiyabani in an extreme and absolute manner. Khiyaban1 like other 
nationalist and patriotic freedom lovers objected to being ruled by 
such a law in Iran. Khiyaban1 believed that Iranians were able to 
manage their own internal affairs. He did not like hearing his 
country being called a •dark• and backward country, and was 
disappointed to see foreigners dominating his fellow countrymen: 
1. Tajaddud, 14/l/1299 (4.4.1920). 
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~~ ... from now on the punishment of any Iranian 
must be carried out by an Iranian; we must 
have such a freedom in which nobody could say 
that Iran is a dark country. We have 
repeatedly seen that our rights and freedom 
have been disturbed by foreigners; Iran 
must be freed by Iranians .... 111 
~iyaban1's love for his country was deeply rooted. He showed 
his feelings when the Iranian flag was being raised above the Police 
College. In the following speech Khiyaban1 once again emphasises 
the importance of knowledge and learning: 
•• ... I rea 1 i ze that whatever I fee 1 in my heart 
you Tabriz Policemen have the same feeling ... 
your salute to the I rani an flag proves that you 
have absolutely understood your national duty ... 
but we all know that without learning and 
knowledge we cannot perform our duties 
properly as regards humanity and our 
t 112 coun ry .... 
Khiyabani often talks about Iran and stresses patriotism. He 
wishes to have a democratic government in Iran in which no foreigner 
can dare to impose his own interest. In order to have such a 
government Khiyaban1 believes that Iran must prepare herself to be 
a powerful country. He warns those countries who may intend to 
violate Iran's rights. In other words he and his followers were 
ready to fight to the last man in order to prevent anybody from 
l. Tajaddud, 26/2/1299 (17.5.1920). 
2. Tajaddud, 2~/5/1299 (15.8. 1920). 
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entering their fatherland as an aggressor. Khiyabani wishes from 
the depths of his heart the best and most perfect progress and 
the idea of advanced countries for Iran, and wants to build up a 
progressive force among the people in order to reach out to other 
civilized countries: 
11 
••• In our po 1 icy I ran is our property. In other 
words democratic Iran belongs to the democracy of 
Iran; any foreigner who wishes to enter Iran and 
try to imprison our democracy in his chains of 
slavery will face us and will be forced to turn 
back, and will not be able to cross the frontier 
of our country unless he crosses over our dead 
bodies. We must provide our own prosperity by 
our own hands; in our opinion Iran is a member 
of the human community and must prepare herself 
for a quick revival and progress so that she can 
unite with other civilized nations as soon as 
possible. This is our slogan and we in the 
name of Iran will learn and practice the best 
and most progressive ideas of the advanced 
countries in our country. . . . 111 
Khiyabani believed that superficial and fanatical patriotism is 
not enough and cannot instil a deep understanding and fighting spirit 
among the people. While stressing patriotism he believed that 
freedom, advancement and eventually being united with the progressive 
peoples of the world is something that must be experienced and 
acquired within the particular environment or society. For this 
l. Tajaddud, 7/3/1299 (29.5.1920). 
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reason when Hajji Isma'il Aqa Amir Khizi, one of the committee 
members of the Democratic Party of Azerbaijan, suggested that 
Azerbaijan might be renamed Azadi-Sitan, Khiyabani welcomed the 
idea, because Azadi-Sitan meant to obtain or acquire freedom -
in other words freedom is not something which can be bought or 
sold. It must be gained by people within their own social context. 
Since the people of Azerbaijan have always struggled to achieve 
this freedom from despotic kings and governments by their own 
efforts Khiyabani regarded the word 'Azadi-Sitan' an appropriate 
name for Azerbaijan. Khiyabani's patriotism and the meaning 
Azadi-Sitan, however, is either misunderstood or grossly misinterpreted 
and distorted by some historians who, translating or interpreting 
Azadi-Sitan as 'country of the free' ,1 'land of freedom• 2 and 'country 
of freedom• 3 accused Khiyabani of being a separatist. 
According to M.Q. Hidayat4 (Mu~bir al-Saltana) and eA. Mustawf? 
'the changing of the name of Azerbaijan to Azadi-Sitan is because 
of the separatist intention of Khiyabani and his followers who 
wanted to separate Azerbaijan from the rest of Iran. Mushir al-
Dawla in his speech in the Majlis accused Khiyabani and called his 
1. See G. Lenczowski, B_:_W .. , pp.60.64. 
2. SeeP. Avery, M.I., p.219. 
3. Annual Report for the Province, "F.O. 371/Persia 1921/34-6440", 
by British Consulate in Tabriz (unpublished document). 
4. See M.Q. Hidayat, Kh.Kh., p.320. 
5. eA. Mustawf1, QE.cit., p.l79. 
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uprising a 'separatist movement' .1 This false conception has 
also been repeated by foreign historians and diplomats. 2 
We believe that neither the Iranian sources nor the foreign 
ones mentioned above have looked closely into the nature of 
Khiyaban1's movement and the meaning of 'Azad1-Sitan•. Firstly 
the changing of the name of Azerbaijan had some elements which 
seemed to make it necessary. After the 1917 October Revolution 
in Russia, the republic of Azerbaijan was declared at Baku and 
its inhabitants decided to annex Iranian Azerbaijan to their territory. 
This is mentioned by A. Kasrav1, who objects to this renaming of 
Arran (the old name of the present Azerbaijan S.S.R.): 
..... Azer~aijanis did ~ot wish to accept their 
wishes and were not interested in this 
suggestion; and were unhappy of this name. 
Thus Democrats in Azerbaijan changed their 
state's name. This idea in fact was 
suggested by ~ajji Isma'11 Aqa Amir Khizi, 
who was a close friend and a famous democrat. 
Amir Kh1z1 declared: Since Azerbaijan has 
struggled and suffered during the 
constitution, and has supplied freedom to 
the Iranians, we wish to rename Azerbaijan 
- - - - 3 as Azadi -Si tan... . .. 
1. See Appendix No. 7. 
2. See G. Lenczowiski; Ibid.; P. Avery, Ibid. R.W. Cottam, QE.cit., 
p.l23jAnnual Report for the Province, Ibid. and The Times, 
September 14, 1920. 
3. A. Kasravi, T.H.S.A., p.877. 
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Secondly, this change of the name was only limited to 
Azerbaijan as a 'Province' not as a 'Country• which is stated by 
a number of diplomats and historians in Iran and the west. 1 
While Khiyaban1 stressed the importance of patriotism he 
also emphasizes the importance of social laws and order and the 
discipline that all people in general and the members of the 
Democratic Party in particular must absorb and practice. Therefore 
in Khiyaban1's speeches patriotism is not separated from 'discipline' 
and social law and order. Khiyaban1 believes that one cannot have 
a proper organization without law and order. In other words he does 
not like to see those who attempt to create anarchy in public. 
Khiyaban1 warns those people who want to put society in disorder of 
a severe punishment even if these people are his close friends: 
" ... In order to preserve discipline and keep order, 
any irresponsible action will face a punishment. 
Our closest friends and comrades will be 
punished if they commit a crime, more severely 
even than the ordinary people. We will 
punish our comrades if they try to i g ·no re the 
rights of the people. There will be a harsh 
future for those members of the uprising who 
make a mistake or intend to do anything without 
the permission of the law .... "2 
Discipline in Khiyaban1's opinion is a very important matter for 
one's achievement in society. Accordingly he urges people to tear 
1. See p.l81 0f!h;swork. 
2. Tajaddud, 15/2/1299 (6.5.1920). 
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off all veils of ignorance and take steps towards progress and 
evolution. Khiyaban1 believes that civilized nations have been 
successful only under such strict discipline. The Iranian 
Constitutional Revolution failed, Khiyaban1 believes, because of 
the lack of discipline, and because there were no well organized 
forces: 
" ... you can be successful like the other 
civilized nations and have an organized 
association if you try to cast out 
i-rresponsible and fanciful intentions 
and to march towards a higher life and 
vision. The success that we have 
achieved during three months has not 
been experienced since the beginning 
of the Constitutional Revolution, because 
we had never worked under such discipline .... "1 
Khiyaban1, emphasising the integrity and the sense of 
responsibility of those who are in charge of various institutions 
such as police, law courts and all members of the uprising says: 
" ... if we receive a report that one of the uprising 
members of the police or the gendarmerie has 
committed a crime, not only will we punish 
them more severely than the ordinary people 
but also we will inform the people of their 
actions, because we wish to cast out the 
development of such bad manners in our society. 
Today we are standing in a position where all 
Iranians are watching our deeds. We must 
continue our lawful activities and prove that 
f d 1 . T b . "
2 we are true ree om avers 1n a r1z .... 
1. Tajaddud, 16/4/1299 (8.7.1920). 
2. Tajaddud, .8/4/1299 (30.·6.1920). 
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Khiyaban1 in this speech discusses life and its importance; 
and states that we have to create a society where the people feel 
happy, peaceful and cheerful. In order to be successful in this 
life one must keep what is useful for the welfare of the society and 
get rid of those aspects that are harmful and a hindrance. In 
a society which on the other hand is dominated by poverty and lack 
of education and in which everything is in possession of the ruling 
class, the people realize their rights are considered to be one of 
the most essential tasks of their leaders. If leaders can create a 
happy and cheerful atmosphere in society and encourage the participation 
of all in building a society then the people become ready not only to 
sacrifice their own limited interests to society but even to give 
up their lives for their people: 
..... life is the most valuable thing in the world 
and anybody has a great deal of interest in his 
life. In order to get a comfortable life and 
to benefit from a valuable and cheerful outcome, 
one must try hard to be able to enjoy such a 
pleasant life. However, we can see some 
people who sacrifice themselves for an ambition, 
and in fact exchange their present and temporary 
life for a permanent honourable life. The 
ignorant people do not understand or find out 
what is going on, but the learned men do 
understand that the life of the human being 
is not a permanent one but will finish sooner 
or later; this temporary life cannot impose 
its importance on the former persons, on the 
contrary this class wish to have a true life, 
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in which freedom, law and order dominate their 
activities in society. They prefer a 
permanent life rather than living under 
despotism and in an unjust world. In other 
words no one is willing to leave a happy life 
unless he is a stupid person. Those people 
who sacrifice their lives are aware of its 
value and consider their ideals to be worth 
much more than their own limited life. They 
sacrifice their own limited life in order to 
fulfil and materialize their love of society 
and the people .... ul 
KHIYABANI AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF IRAN 
Khiyaban1•s uprising was not a disconnected event in the modern 
history of Iran. His struggle was the continuation of the 
Constitutional Revolution of 1905-1911 which was thwarted 
by reactionary forces in Iran. What Sattar Khan, as a 
representative of the people of A~arbayjan, desired to take place 
in Iran was the freedom of people from internal despotism and 
external imperialism. Sattar Khan and his supporters succeeded 
in gaining the Constitutional Law in theory but they did not see 
the translation of the theory into practice. Khiyaban1•s uprising 
was against enemies of the Constitutional Law and indeed his first 
article in Tajaddud was concerned with the problem of putting the 
laws into practice. 
1. Ibid. 
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On April 30, 1917, he published an essay entitled 
Ch i 8ayad Kard (What should be done). In it he analysed his 
nation's expectations from the Constitutional Laws and asked the 
authorities to pay particular attention to Iranian demands. He 
pointed to the 7th article of the Constitutional Laws, and reminded 
the government that now was the time for it to establish a fresh 
and energetic society in Iran. 
Following the collapse of Tsarist Russia, there had been a great 
liberalising movement among nations. Everybody was interested to 
find out what had been happening under despotic rulers and what 
was demanded from a democratic government. Khiyaban1 in another 
article which was published on May 5, 1917 declared: 
"Since the overthrow of Tsarism in Russia there has 
been a new breeze of freedom in the world, and an 
opportunity for everybody and every party to achieve 
their individual freedom and the country's 
independence has arisen. With the example of their 
neighbour's rebellion before them, Iranians should 
not hesitate in the face of such a powerful movement. 
It is impossible to re-establish the previous despotic 
regime which we have been facing. Now what have we 
to do? First of all we must realize that this freedom 
and our Constitutional Laws have been achieved by our 
good and brave patriotic fellow countrymen and women. 
By sacrificing their valuable lives they have helped 
to keep our freedom alive. We should like to ask 
our government, which came to power as the result of 
direct election, to act in accordance with the 
Constitituonal Laws. On the other hand we should 
not forget our beloved victims who died in the 
struggle for our freedom and independence." 1 
1. Tajaddud, May 5, 1917. 
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Three years later Khiyaban1 was inviting Azerbaijanis to 
tread in the footprints of their past freedom fighters: 
..... While ~arbayjan is living and its freedom 
fighters are alive the 'Constitutional Law' 
will not be left defenceless. 'Leave our 
Constitutional Law alone.' This is a call 
which is heard all over A~arbayjan and shakes 
the foundation of the reactionaries. The 
A~arbayjan freedom fighters have risen in order 
to put an end to unbearable chaos in the 
country. The forgetful government ought to 
be awakened to the cry of 'Long live Constitutional 
Law ...... ,l 
Khiyaban1 in another article about the Iranian Constitutional 
Law declared: 
" ... We freedom 1 avers have one aim, one desire 
and on~ idea; we all say that the true 
constitution must be the governing force in 
the country; personal influence and privilege 
must be abolished; the authority of the people 
must be a reality and all institutions must be 
nationalized - that is we have to rely on 
the principle of people's rule. We say that 
there must be justice, equality and freedom 
in society ... in brief we want our children to 
1 ive in our century .... ~~ 2 
Khiyaban1 looks upon the society of Iran as an ill person who 
is being attacked by germs and parasites. In order to cure the body 
1. Tajaddud, April 16, 1920. 
2. Tajaddud, 17/2/1299 (8.5.1920). 
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we must get rid of the germs and parasites. In the society of 
Iran land owners, profiteers and reactionary elements act like 
germs and parasites against the interest of the people and their 
advancement. There must be a party or an organized force who 
should guard the people and fight against these parasitic forces 
in society: 
..... The aim of our uprising is the observation 
and guidance of those who serve the nation and 
securing a reliable future for the people. 
This care and observation is our duty because 
we should not turn against our time (History). 
We should not, as we have done so far, fall 
behind the development and advancement of our 
generation. We should not turn against 
human history because we shall be punished 
for that i n t hi s wo r 1 d . . . ... 1 
What does Khiyaban1 mean by the term •observation• and who are 
going to watch and guide the affairs of the country? Khiyaban1 
has a convinced belief in democracy and often refers to this in his 
speeches. His idea of uprising is not merely an opposition or a 
rebellion against the ruling authority; nor did he wish to replace 
them. He wishes to establish a democratic rule in Iran and thus 
let the people voice their opinions, likes and dislikes and control 
their destiny. He believed that this democracy could be created 
in society only by a free election and the formation of a democratic 
parliament. In other words Khiyabani wanted true representatives 
of the people to be allowed to enter parliament, which could not be 
1. Tajaddud, 19/2/1299 (10.5.1920). 
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done except in a society which is freed from all sorts of 
parasitic forces and elements. If these parasitic elements are 
not eradicated from the society, the honest and patriotic members 
of parliament will be unable to act freely in the interest of the 
country, and most probably they will be imprisoned or killed by 
various plots: 
11 
••• We need 1 aw;j;vl.n_Jrepresenta t i ves who, on the one 
hand, understand their own •time• correctly and, 
on the other hand, teach their fellow human 
beings the situations of the time. Law-
givers of the present time must believe in the 
principle of democracy. Democracy should not 
be entrusted to the aristocracy. We want a 
parliament which is created by the sincere 
wishes of the people and which knows their 
needs and problems; not a parliament which 
is used as a net of hypocrisy and treachery 
in the government of Tehran. Now and then 
they rouse the political interest of a few 
servants of the nation but after a few days 
arrest them... . ul 
Khiyaban1 knew that there was no political immunity or freedom 
in Iran and that the words of •parliament•, democracy• and •freedom• 
which were often used by the government-run mass media, were no more 
than empty words. The people were taught to live in the past and 
believe in an ideal and abstract legendary kind of social justice: 
1. Tajaddud, 20/2/1299 (11 5.1920). 
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..... each time has its own requirement and 
this requirement alters according to the 
level of our knowledge and human understanding. 
Gradually by study and research man's 
imagination expands and naturally his 
convictions and thoughts change. Our 
ancestors regarded Anu ?h1r Van's Justice 
as above all kinds of individual desires. 
For them the justice of that Sasanid King 
was above and better than any thought of 
'justice'. But today we children of 
today regard this justice of Anu ~1r Van 
as mere despotism and cannot accept living 
under such justice and regard ourselves 
lucky people .... "1 
Khiyaban1 had realized that the people of Iran were subjected 
to many abstract promises both by religion and government, but that 
none of these promises were fulfilled within the society and in 
reality. He wished to redirect the people from abstract promises 
to reality. However he did not harbour the illusion that after the 
uprising the people would automatically change and that everything 
would improve. He knew that his mission was to make the people 
realise the problems in society for themselves. 
revolutionaries to act rather than give promises: 
" ... up to now Iranian revolutionaries have 
talked a lot and have expressed all their 
ideals in the form of promises; but we 
want to say less and act more. We must 
1. Tajaddud, 19/2/1299 (10.5.1920). 
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He wanted the 
carry out whatever we have promised. Our 
success and failure depends on our actions: 
either democracy will succeed and will make 
all the people prosperous or many supporters 
of democracy will lose their lives ... 
Do not assume that all things will improve 
soon after your uprising .. Do not deceive 
yourselves. Our problems will rise from 
now on and the most important events may 
take place later - because you should not 
forget that Iran is the centre of Asian 
po l it i c s. . . . 11 1 
Khiyaban1 believed that political speeches and slogans were far 
from enough. Keeping the people busy with political speeches and 
abstract slogans was regarded as contrary to revolution and the 
interest of the people. Those who did not work and did not show an 
interest in the affairs of the country were not regarded as friends 
of the uprising. In other words work and action were regarded as 
essential attributes of being a patriot: 
11 
••• as long as the employees in offices refuse 
to co-operate with us they will be suspected. 
If need arises we shall force them to work. 
This country must educate and treat her 
unemployed and idle children alongside her 
own brave and self-sacrificing ones. The 
condition of living in this country is to show 
enthusiasm and work hard .... 112 
1. Tajaddud, 24/2/1299 (15.5.1920). 
2. Tajaddud, l/3/1299 (23.5.1920). 
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Khiyabani not only did not see any effect of the 'constitutional 
law' in Iran but also observed with sorrow that people were 
suffering under the cover of the Constitutional Law from insecurity, 
injustice, disorder and plundering. People not only gained no 
notable achievements from their bloody revolution but also were 
again victims in the hands of a new regime which pretended to be 
a democratic government. 
Under the Constitutional Law central government imposed martial 
law, torture, censorship and banishment and betrayed the country. 
Since the Revolution, people had said that their rising had achieved 
a remarkable result, but in reality nothing was gained by the people, 
but injustice, disorder, inequality and hopelessness. Finally 
anybody who wished to talk about the Constitutional Law and its 
effects met a fate no different than that of Khiyaban1. 
KHIYABANl AND HIS VIEW OF 'TAJADDUD' (REVIVAL) 
The demands that Khiyaban1 made from the government are in fact 
something new in the democratic and intellectual movements of Iran. 
Thinkers and anti-despotic personalities such as Sayyd Jamal al-D1n 
Af~an1 (Asada badi), M1rza Malkam Khan, Rushdiyya and Muhammad 
cAli Tarbiyat, expressed their views before and during the 
, Constitutional Revolution. But these progressive ideas of Af~an1 
and the founders of the constitutionaJ movement were all suppressed 
by the central government and the reactionary forces. 
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The Anglo-Persian Agreement of 1919 was in fact a manifestation 
of such suppression against which Khiyaban1 revolted, giving his 
revolt the name of 'Tajaddud'. By the use of this term Khiyaban1 
meant that the spirit of the Constitutional Revolution and the 
Democratic Movement of Azerbaijan must be kept alive. He believed 
that the way of struggle against the ruling class and despotism, 
which was paved by Sattar Khan and other revolutionaries, must be 
continued. It was this 'Tajaddud' (revival) of the revolutionary 
spirit in Azerbaijan by Khiyaban1 which frightened the central 
government and its foreign backers. In this section we shall attempt 
to illustrate further the spirit and meaning of Irarr5Tajaddud with 
the help of Khiyaban1's speeches. 
Khiyaban1's 'revival' was directed against the same common enemy, 
namely despotism, fanaticism and backwardness. It had two distinct 
qualities: firstly he expressed his views in an atmosphere of 
political suppression after the set back of the constitutionalists. 
Secondly Khiyaban1 is more radical in his political stand, in that he 
wanted the formation of a government by the people, the introduction 
of compulsory education, the implementation of basic land reforms 
and the granting of freedom to the people. He had set himself up 
as an example of such a programme. His 'revival', therefore, did 
not mean that we have to sit down and speculate about the ideas of 
the past but instead we have to put into practice all progressive 
ideas expressed by the constitutionalists and go forward and make 
fresh discoveries in order to face the demands of the future upon our 
society. Khiyaban1 was always interested in taking part in the 
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theoretical discussions among young people) and was always trying 
to assist his society•s young generation in order to develop their 
thoughts. He believed that we have to provide facilities for the 
progress of the younger generation. Khiyaban1 hoped that scientific 
and philosophic discussions would encourage youth to absorb the 
creative influence of the literature and socio-political writings of 
other countries. He also encouraged youth to prepare themselves 
to attend and hold political discussions. His attempt to achieve 
this was made during a time when people had forgotten, not only how 
to conduct fruitful political meetings, but even how to think about 
politics. Khiyaban1, expressing his belief in the improvement of 
society, declared: 
11 
••• Society is changeable and open to improvements. 
A national society is established by the direct 
participation of its inhabitants and by the 
influence of their thoughts and outl oak. . . . .. l 
Khiyaban1 was a strong believer in science and called for its 
development in the country. He believed that: 
..... Democracy is gained as a direct result of 
knowledge ...... 2 
Here the word •knowledge• is the key word in the understanding 
There were two ways of thinking and social 
outlooks. One was backward-looking and based on superstition and 
traditional beliefs and abstract memories of the past. The other 
1. Tajaddud, 9/3/1299 (31.5.1920). 
2. Ibid. 
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outlook was forward-looking and based on progressive ideas, the 
ideas which are usually acquired by human experience and under-
standing. Khiyaban1 based his policy and ideas on his own 
experience and understanding, that is to say the knowledge which 
is acquired by living with people and experiencing their social 
shortcomings and political successes or setbacks. Perhaps we can 
also appreciate Khiyaban1•s concept of Tajaddud better by noting 
in which ways he differed radically from traditionalists. 
Khiyaban1, while respecting the tradition and religion of the people, 
believed that traditions and religion must not be used as an 
obstacle on the way of that knowledge and understanding which alone 
can bring a sense of freedom and democracy among the people. 
Highlighting Khiyaban1•s interest in the developments of social 
c - -and political thoughts especially among the youth, A. A~ari writes: 
11 
••• Khiyaban1 belongs to the way of thinking which 
is above the idealist group. I, as the author 
of this book, have understood that perhaps 
Khiyaban1 was very careful in expressing his 
opinion in regard to great world philosophers 
because of the existing social circumstances, 
and one can understand this through his speeches 
and articles. In other words he has shown a 
certain restraint in expressing his opinions. 
At any rate the truth is this that the best 
pleasure of life for him was the awakening 
of social thoughts, in particular the 
awakening of the genius and talent of the 
youth to whom the future world belonged. 
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Although Khiyabani was deeply involved in the 
running of the political affairs of the Firqa 
organisation, nevertheless he took part in 
social and scientific discussions ...... l 
All this perhaps shows that Khiyaban1•s idea of democracy and 
freedom was based on a deep conviction that the people of Iran can 
achieve these only by knowledge and political awakening rather than 
by believing in superstitions and traditions. 
Two factors were very important in Khiyaban1•s movement. One 
was revival and the other social progress. One could not succeed 
without the other, because any revival, according to Khiyaban1, 
must be based on social and intellectual progress. Living in the 
twentieth century but thinking in the past is an illusion and 
contradiction in a changing society. He was disappointed to see 
his country so backward both economically and politically while other 
countries were advancing on the path of social progress and change, 
but nevertheless says: 
..... the spirit which is ruling here is the same 
spirit of revival and this spirit must rule 
h .. 2 everyw ere .... 
Khiyaban1 not only wanted to carry out his uprising in 
accordance with his ideas of Tajaddud but also clearly urged his 
fellow countrymen to free themselves from their present backwardness 
and prepare themselves to create a secure future: 
c - -1. A. A~ari, Q.Kh., p.251. 
2. Tajaddud, 10/2/1299 (1.5.1920). 
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..... we wish to free ourselves from the chains 
of ignorance and walk towards civilization 
and revival. We understand what a great 
step our time has taken but we still remain 
a great distance from our aim. We have 
to adapt ourselves to this civilized and 
progressive world but we must also have a 
1 plan for our future .... 11 
Khiyaban1 wants his fellow countrymen to think about this 
seriously and encourages them to study other nations. For this 
reason Khiyaban1 asks people to involve themselves with the affairs 
of other nations and societies by travelling and being influenced 
by" their useful habits and thus to develop useful and progressive 
ideas among Iranians. Meanwhile he points out to his fellow 
countrymen that we should not think that whatever is good or 
acceptable is perfect and unchangeable for ever. In other words 
Khiyaban1 urges his fellow countrymen to come out of the cocoon 
of passive and self-opinionated habits and insists that they think 
them over and change them if necessary by observing the change and 
progress of other countries: 
..... we must be influenced by the revolutions and 
movements in order to set up our progressive 
policies. In order to benefit from the outside 
progressive world, the best way is to travel; 
in other words we must observe the developments 
of other nations and adopt their useful 
achievements for the benefit of our people and 
. t .. 2 SOCle y .... 
1. Tajaddud, 20/2/1299 (11.5.1920). 
2. Tajaddud, 20/2/1299 (11.5.1920). 
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When ~iyabani was talking about the despotic Shah of Iran, 
unrepresentative government in Tehran and the corrupt governor of 
Azerbaijan - and demanding their resignation or dismissal by the 
people - he was in fact attacking and repudiating the entire social 
system and the concept upon which the system stood. The age-old 
concept was that the kings ruled by divine decree, and that his 
representatives, as governors, were expected to be accepted by the 
people without any question. Khiyaban1 by his idea of Tajaddud 
intended to confront and indeed repudiate this kind of concept which 
was essentially based on sheer subjection and obedience. Since 
physical power was granted to the king and spiritual authority was 
given to reactionary Mujtahids, the people had no role to play in 
life but to work and obey. Khiyabani, on the contrary, wanted to 
fling these physical and spiritual chains from the hands and minds of 
the people by giving them authority to think, to act and to decide 
about their own life. Khiyabani•s idea of Tajaddud therefore is the 
revolt of man against the ruling powers and their representatives. 
Khiyaban1 regarded man as a creative and dynamic being who shapes, 
reshapes and changes his society or environment according to his new 
requirements. In order to give the people such a responsibility 
they must be freed from their old physical chains and intellectual 
ensl avements. 'm~ follow;.,, is e1.frce tra"s{Qt.~r, ol fihiyci ~411f"j .Sfe<c::h: 
... today our ideas and aims seem to some people 
extreme and exaggerated but these outstanding 
ideas will, in future, be regarded as deficient 
and out of date .. -·.You ought to learn and 
understand the problems and the learned and 
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wise men should teach and explain these 
problems and rescue you from the bonds 
of the traditions of the past and prepare 
you for a prosperous and dignified future ... 
our opponents wanted to return us to the 
days of barbarism and lawlessness of the 
middle ages. They were and still are 
. 1 reactionary and backward-looking people .... 
- - - ~ /\! I ' ~ 1 I _...-: / '' 
~iyabani refers to the precept ~ ~A~\.)~.>\'1..)~;\ 
(train your own children for a time different from,your own) 2 to 
explain further what he means by 'not living in the past• and being 
•rescued from binding traditions of the past•. He was not, indeed, 
against Islam and past culture, and on the contrary believed that 
progressive ideas and good principles have been expressed in the past, 
but maintained that the men of interest and the ruling class in 
society prevented and defiled these progressive ideas in order to 
maintain their existing positions. The idea of Tajaddud, in fact, 
can be regarded as the social theory and political outlook of 
Khiyaban1, in which both men and women must have equal standing: 
..... it is impossible for us to make a decision 
in which the doors of revivalism become shut 
in the faces of women. . . . 113 
In other words in an oppressed society both men and women suffer 
and if we want to free the society from all sorts of injustices the 
women cannot possibly be excluded from this revival. 
1. Tajaddud, 20/2/1299 (11.5.1920). 
2. Tajaddud, 20/2/1299 (ll .5.1920). 
3. Tajaddud, 27/3/1299 (18.6.1920). 
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CONCLUSION 
Khiyabani's movement in Azerbaijan was not the same as earlier 
movements in Iran. Although Khiyabani himself regarded his uprising 
as the continuation of Constitutional Revolution, nevertheless his 
movement was more radical and he wanted to change-social system. 
He wanted the people to form an independent and powerful government 
which would take notice of people's needs and aspirations. When he 
emphasised that the people could change the government if they wished 
he was, in fact, rejecting the established monarchical system. 
Khiyaban1 believed that the negative influence of foreign powers on 
Iran was the result of the existence of weak, corrupt and selfish 
kings and governments who had ignored all human rights and principles 
in Iran. The King and his governments, while depriving the people 
of every sort of freedom, were free to misuse their power by making 
unjust treaties with foreigners and receiving unnecessary loans. In 
order to bring about government by the people Khiyabani believed that 
the people must understand the meaning of freedom and independence. 
In his speeches he explained the aims of the Constitutional 
Revolution and the way in which the enemies of the Revolution 
betrayed the Revolution. He told the people what should be done in 
defence of the constitution and democracy. Khiyaban1 had learned 
that governments change in Iran but the system, the corruption and 
selfish rulers still remain, in other words that those in charge 
change but the system remains. Accordingly he wanted to change 
the system from autocracy to democracy, from an unjust society to 
a society where social justice is observed, and big land owners and 
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the rich do not have any more control over the elections and 
formation of the governments. Khiyaban1 was a patriot who 
wished the whole of Iran to be governed by a democratically elected 
government. Thus his movement was not, contrary to the assertions 
of hostile commentators and critics, a separatist movement. 
Finally Khiyaban1•s idea of Tajaddud illustrates his dialectical 
approach to society and history. He did not accept society and 
its governing laws as static and unchangeable. He regarded human 
reason as superior to all sorts of superstitions. He wished the 
peop 1 e to ·1 i ve in the present century and to face the needs and 
demands of their age with understanding and knowledge. Khiyaban1, 
while respecting the religion and traditions of the people, believed 
that these should not·be used in order to keep the people backward. 
He was a political thinker and revolutionary who opposed the court, 
the big land owners, and the statemen who exploited the people 
bodily and materially. Thus with his idea of Tajaddud Khiyaban1 
also opposed the philosophical system which supported the existing 




Internal movements in Iran in general and the uprising of 
Khiyaban1 in Azerbaijan in particular appear as the culmination 
of a long period of conflict between the court and the nation. 
Khiyabani•s uprising was in fact the continuation of the 
constitutional revolution, during which not only did the 
established institutions not change, but in the name of 
constitution itself the court continued its despotism. As a 
result the people gained nothing from the achievements of the 
constitutional revolution. 
The uprising of Khiyaban1 once more proved that there existed 
close links and co-operation between internal reactionaries in the 
form of the government, big land owners and big businessmen, and 
foreign imperial powers, in this case Britain, who could not afford 
to see any uprising which might threaten their vested interest. 
During and after the October Revolution of 1917 which resulted in 
the fall of the Tsarist regime the ruling class in Iran and Britain, 
in order to keep the existing system intact and save it from the 
influence of Bolshevism, attempted to prevent any democratic 
movement in Iran in general and Khiyaban1's movement in Azerbaijan 
in particular. They were determined not only to suppress any 
uprising in Iran but also to scrap all the achievements of the 
Constitutional Revolution. Britain, who at the beginning of the 
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Constitutional Revolution supported the revolution against Tsarist 
Russia, now finding her position and interests in Middle East 
threatened by Bolshevik influence, moved against the defenders 
of the Constitutional Revolution. 
The Anglo-Russian agreements of 1907 and 1915 divided Iran 
between these two powers; the outbreak of World War I brought more 
intervention by foreign countries in the form of Turkish, German, 
Russian and British troops in Iran. Although Iran had declared 
its neutrality, she became a battlefield of the countries involved 
in the war. The evacuation of Iran by the Russians in 1917 and 
the end of the war gave a chance to Britain to reassert her influence 
in Iran. The movements which took place between 1916-1920 in Iran, 
were essentially democratic, anti-imperialistic and based on the 
~ 
principles of Constitutional Movement which Khiyaban1 supported and 
defended all along. 
The agreement of 1919 between Iran and Great Britain is the 
manifestation of this policy of collaboration between the Iranian 
ruling class and Britain. Khiyaban1•s uprising must be understood 
in the context of this period in general and against the 1919 
agreement in particular and the collaboration of internal forces 
and Britain against Khiyabani and other democratic forces during 
this period is worthy of study. In this work we have attempted to 
show social conditions in Iran before and during the Constitutional 
Movement under despotic rulers on the one hand and the rivalry 
and co-operation of Britain and Russia in Iran on the other, and 
the role of these forces and people in regard to Constitutional 
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Revolution. In order to show the role of foreign powers in 
Iran, particularly against the constitutionalists and democratic 
movements, we have discussed the Russian invasion of and involvement 
in Tabriz, and have attempted to record the impressions and reactions 
of Khiyabani to these events. 
To turn to the following period, contrary to the central 
government propaganda none of the movements which took place 
between 1919-1921 were either communist or separatist but were 
directed against any external intervention and internal reactionary 
forces. Khiyabani 1 s uprising started while the corrupt and despotic 
Iranian king, A~mad Shah and his government were in power. 
Khiyaban1 1 s uprising had the main aims of halting the reactionary 
and anti-constitutional activities of such men as Vu~uq al-Dawla and 
putting the constitutional laws into practice and preparing people 
to create a free and an independent country where freedom would be 
the fundamental basis for advanced ideas which could improve the 
life of Iranians. 
In order to be successful in this task Khiyabani wanted to 
establish an intellectual and political movement in Azerbaijan and 
to reform the administration in Tehran where corrupt and reactionary 
elements ruled the country in the name of the government. The 
government managed to label Khiyaban1 and his uprising a separatist 
movement. We have attempted to show that these charges against 
Khiyabani were unfounded and false. Khiyabani not only did not 
wish to co-operate with a foreign power; on the contrary, he 
threatened those who wished to interfere in the internal affairs of 
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Iran nor did he wish to co-operate with either the local 
reactionary groups or the corrupt central government. Khiyaban1 
might have been successful if he had accepted the help of the 
Bolsheviks, but although he knew that this would have strengthened 
his position and most likely would have made his uprising 
successful, he refrained from doing so and relied only on his own 
native resources in Azerbaijan. In this decision he was motivated 
by his consistent and deeply rooted idea that revolution and 
national revival should be generated, grow and develop within a 
particular society and among its people. For this reason we 
have regarded him a nationalist democrat and patriot who, while 
respecting the progressive ideas of other countries, believed that 
Iran can be freed only by her own democ~atic forces and by the 
political awareness of the people. He backed his political uprising 
with his philosophy of revival which was again based on his conviction 
that political mobilisation and uprising must be home-based. There 
were two forces in the society of his time; one was the 
traditionalists who regarded theirt.-aditiohs as final word and 
disregarded reason and human experience. Khiyaban1 belonged to the 
other group who believed in human reason and experience; that man 
is a creative being and is able to direct his own life and society 
without relying on superstition and supernatural powers. His idea 
of Tajaddud is in fact the recognition of man's dignity, creativity 
and originality as a maker of history. By his philosophy that we 
have to train ourselves for the present and teach people to 
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understand their own problems in society Khiyabani, in fact, opposed 
the closed body of traditional knowledge which was exclusively in 
rea ctiona ~"")' 
the hands ofJreligious leaders, who backed the existing system by 
keeping the people ignorant of the creative and intellectual part 
that they could play. Thus his revivalism was essentially based 
on politically enlightened people without whom the struggle could 
not succeed. He knew that despotic rulers are more afraid of 
the speeches of thinkers than the bullets of freedom fighters, and 
that they plot day and night against such thinkers in order to 
silence them. 
It is perhaps appropriate to allow Khiyabani to say the last 
word on this subject. Khiyabani•s last word in regard to the 
people of Iran is still valid. He believed that if a nation has 
a united desire and conscious policy towards freedom and independence 
they cannot easily be betrayed by either politicians or kings. His 
criticism of the Iranian people, and perhaps his disappointment, is 
summarised in the following passage: 
..... The freedom and independence of a nation 
depends on this, that the meaning of success 
and failure, honour, dignity and humiliation 
must be taught from childhood. A nation 
who does not recognize the difference 
between these qualities cannot possibly 
possess a good name. The past experience 
of Iranian history should have made the 
Iranian people utterly devoted to freedom, 
independence and advance on the way of 
development and progression more than any 
other nation. But on the contrary, today 
207 
backward black Africans understand the meaning of freedom and 
independence better than us. You are always seeking for a 
cruel shepherd who will save you from the wolves and will 
finally himself cut your throat. You do not have an independ-
ent enthusiasm and driving force so that you can personally 
stand up for your rights and interest .... "1 
To conclude we may quote the text2 of a speech delivered by Jacfar 
P1shavar13 on the occasion of the unveiling of Khiyaban1's statue in 1946, 
which in some respects summarises the weaknesses as well as the strength 
of Khiyaban1 and his movement which have been discussed in the course 
of this thesis: 
11 An uprising of personalities such as ~aykh ~1uhammad Khiyaban1 secures 
a people's uprising and a nation's thoughts. If there is a pride for 
Azerbaijan the Azerbaijanis themselves and their pride secure this. The 
steps that the national leader Sattar Khan, Baqir Khan and Shaykh Muhammad - - -- . 
Khiyaban1 have taken for the sake of the Constitution will never be forgot-
ten. Any time the names of Azerbaijan and Tabriz are mentioned the 
honourable names of these leaders are mentioned. The people respected 
them in the name of Azerbaijan. We must keep their work alive foreverj The 
v1ork of Khiyaban1 in particular. If the national leader Sattar Khan 
has raised the name of Azerba i j an by arms, the 1 earned speeches of the 
Shaykh has had a more lasting effect in this respect. The Shaykh was a 
great thinker. Reading his speeches one learns fresh ideas. His words 
are very meaningful and deep. There are very few superfluous words in his 
speeches. But there are many practical suggestions. One must very 
regretfully say that Shaykh's social environment was not favourable. 
Freedom lovers had not yet been tested at that time. Hhile the Shaykh was 
struggling for his belief and ideas, among his friends, one sometimes can 
find individuals who/while working with the Shaykh,used to stab him from 
behind. I think that the uprising of Khiyaban1, no matter how it ended, 
has a great importance in Iran. Our movement is the continuation of his 
uprising. The Shaykh was not able to express our demands very openly, 
1. Tajaddud, l/6/1299 (24.8.1920). 
2. Yirm1 B1r -Azar (Nutqlar va r~aqalalar) Sayyid Jcafar Pishavar1, op.cit., 
pp. 1 06-11 0.-
3. Sayyid Jcafar P1shavar1, leader of the Democratic Party and government 
of Azerbaijan 194;-1946 in Tabriz. 
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because the atmosphere at that time did not allow him. Looking at the 
Tajaddud newspaper, \•le can see this clearly. The Shaykh always used to 
respect the name of Azerbaijan in his own speeches. The people of 
Azerbaijan is itself a special nation. Even at the beginning of the 
Constitutional Revolution, Mu~affar al-01n Shah in his telegram addressing 
the Azerbaijanis, mentioned the national assembly of Azerbaijan. Kasrav1 
also, although he has certain negative thoughts in regard to the Azerbaijan 
movement, nevertheless the history which he has written shows that the 
people of Azerbaijan in fact has always kept its own qualities and in truth 
it itself is a nation. The environment in which the Shaykh lived did not 
allow him to express these things openly. What the Shaykh was saying was 
an introduction to our demands. Now we have eternalized the memory of 
three great characters. From the point of view of bravery Sattar Khan was 
a hero. He did not give himself up to the enemy. But from the point of 
view of thought, ideas and kno\~Jledge the Shaykh has an extremely high 
position. Sattar Khan was brave. The Shaykh while having that quality 
also possessed a state of scholarship. Perhaps the ~aykh was not a mili-
tary man but he used to encourage the riflemen. The Shaykh was well known 
before the uprising. His speeches were very famous. Especially during 
the constitution, at the time of reactionary developments in the t·1ajl is, 
the Shaykh's speeches against the reactionary forces were strong and logical. 
Regrettably we must say that he was alone. One can say that it was like 
coming across with a flower in an arid desert. The Shaykh was one of these 
flowers. This movement was limited to the Shaykh and the people around him. At 
that time evea·the Shaykh could not trust those around him because there vJere 
traitors and they used to appear. This became more clear later, especially 
after Ri za Khan took power. As I have said the Shaykh \vas 1 i ke a flower in 
a dry desert. There were very few people in that society who could understand 
the whole meaning of the Shaykh's speeches. The Shaykh himself felt this. 
In his own speeches he always talked about unity, discipline, and sincerity. 
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This was because a number of the people behind him were not trustworthy 
people. One of the weaknesses of the ~ay~•s time was lack of organization. 
It is true that the Firqa existed at that time but the Firqa_ in the meaning 
that we understand it did not exist. The government was encircled by re-
actionaries. In addition one of the weaknesses of this movement was this, 
that the movement was named after the Shaykh alone. The Shaykh was alone 
at that time and used to attend to everything himself and had to answer 
telegrams and letters himself. Because of this, that movement soon dis-
appeared. If there had been a strong organization the movement would not 
have disappeared so rapidly. We must add this that the Shaykh believed a 
little bit in the reactionaries. He used to say that it was possible that 
~ajjy Mu~bir al-Sal~ana was a democrat. If the Shaykh had known this 
person well he probably would not have met his death so easily. 
Moreover, after World War I the treachery of Vu~uq al-Dawla made people 
lose trust in political organizations. At that time Democrat Firga was 
divided into two parts. Vu~uq al-Dawla had deceived a number of freedom 
lovers and a number of people such as Sayyid ~iya' al-D1n and Malik al-Shucara 
Bahar. Because of this they became misled and corrupted. Certain acts were 
the result of their corruption. Riza ~an•s coming to power was a result of 
this. As we have said they made people lose their trust in political organ-
izations by creating division among them. Our movement succeeded because of 
our strong organization and discipline. As a result of our strong discipline 
and our service to the people we have been able to increase the trust of people 
towards our party. In our first congress we decided that anybody who betrayed 
the Firqa would be executed. This had a great effect. It is true that 
various small things happened but they have been disclosed. The people oppose 
such persons and remove them from power. One of the reasons for the success 
of our movement is this, that we have made the thoughts of our people a mirror 
for ourselves. We act according to the wishes of the people. They could 
not do this at the time of the Shaykh. During the time of the Shaykh no step 
was taken towards reform in six months. The present democratic movement of 
Azerbaijan, contrary to the past, requires action every minute. 
In regard to development of our towns, serious actions have been taken: new 
streets are being opened, new buildings are built, the streets of our cities 
are being asphalted. These have great importance on the way of development. 
By this way the cleanliness of the cities is being secured. Besides from 
the propaganda aspect it has a great importance. Nowadays those foreign 
political personalities who visit us see that we are truly working. They are 
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really seeing that we are doing new things. 
We set up statues of our heroes. We bring their works to life. In 
this way we wish to show that the people respect those who have sacrificed 
themselves for them. Setting up statues of Sattar Khan, Baqir Khan and 
Shay~ Mu~ammad Khiyaban1 encourages the people and creates the feeling of 
freedom and patriotism in them. Since the Constitutional Movement, the 
district of Davach1 has been called the district of reactionaries, but 
this is not true. No attention has been paid to it. No place can be 
reactionary by itself especially a working class district like Davach1. 
We are now building schools in Davach1. Now our newly built schools are 
visited from morning until evening by five hundred people. They show more 
interest because in the near future their children will be educated in them. 
The people see this and believe in our Firqa and follow us. The reform 
that has taken place in our villages did not take place in the Shaykh's time. 
Besides when the Shaykh delivered speeches the people used to gather round 
him and show their feelings. The Shaykh used to believe them, but their 
feeling being momentary used to disappear as soon as they returned home. 
The spirit and feeling of freedom must be awakened and strengthened. To 
do this a condition and atmosphere must be created and the feeling of the 
people must be utilized, and for this the existence of strong and powerful 
organization is essential. Such an organization that the atmosphere which 
it creates must produce steady and dignified freedom lovers. Because there 
was not such an organization at that time, such a favourable a~mosphere did 
not come to existence. 
These things do not lessen the great personality of Shaykh Muhammad -- . 
~iyaban1. We must learn from this experience. Now our condition is better 
than any part of Iran. Now something is happening in Sh1raz and Khuzistan 
and other parts of the south. We regard it too early to express our views on 
this matter. At the proper time the Firqa will express its views. We are 
sure that whichever side we support that side will win. 
There is a great difference between our movement and that of Khiyaban1. 
In Khiyaban1's movement the people did not struggle under the leadership of a 
disciplined organization. But at the present movement the Azerbaijan Democrat 
Party leads us by a strong discipline and possesses great power. 
Our Firga attracts the confidence of the people and guides it by correct 
tactics. Our people offer their duties to their national heroes by erecting 
their statues and tombs which are worthy of their sacrifices. This action at 
the same time shows that the people and those who make sacrifices in the 
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A) ~iqat al - Islam and eight other freedom fighters being hanged 
by Tsarist Russians in Tabriz 1911. (The picture is taken from 
E.G. Brownels collection (Nama ha 1 i as Tabriz)(Cambridge Library.) 
B) Sattar Khan, the leader of the Constitutional Revolution 
in Tabriz 1905-9. 
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A) Four fre edom fighters being hanged by Tsarist Russians in 1911. 
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B) Yusuf Khan-i Hu~abad1, who was cut in half by Samad Khan-i 
~ujac-;1-Dawia on Tsarist Russian orders in Tabriz 1911. 
(Are taken from E.G. Browne•s collection (Nama ha'1 as Tabriz) 
Cambridge Library.) 
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A) Sayyid Muhammad Tabataba'1, one of the founders of the . . . 
Constitutional Revolution of 1905-9. 
B) M1rza Muhammad Taqi Tabataba'1, the chairman of the Tabriz 
Anjuman in 1908-1918 (see Appendix _). 
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A) The fir st anniversary of ~iyaban1's death, celebrated by the 
Democrat Party of Azerbaijan in Tabriz 1921. (The picture 
taken from Azar1's book on Khiyaban1.) 
B) The monument to ~iyaban1 outside the ~iqat al-Islam school 




- - - - - -1 Mirza Mu~ammad Taqi ~aba~aba•i (1883-1937) was born in Tabriz. 
He studied religious subjects with his father M1rza cAl1 Aqa and 
~iqat al-Islam and attended the Luqman secondary school where he 
studied modern subjects. After his father•s death he became the 
Pishnamaz of the Aqa Machidi (Aqa Mosque) which was built by his 
father. During the Iranian Constitutional Revolution and the nine 
months of fighting in Tabriz he was active along with other freedom 
lovers. He became the chairman of the Anjuman-i Ayalati va Valayat1 
of which Khiyaban1 was a member and was a deputy for Tabriz in the 
Majlis for the fourth and fifth periods. In Majlis he was the 
member of the Social Democrat Party. He later became the 
Qaz1 La~kar (Army judge) of Azerbaijan and died at the age of 55. 
His grave is in the cemetery of Oar al-Salam in Najaf. 
l. The present author•s grandfather. 
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THE 1919 AGREEMENT 
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SECRET. I ' , .. I 
c. 199. 
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British Loan to Persia of £2,000,000 (.A. ugust 1919). 
The Anglo-Persian Agreement, with which is bound up the Agreement to grant 
to Persia a loan of i,OOO,OOOl. sterling at 7 per cent., was ~:;igned in Tehran on 
9th August 1919. 
EYer since the negotiations for the Agreement reached their concluding stages 
there has been a tendency in most quarters to urge. that advances and subsidies to 
Persia, for whatever purpose, should be made ''as advances out of the loan." 
It seems that it would be convenient to havo a\·ailable a comparison of the objects 
for which the loan was granted with those for which the various subsidie~ which it. 
is suggested might be advanced from the loan are made, and to examine the extent 
to which th~ loan has been drawn upon, and whether properly or not. 
I. TLe purposes and tnain conditions of the loan are dearly shown in the 
following extracts from the Agreement between the two Oovernn1ents and the 
Agreenu~nt relating to the loan:-
. Jg1·ecment betH:cen the Governments of Great l:h·itain and Pe1·s·ia. 
PRE ruBLE : In virtue of the close ties of friendship which ha,·e e·xi::;ted 
between the two Governments in the past, and in the conYictioil that it is in the 
essential and mutual interests of both in future that these ties should be cemented, 
and that the progress and prosperity of Persia should be prmnoted to the ntrno~t, it 
is hereby agreed between the Persian Government on the one hand, and His Britannic 
:Majesty's l\linister, acting on behalf of his Government, on the other, as follows :·--
a G B G 0 
:!. The British Government will supply, at the cost of the Persian Governlllf'llt, 
the serYices of whateYer expert advisers may, after consultation between the two 
Governments, be considered necessary for the several departments of the Per:-'ian 
.Administration. These adYisers shall Le engaged on contracts and endowed with 
adequate powers, the nature of which shall be the matter of agreement het\\'een the 
Persian GoYernn1ent· and the advisers. 
:-~. The British Government will supply, at the cost of the Persian Governmeut. 
such officers and such munitions and ertuipment of modern type as may be adjudged 
uece:-;sary by a joint conm1issiou of military experts, British and Persian, which shall 
assen1ble forthwith for the purpose of estimating the needs of Persia in respect of the 
formation of a uniform force which the Persian Government propose to create for the 
establishment and preservatiou of order in the country and on its fronti~rs. 
-l. For the purpose of fiuancjug the reforms indjcated in clauses :.: aud 3 of this 
.Agreement, the British Government offer to provide or arrange a substantial loau 
for the Persian Government, for "·hich adequate security shall be sought by the twc., 
Govenunents in consultation in. the revenues of the custnms or other sources of incom~ 
at the disposal of the Persian Go~ernment. Pending the con1pletion of negotiations 
for such a loan the British Government will supply on account of it such funds as 
may Le necessary f(;r initiating the said r~forms. 
• • • 
Agreement 1·elating to Loan of 2,000,000Z., at i per cent., redeemable in 
Tz.centy Years. . 
PHEA!\[BLE : Contract between the British Government. and the Persian 
GoYen1ment with reference to an agreement concluded this day between the said 
Governments. It is agreed. as follows :-
.. A.rticle I.-The British Government grant a loan of 2,000,000Z. sterling to the 
Pe.rsian Government, to be paid to the Persian Government as. required in such 
instalments and at such dates a~; mav be indicated bv the Persian Government, after 
the British Financial Adviser shall h~ve taken up the duties of his office at Tehran. 
as p1·ovided for in .. the aforesaid agreen1ent. 
10 131:3 50 4.20 A 
2 ...... ~. 
1!. From these extracts it is apparent·-
(a) That thP. British Government! is conYincel1 that it is to its interegt as much n~ 
that _of the Persian Goverm~ent to promote the progrPss and prosperity of 
Pers1a. 
(b) Th~t the loan was granted for the specific pnrpose o£ financinO" such reforn1s 
1n the Persian .:\dministration and military forces as would lead towardR 
the achievement of the common interests o£ both nations. 
(c) Tha_t the l?an may pro1!erly: the_r~fore, be deYoted to the expenses of reform. 
Including the snlar1es of Bnt1sh officers lent to thE\ Persian Government 
for ath·i.ce in reform, civil and n1ilitary, aud the cost of equipment of the 
reorganised combatant forces. 
· (d) That. iust~lments of the loan cannot properly be made till the ll1·iti~h 
FmancHil Adviser has taken up his duties in Tehrun. (By lllutual 
c:on~en~ of the P.ersian Prime Minister and His l\fajesty's Minister this 
hnutat10n was disregarded in respect of an instalment of Ts . .JOO,OUO 
(l31,00UZ.) drawn in August immediately after the signature of the 
.. :\greement, partly for the purpose of securing for it nnd the reforms a 
(I good Press" in Persia.) 
III. The subsidies still paid to the Persian Government in Tehran are:-
(a) For general administrative expenditure, Ts. 350,000 ner month. This snhsidr 
is composed of ""moratorium payments, begun i~ 1915, pl·us an addition~! 
ad\"ance begun in HHS. The whole is recoverable fron1 the Persian 
Go,rernment, but. doPs not bear interest. Its object is t0 make Pt->rsian 
~overnment expenditure balance lrith receipts, whieh, without the su bsiJy, 
1t greatly exceeds. 
(h) For the maintenance of the Persian Cossack Division, Ts. 100,000 per month. 
This, which is equal to the amount found by the PP.rsian Government 
111onthlv for the maintenance of the Division, is a non-recoverable subsidY. 
It was started as n. war measure to obviate the risk of internal disturlmn~e 
which would resnlt from the dispersal of the Di,·ision as n conseque11CP of 
inability to pay it. 
1 c:) A personal payment of Ts. 15,000 a month to the Shah, to be continnP.d :;o 
loug as he keeps Vo~sugh-eu-lJowleh 's Cabinet in power. 
(d) . .:\. subsidy of Ts. 20,000 per month to the Persian Government was sanctiolled 
in June l!HD for the 1naiutenance of a force in Khorassan to guard og:ainst 
a possible Bolshc,rik invasion., \Vhat payments, if .any, have actually heen 
made i:; not dear from the information aYailnble. ( l'os~ilJ1y paymP.nt is 
m:.1de In· the Consul-General at Meshed to the Governor-General, 1n,. 
direct drawiug ou India.) ~ 
It is apparent that the above subsidies are not such as could legi timatc>)y be 
regarded a'3 adYauces out of a loan granted t.o enable a campaign of admiuis-
trati Ye reform to be earried on. Yet the second2 and the fourth 2 have been 
sanctioned, for certain periods, only on the condition that the~- are regarded as 
ad,·nnces out of the loan of ~.OCJO,OOOZ. ~ unu it is now proposed that. a similar 
sti pnlation should appiy to the first for two months at an~ rate. 
To the aboYe list should be arldeu the payment to the GovPrnm·-.General of F;JJ's 
: ,f T::-. -±5,00U (for three months at Ts. 15,000 per month) for the ma1ntenauce of tlH~ 
: :orth Tionc.l Ciuards. This f:nbsid\· was not even ·onP to tilt~ Central Government of 
Persia, and to allocate an~· portion ~f it against a loan to thn.t G~H~ernment is ubYionsly 
improper, e.xeept with the specific consent of the latter, ''"_luch ':·as, ho\~·e~:er, 1.10t 
so11ght. Yet the last authorised instalment (for three monthsJ of tlus su bs1dy, whiCh 
ha~ now lnpsed, was sanctioned only as an ach·ance out of the loan. 2 
IY. Apart from the tendency, mentioned above, to allocate as "a(h·ances out of 
the loan ·· all sorts of payments to the Persian Go\'"ernment, there has been sho_·w:n frmu 
time to time a similar tendencv to P.xpect that as soon as the lonn becomes leg1tunately 
n \·ailah)e Oll the arrival of the 'Financial .Adviser in Tehrau,3 th~ need for the varions 
::;nb:-:iJies now paid for Ynrions sen·ices will cease to e:xi:-lt. 
1 The Government of India 'vere soaptical about the .Agreement and its virtue~ throughout the 
ne'!otint.iona. 'l'he SE>creturv of Sta.t,t, i<'r India, howe>er, st.ated thn.t he did not endorHe the Go"r"eJ·rnuent 
of India.'s '"iew; nud ~·bile the GoYernment of India might with consi~toncy decline to subscribe to r.he 
!'tatemcnt of policy in the pt·eamble, it luts been nccepted by His ~fn.josty',.; Govel"Illllcnt aR n. "·hole. 
: .'r-~ Stat<>ment attnched. 
~ • ...:~f> E'::ttrnct fJ"Om "AgTeement J·elnt.ing- to the loan oi ::!,000.0001.,·• .. -\rticlc I. a.bovo. 
It is, surely, "ndnly optrmHitlc to expect that any Financial A.ch·iser, lwwever 
nble, will find it possible in less than a wonth so to reorganise Persia's revenue 
system, and so curtn.il expenditure, as oo remo\'C the existing excess of expPnditure 
over recAipts amounting t.o por;sibly Ts. tJ.70,fH>0 1 a month. Uuless the Fionueial 
Adviser is to be faced with a ta~k utterly hopeless from t.he f;tnr't, ir. is only fair to 
allow him a considerable period before expecting taugible results ; and during this 
period it will be necessary Lhat the subsidies provided for the current needs of the 
ad1ninistration should be continued-at. it may he boved, a grauually decreasing rate. 
The alteruati \'e, to which a decided inclination is apparent on the part of the Foreign 
Office--under pressure ot circumstances-is to devot.e the loan to current adminis-
trative expendjture; but this is to return to the procedure Rhowu to be irnproper 
under the terms of the Agreements, and rendered no less improper by the fact of the 
Financial Adviser's arri\'al in Tehrnu. 
V. These considerations affect principally the sn b:5idy o.f '1'::;. ~50.000 for general 
administrative purposes. \Vith the substitution uf '' Military ~lission " for '' Financial 
Adviser" they probably apply equally to th~ subsiuy for the Cossack Division, though 
for a much less period. The ~lilitary ~fission submitted on 21st March Hl20 definite 
recommendations for the. disposal of the Dh!ir:::ion, but it will presumably he at least 
on~ month before effect is given to them. 2 For th~ mo.iut.ennncc of such part of the 
Division as is to be retained the sum o! Ts. 100,000 found by the Persian Government 
monthly without outside assistance, may or may not suffice ; if it does not, a contribu-
tion fron1 the l.h·itisb Govermnent might not unnaturally be demanded by the 
Persian Government. · 
VI. If the British Government intends to follow out the policy indicated in the 
preamble to the Agreement o£ August HH9, and to endeavour to promote the progre~s 
and prosperity of Persia, the necessit.y muRt be faced of continuing to finance the 
country while the process of reform is in progress, in addition to financing the reforms 
themselYes. It is thwarting any possibility of success that t.here 1nay be to divert to 
improper uses what remains2 of the loan of 2,000,000l. ; ancl further, it is ouly fatr to 
l: the poJicy as outlined in the Agreement that t.he allocations3 u.lready improperly made 
against the loan should be cancelled. 
1 i.e., the combinn.tion of subsidies (a) (b) and (d) above. It. is perhaps fo.ir to include (b) still, for 
although the Military Mission ha.s reported a.s to the disposa.l of tu~ Cossack Ui..-Uiion, the nccesHur.r 
measures ca.n hardly be taken in o. day. 
:: 1'his wo.a written before 'l'ehran telegmm No. 190 of 9th April.l920 (F.O.Tefet-ence ~o. 191109/3-!) 
ha.d been received. 
3 See Statement a.tto.ched. 
Political Department, India Office, 
22ntl April 1020. 
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Mahd1 Qul1 Khan Hidayat (Mukhbir al-Sal~ana) was born in 1860 in 
Tehran. He was educated in Berlin and on his return was appointed 
governor-general of Sh1raz. He was elected as a deputy for Tehran 
for the fourth period of the Majlis. He then became the head of 
the Tehran General Post Office, being subsequently imprisoned for 
dishonesty while occupying this post. 1 ~iqat al-Islam says of 
Mukhbir al-Saltana; 11 He is a conservative; if he tries to introduce 
himself as a democrat, that is because he is weak, but he is an 
absolute dictator when he is in pmaJer 11 • 2 Of himself he says, 
11 my rule is neither constitutional, nor despotic, but it is closer 
to despotism because people do not understand the constitution ... 3 
Mukhbir al-Saltana became Prime Minister in 1927 and held office 
until 1933. He built a hospital, a school and a mosque in Tehran 
and published a number of historical books. One of his most 
valuable works is the Guzari~ nama-yi Iran in which he covers 
Iranian History from the beginning to the Pahlav1 dynasty. 
is Khatirat va Khatarat in which he gives a brief account of 
Khiyaban1•s movement among many other subjects. 
Saltana died in Tehran in 1946. 4 
l. See, I. Safa•1, op.cit., p.436. 
Mukhbir al-
Another 
2. See, N. Fat~1, Zindagan1-yi ~iqat al-Islam-i ~ah1d, (Tehran, 1352), 
p.50. 
3. see, R. Ra • 1 s Niya, p. ~--r . , p. 308. 
4. For fuller account see I. Safa•1, QE.cit., pp.43l-4~0. 
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SPECIMEN PAGE OF TAJADDUD, ANNOUNCEMENT OF UPRISING 
(taken from Az Sab~ ta N~m~), 
AND AZADI-SITAN STAMP 
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APPENDIX 5 
POEMS ABOUT KHIYABANI 
i> 
The following poems are extracts from the works of well known 
Iranian Poets who strongly attacked the enemies of Khiyaban1•s 
uprising and admired the patriotism and progressive views of 
Khiyaban1. 
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APPENDIX 6.' 
r~ . T • P IS Y AN 
Muhammad Taq1 Khan-i Pisyan (1891-1921) was born.in Tabriz. He 
completed his studies in the Luqman school and left Tabriz for 
Tehran where he attended army college in 1911. He served in the 
army until the outbreak~of World War I, when he joined a group of 
Iranian army men who fought against the Russians and British and 
allied themselves with the Germans. When the Ottomans with their 
German advisors were defeated in Mesopotamia, Pisyan left Iran 
for Berlin where he served in the German army until the end of 
the war. OD his return Pisyan was appointed chief of the Khurasan 
gendarmerie and during Sayyad Ziya al-Oin's premiership he was 
appointed governor-general of ~urasan, with instructions to arrest 
Qavam al-Saltana, the former governor-general of ~urasan, and send 
him to Tehran where the latter was imprisoned for some time. 
Following Sayyad Ziya al-D1n's fall, Qavam al-Saltana became the 
new Prime Minister of Iran. Qavam was now eager to retaliate 
against Pisyan, and eventually relations between Qavam and Pisyan 
became so bad (3.4.1921) that the tribes and landlords of Khurasan 
rebelled against Pisyan with the direct support of Qavam and central 
government troops. Finally a battle took place in Quchan between 
the tribesmen and followers of Pisyan in which he was wounded and 
beheaded by the local Kurds, and his short lived movement was 
completely suppressed by Qavam al-Sal~ana in Autumn 1921. Pisyan 
was a true nationalist and a brave patriot who demanded that Iran 
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should be freed from foreign influence. He was fluent in 
Turkish, French and German and interested in art and poetry. 
c - -For more details see, A. A~ari, Q.K., see also 
Y. Aryan Pur, QE.cit., Vol .2, pp.352-54; 
H. Makk1, Q£-Cit., Vol .l, pp.275-303 and M. Mujtahid1, R.A., 
pp.43-45. 
APPEND IX 7 
MUSHiR AL-DAWLA'S SPEECH IN THE MAJLIS 
Speaking of these events in the Majlis Mush1r al-Dawla made the 
following statement on 22.10.1920. 
11 First of all I apologize for taking your time by 
my speech but I am obliged to tell you what I have 
in mind: In issue No.4 of Tufan newspaper there 
is a note about the late honourable Shay~ 
Muhammad Khiyaban1 part of which concerns my . -
Cabinet. Since the reference is absolutely 
devoid of truth I think that it is necessary to 
give some explanation here for your information. 
During my time in the Cabinet all proceedings 
regarding Azerbaijan have been presented to the 
public through press statements at the proper 
time and you honourable members are aware of these 
statements. There are, however, certain new 
allegations made in the !ufan newspaper which I 
have to refute and furthermore state that I have 
no connection with the affairs of Shaykh Muhammad -- . 
His intentions and his actions in Azerbaijan prior 
to the formation of the Cabinet are nothing to do 
with me, and I have no proper information about 
them either; at that time the authorities 
knew more about the circumstances. The 
explanation, approval and condemnation of these 
problems have nothing to do with my Cabinet, but 
the part which concerns my Cabinet must be 
explained. 
2·'·<· 
In issue No.4 of the above ~entioned newspaper 
there is an article which deals with the 
Azerbaijan problem as it manifested itself 
during my Cabinet. It specially mentions 
Mu~bir al-Sal~ana, and alleges that Khiyaban1 
was insisting that Mu~bir al-Sal~ana should not 
be sent to Azerbaijan while my Cabinet and myself 
were insisting that he should go. 
This is not what happened and it is absolutely false. 
Repeated telegrams were sent for a whole month to 
~iyaban1 and the executive members of the 
insurrection committee with the knowledge of my 
Cabinet members: copies of these telegrams can 
be seen in the Cabinet of the Prime Minister 
and post office. They show that they told us 
explicitly that •we do no~ accept a governor 
general appointed by Tehran. We do not want 
the central govern~ent to interfere with 
Azerbaijan•s affairs, just give us as much 
money as possible•. 
It is obvious that all honourable deputies would 
approve of a Constitutional regime, the very same 
Constitution that Khiyaban1, according to his 
supporters, demanded should be established by our 
Cabinet. Would such a Constitution allow 
governing bodies to accept the bases and 
principals of the decentralization and division 
of Iran? We said to Khiyaban1 that Azerbaijan 
is an inseparable part of Iran. If the agreement 
is merely about who is to govern Azerbaijan then 
there is nothing to stand in the way of a solution 
to the Azerbaijan problem. After many suggestions 
and actions, we realized that they refused to listen 
to any logic and to accept any proper argument 
so we finally decided to send the governor that 
we thought suitable. 
In this newspaper the article is written in such 
a way as to imply that the plot and plan for 
Khiyaban1's death had been drawn up in the Centre. 
I deny this. When the governor left Tehran for 
Azerbaijan we were still hopeful that the late 
honourable Khiyaban1 would, in view of his robust 
common sense, take stock of the situation once 
the governor arrived and would extend the hand 
of brotherhood towards him, so that the two of 
them would work together. No plan and plot was 
drawn up here at all; the governor was also 
trying hard to solve the problem peacefully 
when he arrived. The reason that he did not 
succeed was because of an ultimatum handed to 
him by the late Khiyaban1. 
Gentlemen, the points that I am making here are not 
only based on information from official sources; 
alongside official reports I was also receiving 
private information. I was not unaware of the 
situation in Azerbaijan and I know in particular 
that when our governor arrived he showed 
exceptional patience and endurance. This 
information is from reliable and impartial 
sources; if the Majlis ever wish to investigate 
this matter then I can provide the sources of 
information in detail but I will not now mention 
them. I repeat this again - that the 
allegation about a plot, which was supposedly 
drawn up here, is incorrect because the 
problems of Azerbaijan and the late Khiyaban1 
were not so important as some people imagine, 
not so very important in the eyes of the 
government; the government was trying to solve 
the problem peacefully. 
23~ 
The government knew well that, apart from a few 
people, no one in Azerbaijan agreed with the 
dictatorship of the late Khiyaban1 and thus was 
not so desperate to find a solution to the problem 
that it was forced to draw up a plan against him. 
It was not a question of war that the Cabinet 
should waste its time on this; the aim was 
merely to let the whole business pass over as 
peacefully as possible because it was a domestic 
issue only involving Iran and Iranians. The 
governor also did his best to bring about a 
peaceful solution, but he did not succeed. When 
he arrived and received an ultimatum from Shay~ 
Muhammad Khiyaban1, he was obliged to use force . -
and enlist the help of the Cossacks; the death 
of Khiyaban1 was, as the governor states, by 
suicide. The events which took place proved 
at any rate that the government was correct in 
its view that the problem was not so important, 
for a mere 200 Cossacks were ab 1 e to· put down a 11 the 
unrest in Tabriz. If the hearts of the 
Azerbaijanis were fully with Khiyaban1 how could 
the entry of 200 Cossacks into Tabriz put an end 
to everything that was going on? Have you 
forgotten how the people of Azerbaijan supported 
Sattar Khan and how they resisted the forces 
of the central government, finally succeeding 
and becoming victorious? 
Azerbaijan who has always seen herself as the right 
and ·strong hand of Iran, Azerbaijan who shed streams 
of blood to protect the boundary and nationality of 
Iran cannot be deceived by these kind of brilliant 
words. 
A wise and perceptive man would know that 
Azerbaijan's prosperity lies only in unity and 
being part of Iran. Azerbaijanis are not 
deceived by these words, and they know that if 
Azerbaijan is separated from Iran she will not 
be able to stand on her own feet and will, 
sooner or later, become a part of some other 
country. 
My Cabinet and I in front of the Majlis and on 
the holy Qu~an take oath that we will protect 
the principles of the Constitution. Since 
our commitment was not to establish a feudal 
system in this country we have therefore done 
our duty. Now let them say whatever they like. 
I have made this statement to give information 
to the honourable members of the Majlis. After 
all what is written in the newspaper is directed 
against me in person. Since the subject is a 
personal matter I shall not waste any more of 
your time on it here, especially as I am 
not a good judge of myself. Nevertheless I 
must insist and I am sure, gentlemen, that you 
all agree with me, that my opponents outside the 
Majlis have no right to pass judgement on me. 
Any comment about me and the authorities must 
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